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Information security is fundamentally concerned with the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information assets at all times. However, given the 
ubiquitous nature of information systems and organisations’ growing reliance 
on large-scale interconnected networks; coupled with the increasing cyber-
capabilities of adversaries, and widely available sophisticated hacking tools, it 
means that the prevalence and impact of cyber-attacks will continue to rise. 
Banking and financial organisations, in particular, operate in a dynamic and 
complex environment where risk management is an endless game between 
system defenders and adversaries. Therefore, given the complexity of 
cybersecurity and different layers of risks associated with this phenomenon, it 
has attracted a lot of interests from academic researchers, the private sector 
and government institutions.  
 The problem of cybersecurity risks management in corporate 
organisations is non-trivial, hence, constructing tools that truly satisfy the 
holistic management of information security is difficult and not readily 
available. The work described in this thesis presents a multi-domain approach 
to support comprehensive security management in organisations. This global 
objective is achieved through the evaluation of compliant security model and 
how employees rationalise security behaviour while using some ISO/IEC 
27001 certified banking organisations as a regional case study. The study 
investigates the internal and contextual factors that drive individual security 
behaviour intentions. Based on the characteristics that have been proven to 
influence human behaviour, like personality traits, emotional states, 
psychosocial and cognitive capabilities, this work used values from these 
attributes in combination with security data breach reports, to develop a 
conceptual model that represents possible predictor of malicious insider 
activities. Also, in order to encapsulate the problems under consideration, this 
study explores organisations can optimise resource allocation for security 




disparities in resource allocation decisions. The work presented in this thesis 
is based on the review of existing theories that are focused on human 
behaviour within the context of information security and criminology. The 
findings from this study also identified several factors that could strongly 
project the intention to violate security protocols, and the results significantly 
increase our understanding of the elements required in support of holistic 
security management. This study has implications for security professionals 
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“If security were all that mattered, computers would never be 
turned on, let alone hooked into a network with literally millions of 
potential intruders.”  
-Dan Farmer 
 
This introductory chapter sets the tone for the rest of the thesis by presenting 
an overview of the problem, the research motivation and the research 
questions in this study. Important issues of security compliance, the insider 
threat and resource allocation for security investment are also covered in 
relation to the challenges of identifying, defending and pre-empting security 
threats in organisations. Finally, the thesis structure, scope and outlines are 










Organizations’ information systems are increasingly subjected to the risks that 
come with businesses reliance on technology, in terms of information 
processing, storage and dissemination. The digital gap between businesses 
with respect to people and systems is generally becoming ubiquitous due to 
technology advancement and the seamless human-machine interaction that 
has been integrated along the business process evolution [1]. In particular, the 
dynamics of modern-day economies, and how information is created and 
distribute requires that organisations are dependent on large-scale 
interconnected information systems, which also leads to increased cyber-risk 
exposure  [2].  
 Risk management is a critical issue for most organisations. Not only 
are organisations’ reliance on large-scale interconnected information assets 
on the increase, but the widely available sophisticated attacker tools also 
suggest that the prevalence and impact of cyber-attacks are set for a rapid 
increase as well [3]. Hence, cybersecurity is one of the most significant 
challenges facing businesses in recent times. Economic loss due to cyber-
attack is on the increase, and many businesses have been obliterated due to 
loss of intellectual assets to cybercriminals. This figure is set to grow 
exponentially, according to the study conducted in [4] which enunciated that 
by 2020, losses from cyber-attack may hit the $20 trillion mark. In a different 
report [5], studies conducted to quantify the actual and potential value of 
losses as a result of successful system breaches are put in the region of $500 
million and $5 billion per year in the USA alone. Therefore, the importance of 
risk management cannot be overemphasised.  
 Information security management policies are often difficult to be 
successfully implemented because significant issues of diffused liability and 
incentives are not appropriately distributed. Information systems exploitation 
is not always a consequence of technical or policy failure, but often due to the 
lack of balanced incentives between the designers and users of such systems  
[6]. Despite managements’ efforts to protect organisation data, problems of 
identity theft, database breaches and stolen passwords continue to be the 
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crucial challenges faced by corporate organisations and government agencies 
[7]. In today’s cyber battle, an agent’s elevated access to information and 
services creates potential vulnerability to the system, signifying possible 
issues of malicious insider activities. One of the most significant challenges 
faced by organisations is system misuse by trusted insiders, whose actions are 
deeply rooted in non-compliance. It is one thing for organisations to meet the 
demands of regulatory standards, but it is a different challenge to enforce 
compliance behaviour within a workforce. As suggested in the relevant 
literature, insiders are the weakest link in organisations’ security efforts 
[8],[9]; a system is more susceptible to insider threats exploitations compared 
to exploitations due to failures of technical and procedural measures. Thereby, 
implying that the most considerable threats come from insiders. Lack of 
compliance by employees to information security policies is claimed to be 
responsible for more than half of information systems security breaches [10]. 
It is often difficult for organisations to balance the psychological, incentive and 
communication need of employees as they interact with information systems, 
due to the complex nature of human behaviour. If all end users are rational, 
cybersecurity will be a straight game between defenders and attackers of 
information assets.  
 There are a lot of fundamental issues associated with risk evaluation, 
reporting and mitigation in the cybersecurity domain. The problem of 
cybersecurity risks management in corporate organisations is non-trivial, 
hence, constructing tools that genuinely satisfy every aspect of risk 
management and measurement theory is difficult; but also not readily 
available [11]. Information security is fundamentally concerned with the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information assets at all times. In 
order to defend against threats to information assets, organisations invest in 
countermeasures, however, as the number of assets to be protected grows and 
IT budgets are constrained, there is a need for careful evaluation of 
information security investments [12]. As firms’ vulnerability to cyber-attacks 
increases, so is the need for further investment in cybersecurity enhancement 
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measures. Security managers can effectively reduce the potential and 
probability of loss to cyber rogues by reinforcing firms’ cyber capabilities [13].  
 Finally, cybersecurity risk management is not only confined within the 
elements of compliance and the insiders’ problem but also include the issues 
associated with optimum resource allocation for security investment. These 
three elements are valid problems as identified in the literature review in 
chapter two and form the basis of this study. 
 Overview of the Research Problem 
An organization’s continual effort to reinforce its cyber resilience and the 
unique challenge posed by malicious insiders, borders on issues that 
encompasses different loosely coupled variables; people, process, regulation 
and resources. Even more so, constructing tools to address these issues often 
involve several controls like technical, procedural, formal and informal 
solutions, which are difficult to apply in large and complex systems  [14]. In 
reality, what constitutes information security risk, is relative to an 
organisation risk acceptance level. However, in most cases, security managers’ 
priority is to mitigate organisational risk exposure that could undermine the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of mission-critical systems at all 
levels.  
 Apart from huge financial losses to organisations, a security breach 
can lead to sanctions from industry regulators, negative corporate image, and 
loss of confidence in clients and customers [15]. A classic example is the case 
of TalkTalk, the UK communication giant that was hacked in 2015. Personal 
details of nearly 157,000 TalkTalk customers were accessed through a basic 
SQL injection attack on the company website. More than 15,000 personal 
account numbers and sort code were also stolen. The impact of cyber-attack is 
reported [16], [17] to have cost the company £42m, loss of over 100,000 
customers and a fine of £400,000 for the data breach by the Information 
Commission Office (ICO). The ICO claimed that hacks could have been 
prevented if TalkTalk had implemented basic cybersecurity measures to 
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safeguard its customers’ data. This shows that the problems associated with 
security compliance are still valid. 
 There are many drivers that can be considered when implementing 
organisations’ Information Security Management System (ISMS); some of 
which can be evaluated from the perspective of compliance (focusing on 
regulations), insider threat (focusing on people) and security investment 
decisions (focusing on resources). In terms of regulations and standards like 
the ISO/IEC27001 Standard for best practices in ISMS, which outline general 
requirements for safeguarding organisations information assets. It defines the 
baseline requirements and controls for the assessment of ISMS, under the 
principle of confidentiality, integrity and availability [18]. However, the 
problem with Standards and security guidelines is that the thought process of 
system adversaries is not necessarily addressed. There seem to be a more 
concerted effort on the implementation of physical, policy and technical 
measures to mitigate anticipatory threats [19]. Furthermore, some of the 
previous research on this subject [20] also identified that Standards come with 
a predetermined set of guidelines for compliance. However, the size and need 
of organisations vary when it comes to protecting IT infrastructure. Different 
organisations require different security treatments. Hence, the one-cap-fits-all 
approach entrenched in Standards may undermine the effectiveness of 
security by compliance. Yet, this command-and-control approach is still taken 
by a large number of organisations [21]. Even much so, Standards are based 
on the principle of deterrence, which expects that employee’s behaviour fits 
within a certain frame of reference [22],  whereas, policies and procedures are 
behaviour oriented, and there is no absolute certainty that people always do 
as told. Therefore, security stakeholders always strive to know what the key 
drivers for non-compliance are. 
 In terms of Malicious Insiders, the dawn of web 3.0 (semantic web) 
and the mobile workforce also brings along a radical dimension to 
organisations information security problems. Insider threat manifests when 
agents’ behaviour is contrary to regulatory policies and guidelines. It refers to 
harmful acts that a trusted employee may carry out to undermine the 
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confidentiality, integrity and availability of information assets [23]. Currently, 
there is no complete, effective and systemic method developed to address 
cybersecurity challenges [24]. Although, a lot of academic contributions have 
identified the central role of insiders in any fortified and secured environment, 
as stated in section 1.1, but the number of attempts to address human factors 
in cybersecurity is quite low despite the evidence suggesting that a malicious 
insider exhibits observable ‘concerning behaviour’   in advance of an exploit 
[24]. The problem space of insider threat continues to be valid, and 
researchers still seek answers to these problems [25]. 
 In terms of resource allocation for cyber risk investment, it is difficult 
to estimate the financial impact of the insider problem because a lot of 
organisations fail to report insider misuse  [26]. In addition, incentivising 
security investment is hard, partly because stakeholders’ perspectives on how 
to manage organisations cybersecurity initiative often differs when it comes 
to incentives and business motives. The perverse incentive has implications in 
many aspects of information security especially when those entrusted with the 
protection of information systems are not the ones that bear the consequences 
of security failure [27]. Hence, the challenge is how to design a system that can 
support security managers when making a business case for security 
investment. The problem areas of this work are focused on organisation 
security management challenges in respect to; information security 
compliance, predicting insiders’ intention to violate security protocols and 
optimisation of resource allocation for organisations’ cybersecurity 
investment. 
 Research Motivation  
The three motivation elements of this work are based on factors that may 
undermine the cyber risk management of corporate organisations. Over the 
past decade, I have been actively involved in risk assessment as part of my 
studies and work. My Master’s thesis was based on risk assessment for critical 
infrastructures; where risk management is evaluated against the backdrop of 
standardisation and automated software. The motivation for the current study 
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centres on distinct areas that supports a more holistic approach to security 
management. The literature review is therefore confined to the scope of the 
research motivation, from which research gaps are identified, and research 
questions are developed. In the following sub-sections, each element is briefly 
discussed to set the tone for the rest of the thesis. 
1.3.1 Security Standards and Compliance 
The first motivation for this study stems from the directives issued to all 
banking organisations in Nigeria by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). The 
CBN is the apex bank responsible for monitoring, reforming and regulating the 
activities of banks and other financial institutions in Nigeria [28]. The CBN 
mandated that all Nigerian banks must be ISO/IEC 27001 certified by 
December 2015 or run the risk of sanctions. The certification is mostly 
conducted by third-party accredited assessors, and the Ultima Risk 
Management (URM) [29], a UK risk management company, conducted the 
certification process for most of the Nigerian banks. Hence, by the end of 2015, 
all the major banks in Nigeria have been ISO/IEC 27001 certified. 
 If an organisation complies with policy, law, regulation or a legally 
binding necessity identified with information security, then the organisation’s 
information security program may suggest that is consistent with all the 
prerequisites of compliance. The fundamental benefit of certification and 
compliance is that it provides the confidence that there is no omission in any 
element of risk assessment; and that the industry security standard 
requirements are observed [30]. Therefore, saving the organisation from the 
security incidents, corporate reputation damages and penalties from the 
industry regulators, should a security breach occur [15]. It is therefore 
interesting to understand in a regional context, how organisation compliance 
influences security behaviour changes in employees and the threat landscape 
at large. Hence, the first motivation for this study is to explore the adequacy of 
compliance-based security in banking organisations, which also helped form 
the first research question discussed in section 1.4 of this thesis. 
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1.3.2 Malicious Insider Threats 
Malicious insiders present a unique form of security challenge for 
organisations, given that insiders often have privileged access to critical 
assets; that make them the most serious security threat [23]. Insiders also 
constitute the most expensive form of a security breach, and the trend is set to 
increase significantly, despite organisations and government institutions’ 
efforts on security tools and policy enforcement. [31]. 
 In banking and financial organisation, the complexity of the operating 
environment and business processes is tied to critical information assets such 
that when adversaries carry out attacks, the effects often have colossal impacts 
on the organisation in terms of the loss of time, capital, human resources, 
reputation and competitive advantage [32]. Therefore, banks are under 
constant pressure to ramp up security; and banking organisations are more 
likely to upscale cybersecurity spending by a third, compared to non-financial 
organisations [33]. However, in situations where an employee already gains 
the trust of an organisation and has authorised access that bypasses most 
physical and electronic security measures, then the effectiveness of 
organisations’ security effort is considerably influenced by insiders [34]. 
Thereby, suggesting that when it comes to deliberate and malicious activities, 
most organisations are ill-equipped to detect or prevent security violations 
from happening [35].  
 The motivation for this element of the current study is to assess how 
the factors that connect security protocols violation can be used to model and 
analyse a scenario for the prediction of malicious insider activities; as part of 
the holistic approach to security management. The insider problem discussed 
in the literature review chapter helps to form the second research question. 
The second research question is also developed as a direct consequence of the 
first research question, presented in section 1.4 of this report. 
1.3.3 Resource Allocation for Information Security Investment 
The priority of a security manager is to mitigate risk exposures that could 
undermine the organisational confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
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mission-critical systems. Although, there is evidence of increased likelihood of 
cyber threats for organisations [31], and in response, organisations are also 
likely to upscale security spending [33]. When an organisation operates on a 
small or medium scale, threat exposure is still imminent, but it is 
comparatively easier to maintain and assign resources for information 
security investment.  However, as organisation scales up and the number of 
assets to be protected grows in the face of constrained IT budgets, there will 
be a point where a careful evaluation of information security investments will 
become apparent. However, an optimal level of resource allocation for security 
investment is often affected by intrinsically uncertain variables, leading to 
disparities in incentives and resource allocation decisions [36]. Top 
management in organisations may be unwilling to invest in security in the 
absence of incentives [37], while security managers may consider all risk 
facing targets deserving of proportionate security investment. 
 The motivation for this element of work is to explore how these 
disparities can be reduced within the context of information technology, and 
as part of a holistic security management. The research motivation and 
findings from the literature review also help form the third research question 
discussed in section 1.4 of this thesis. 
  Research Question 
This thesis addressed three primary research questions as a way of 
contributing to the body of knowledge. The research questions are developed 
after an extensive literature review discussed in chapter two, the brief 
explanations presented in this section is to allow the reader to have a snapshot 
of the thesis narratives. The research questions are presented again with a 
detailed approach to how each question is addressed in chapter three 
(research design). 
 
RQ1: “Is security by compliance adequate for the protection of 
organisation information assets?” 
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Most organisations adopt security standards for the protection of information 
systems, but when compliance is evaluated against security, the assumption is 
that compliance is substantially less demanding to quantify, but easier to 
justify in the event of a security breach. Therefore, compliance in isolation is a 
diversion from actual security. Is the assertion that compliance does not 
equate security true?  
 The reader may ask why this question is considered important, the 
response to it is that even though the problem domain that the research 
question stems from is not novel, the reality is that the problem is still valid 
and compliance gap still exists. 
 
RQ2: “How can we profile malicious insiders by aggregating risk 
indicators from unrelated risk domains and safeguard security protocol 
violations?” 
Malicious insider activities are difficult to lock down, given that insiders 
already reside behind the organisation firewall. Based on the review of insider 
threat to organisations, including data breach reports, individual personality 
traits and behavioural theories from academic literature; can we use the 
knowledge to suggest how insidious and hard to articulate form of insider 
security protocol violation can be addressed? 
  
RQ3: “How can we address the issue of misaligned incentives and improve 
resource allocation decisions for cybersecurity investments?” 
The challenges of resource allocation for the protection of organisation 
cybersecurity initiative is underpinned by the uncertainty in the budgeting 
process and the ability to forecast with any accuracy, the impact of a breach.  
Therefore, security resource allocation process is subjective and appeals 
differently to the risk appetite of significant stakeholders. How can we reduce 
the disparities associated with the process of security breach-cost estimation 
and improve security resource allocation decisions? 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
11 
 
 Thesis structure 
The rest of this thesis is divided into three broad categories under section one, 
two and three. A graphical illustration of the research flow is shown in Figure 
1.1 to capture the research process. Section one presents the extended 
literature review for this work, which helps pave the way for the research 
questions addressed in this thesis. In chapter two, the literature review is 
carried out to identify various gaps in the literature, especially in the areas of 
compliance, insider threat and information security investment. The gaps in 
the literature help clarify and refine the initial research questions. The 
research design and methodology are described in chapter three. It clarifies 
how research approaches, simulations and tools are applied to each of the 
research questions, and how the questions are addressed concerning the gaps 
in the literature review. The first research question is addressed in chapter 4 
and chapter 5; the second research question is addressed in chapter 6, and 
chapter 7, the third and final research question is addressed in chapter 8. 
Section three covers the conclusions and suggestions for future work. The 
chronological order of the thesis structure and a brief description of each 
chapter is as follows: 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the research and presents a generic background 
leading to the problem statement and the motivation for this research. 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 
Chapter 2 presents the fundamentals and a brief overview of information 
security. It covers an extensive review of the literature on the three distinct 
areas of this work; standards and compliance, malicious insider threats and 
resource allocation for security investment. The review helps to identify the 
gaps in literature with respect to the domains of interest. 
Chapter 3. Research Design 
This chapter introduces the design adopted for this work by linking the 
research questions to the research methodology. It also describes how 
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primary and secondary data were obtained for quantitative analysis, 
simulation and modelling in this work.  
Chapter 4. Security by Compliance and The Implications for Banking 
Organisations 
This chapter answers the first research question based on a quantitative 
analysis of survey data obtained from banking organisations as a regional case 
study. It also covers how relevant theories help explain the quantitative 
analysis of survey data, to arrive at a conclusion on the implications of security 
by compliance in banking organisations. 
Chapter 5. Exploratory Study of Compliance-Based Information Security 
Management in Banking Organizations 
This chapter also contributes to answering the first research question by 
building on and extending the approach adopted in chapter 4, then using the 
Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) to explain our 
results. The compliance survey data obtained from banking organisations, the 
application of neutralization theory, and security scenario effects are 
combined to form security compliance hypotheses for this work. The chapter 
also helps to answer the question of why employees’ violation of security 
protocols still occurs even though the organisation in which they work are 
compliant with industry security requirements. 
Chapter 6. System Dynamics Approach to Malicious Insider Cyber-Threat 
Modelling and Analysis 
This chapter helps to address the second research question by presenting a 
system dynamics approach to the modelling of malicious insider activities. The 
model takes risk indicators from different domains to analyse the interplay 
between unrelated risk factors and show how they can increase the chance of 
cyber-security incidents in banking organisations. 
  




Figure 1.1 Thesis Structure 
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Chapter 7. Malicious Insider Threat Detection: A Conceptual Model 
This chapter also addresses the second research question by presenting a 
conceptual model of malicious insider detection. The model aggregates the 
weighted values of different risk factors from unconnected domains and 
simulates the output using MATLAB. The result of the model can be used as 
part of the resources for managing organisation insider threat assessment. It 
can also be used to obtain insights about malicious insider activities, and draw 
inference about insider action during security breach investigations. 
Chapter 8. Towards Understanding the Incentives and Information Security 
Investment Decisions 
This chapter contributes to answering the third research question by 
presenting a Monte-Carlo Simulation model for resource allocation and 
security investment. In particular, it shows how using “ModelRisk”, a risk 
analysis tool and a three-point probabilistic estimate of the cost of data breach, 
can simplify cost estimation for complex asset classes in an organisation. 
Chapter 9. Research Findings and Future Work 
This chapter presents a summary of the key findings and contributions of this 
study to the body of knowledge and also touches on the areas of interest and 
suggestions for future work. 
 In this introductory chapter, the motivation for this work has been 
highlighted in three research areas of interest. It also shows how the problem 
statement links with the research motivation. The next chapter presents the 
extensive literature review for this work, leading up to the gaps in the 


























SECTION 1: INFORMATION SECURITY RISK 
MODELLING, STANDARDIZATION AND COMPLIANCE IN 
BANKING ORGANISATIONS 
 
This section introduces the preliminary part of this research by presenting the 
extensive literature review of information security risk management. The 
literature review chapter specifically focuses on compliance, malicious insider 
problems and resource allocation for security investment. The breakdown of 
this section is as follows: 
▪ Chapter 2. Literature Review 
▪ Chapter 3. Research Design  
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 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
“Securing a computer system has traditionally been a battle of wits: 




This chapter presents the extensive literature review of this study. It is a 
particularly important aspect of this thesis as it introduces the reader to 
information security risk management in general; with a focus on 
standardisations and compliance, malicious insider threat modelling and 
simulations, and resource allocation for cybersecurity risk investment. This 
chapter starts with an introduction of the current threat landscape and 
concludes with the identification of gaps in the literature with respect to the 
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 Introduction 
This thesis discusses information security in general with respect to systems, 
people and processes; as such, the term “information security” and 
“cybersecurity” are interchangeably used throughout the thesis. Although 
some academic materials highlight the difference in the two terms, suggesting 
that the two terms are not analogous [38]. Cybersecurity extends the 
boundaries of traditional information security by broadening the scope of 
attack vectors to include unknown participants and includes human targets in 
the scope of a potential victim of attacks; while information security is mainly 
about the protection of information resources and the element of the human 
factor in the security processes.  In both cases, there are scenarios involving 
two different parties; one is motivated to exploit system vulnerabilities 
(adversaries0, while the other is motivated to protect them (defenders). 
 As the interconnected and public-facing information systems 
increasingly get ubiquitous through the internet of things (IoT), so is the level 
of associated risks. In the information age, cybersecurity is considered to be 
vital to critical systems that interact with the real world in real-time scenarios 
[39],[40]; whereby the exploitation of those environments allows adversaries 
to raise the stakes significantly.  
 Adversaries ‘modus operandi’ varies a lot, depending on the level of 
attacks. At the enterprise level, through system hackers, there are adversaries 
that exploit systems for personal and financial gains or for business 
advantages. In most cases, the primary choice of weapon utilised to carry out 
malicious intent in the cyberspace is malware, through the exploitation of 
existing and emerging technologies [41]. Other forms of attack include 
different variants of ransomware attacks like the WannaCry, CryptoLocker, 
CryptoTear and Fusbo [42]. The WannaCry attack, in particular, locks up 
computers in demand of ransom which affected over 200, 000 victims across 
government organisations, companies, hospitals and more than 150 
universities [42]. At the State level, through cyber warfare, there are 
adversaries, primarily a nation-state and organised criminal gangs that are 
using cybersecurity vulnerabilities and cyber exploitations as a method to gain 
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access to networks, to potentially cause disruptions for strategic or military 
purposes. Classic example at this layer is the Stuxnet (computer worm) attack 
on the Iranian nuclear program computers, purportedly said to have been 
created by the USA [43]. There is also the case of Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attack on a number of Georgian government websites, commercial 
sites and media sites. The attacks were claimed to have been initiated by 
Russia [44]. While some organisation might not be the primary target of cyber 
warfare, their critical infrastructures like the economic system, financial 
institutions, stock exchange, water treatment plants, power grid and ATM 
systems, may provide a target of opportunity.  
 System hackers and the Nation States have the patience, the resources 
and the expertise to conduct tens of thousands of attacks on targeted systems. 
Therefore, system defenders need to embrace this new reality and begin to do 
things differently. The proliferation of systems and cyber-attacks is only going 
to increase, and there is no silver bullet to solve cybersecurity problems   [45]. 
 Security is a paramount concern for most organisations, but a secured 
environment cannot be solely based on technical tools. Therefore the human 
aspect of information security is increasingly considered to be as vital as a 
technical intervention for an overall security posture. However, the human 
dimensions in security efforts are often described as too trusting entities, such 
that even the most harden system can be breached via social engineering 
[9][45][46]. The anomalous human behaviour can be inherently complex, 
unpredictable and challenging to lockdown with a lot of cybersecurity 
instruments because the majority of the cyber defence tools are mostly 
focussed on IP addresses, ports and protocols of network security. The more 
technology integrates into our lives, so is the opportunity for the increase in 
system abuse. Technology is continuously evolving, but so are the associated 
security risks. Therefore the defence techniques to combat these threats must 
evolve as well through constant and innovative practices of cybersecurity 
awareness, investments and education [45]. 
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The rest of the literature review chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 
presents a critical review of the literature covering security standards and the 
current state of security by compliance. Section 2.3 covers a review of the 
theoretical perspective with respect to insider threats, modelling and 
simulation. Section 2.4 reviews the challenges associated with the allocation 
of resources for cybersecurity protection, touching on risk assessment and 
misaligned incentives. Section 2.5 highlight the gaps in the literature and also 
reinforces the significance of the research questions in this thesis, while 
section 2.6 summarises the chapter. 
 Information Security Standardization and Compliance  
Standardization is the process of formulating technical consensus for parties 
sharing universal values in a given context. The purpose of standards 
development is to provide support for companies and consumer of products 
and services regarding product reliability, security and quality over a given 
period [47]. Usually, standards development arises through the efforts of 
experts from scientific institutions and companies that have string together a 
detailed description that characterises particular products or services. In the 
context of the information security management system (ISMS), organisations 
engage in ways to apply industry best practices to manage risks, and most of 
the best practices are the recommendation of international standards like the 
ISO/IEC 27001 and NIST SP 800-32 [30]. The rest of this section presents the 
framework for information security standards. 
2.2.1 Framework for Information Security Standards 
Managing information security through a code of practice enable 
organisations to certify their security processes through independent 
attestations, which supports and verifies the appropriateness and soundness 
of security measures for customers, clients and industry regulators. There are 
different variants of a framework for information security good practice, 
depending on the domain of application. However, international standards are 
universal. 
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The ISO/IEC 27K Series of Standard 
ISO/IEC - The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the 
International Electrotechnical Committee (IEC) publishes the ISO 27K family 
of standards. It is a derivative of the original British Standard, which is an early 
draft of the guidelines on security management [30]. The origin of the ISO 27K 
family of standards can be traced back to the British Standard Institute BS 
7799-1 IT Security techniques code of practice for information security 
management in 1995. There is also a complimentary part BS 7700-2, which 
explicitly provide guidelines for the certification of company processes [47]. 
The ISO harmonised the British Standard with other standards like the ISO 
9001 in 2005 to develop the ISO/IEC 27001. The ISO 27000 provides the 
overview, introduction, explanation and terminology within the context of 
information security management systems. The certification standard 
ISO/IEC27001 (2005) forms the ISO27K standard foundation and requires 
that all controls, except on a firm ground of exclusion, be considered as part of 
an ISMS. Often regarded as the part two of the ISO/IEC 17799 (2005), the  
ISO/IEC27001 (2005) takes the form of recommendation, guidance and 
reference point for identifying controls needed for information systems [48]. 
The ISO/IEC 27002 comes with a catalogue of controls and code of practice for 
information security, though, ISO/IEC 27002 is currently under review, the 
review process is a regular occurrence every few years to preserve the 
relevance of the Standard in the face of dynamic and sophisticated information 
security threats. The ISO/IEC 27K family provides an area of comprehensive 
coverage that meets the risk management requirement of organisations in the 
area of business involving people, services, processes, information technology 
and physical assets [10]. The ISO/IEC Standard is robust enough to be adopted 
by both commercial and government organisations yet flexible to be used by 
small-scale organisations as well. The ISO/IEC 27001 Standard proposes 39 
control objectives and 134 measures as part of the requirements for planning, 
implementation, operation and continuous monitoring. The control objectives 
are listed in Table 2.1, categorised under nine domains and comprehensively 
described in [11].  
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 Domain  Control objectives  
Security policy  
To provide management direction and support for information security in accordance with business 
requirements and relevant laws and regulations.  
Organization of   
To manage information security within the organisation.  
information 
security  
To maintain the security of the organisation’s information and information processing facilities that 
are accessed, processed, communicated to, or managed by external parties.  
Asset To achieve and maintain appropriate protection of organisational assets.  
management  To ensure that information receives an appropriate level of protection.  
 To ensure that employees, contractors and third-party users understand their responsibilities, and are 





To ensure that all employees, contractors and third-party users are aware of information security 
threats and concerns, their responsibilities and liabilities, and are equipped to support organisational 
security policy in the course of their routine work, and to reduce the risk of human error.  
To ensure that employees, contractors and third-party users exit an organisation or change 
employment in an orderly manner.  




To prevent loss, damage, theft or compromise of assets and interruption to the organisation’s 
activities.  
 To ensure the correct and secure operation of information processing facilities.  
To implement and maintain the appropriate level of information security and service delivery in line 
with third-party service delivery agreements.  




To maintain the integrity and availability of information and information processing facilities.  
To ensure the protection of information in networks and the protection of the supporting 
infrastructure. To prevent unauthorised disclosure, modification, removal, and destruction of assets. 
To maintain the security of information and software exchanged within an organisation and with 
external entities.  
To ensure the security of electronic commerce services, and their secure use.  
To detect unauthorised information processing activities. 
 To control access to information.  
To ensure authorised user access and to prevent unauthorised access to information systems.  
To prevent unauthorised user access, compromise or theft of information and information processing 
facilities.  
Access control  To prevent unauthorised access to networked services.  
To prevent unauthorised access to operating systems.  
To prevent unauthorised access to information held in application systems.  
To ensure information security when using mobile computing and teleworking facilities.  
 To ensure that security is an integral part of information systems.  






To protect the confidentiality, authenticity or integrity of information by cryptographic means.  
To ensure the security of system files.  
To maintain the security of application system software and information.  
To reduce risks resulting from the exploitation of published technical vulnerabilities.  
 To ensure information security events and weaknesses associated with information systems are   
Information 
security   
communicated in a manner allowing the timely corrective action to be taken.  
incident 
management  





To counteract interruptions to business activities and to protect critical business processes from the 
effects of major failures of information systems or disasters and to ensure their timely resumption.  
 To avoid breaches of any law, statutory, regulatory or contractual obligations, and of any security 
requirements.  
Compliance  To ensure compliance of systems with organisational security policies and standards.  
To maximise the effectiveness of and to minimise interference to/from the information systems audit 
process.  
Table 2.1. ISO27001 Control Objectives (Disterer,2013)  
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Since 2006, The ISO/IES 27K family of standards has continued to register 
global growth rate, and according to the ISO survey report of 2016 [49], there 
is more than 20% increase in ISO/IEC 27001 certification. The United 
Kingdom currently ranks second and also accounts for about 10% of the global 
ISO/IEC 27001 certifications, only after Japan, as shown in Error! Reference s












In terms of figures, the total number of ISO/IEC 27001 certificates issued 
globally as of 2016, is just under 3500 as shown in Figure 2.1. The chart shows 
the consistent growth rate of certification from 2006 to 2016, and Japan is in 
the lead with 8,945 certifications. Japan plays a significant part in the global 
certification process because Japanese businesses are mandated to hold an 
ISO/IEC 27001 certificate [50]. The compliance requirement to the ISO/IEC 
27001 certification is often domain specific as in the case of Nigeria, whereby 
ISO/IEC 27001 certification for all Nigerian banks and financial institutions 
were mandated by the CBN. Certification of ISMS that aligns with ISO/IEC 
27001 not only project a positive image of security compliance to businesses 
but also offer a way to demonstrate the readiness to provide IT services in a 









United States of America 1115 
Taipei, Chinese (Taiwan) 1087 
Spain 752 
Netherlands 670 
Table 2.2. Country rankings based on the overall ISO certificate 
issued (ISO, 2017) 
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Standards and Frameworks within the context of information systems are not 
limited to the ISO 27K suites alone. Although not extensively reviewed for this 
work, there are other security frameworks like the Risk Management Guide for 
Information Technology Systems ‘The NIST special publication (SP) 800-37’, it 
is a US government standard developed by the National Institute of Standards 
& Technology (NIST) [51]. The Risk Management Guide is a qualitative and 
comprehensive risk assessment tool designed for skilled security analysts and 
technical experts to conduct risk management. NIST follows nine distinct steps 
of threat evaluation processes: 1) System Characterization 2) Threat 
Identification 3) Vulnerability Identification 4) Control Analysis 5) Likelihood 
Determination 6) Impact Analysis 7) Risk Determination 8) Control 
Recommendations and 9) Result Documentation [51]. Other frameworks 
include the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) [52], the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) [53], the Control 
Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT) [54] and the 
Gramm-Leach Bliley Act (GLBA) [55], just to mention a few.   
  
Figure 2.1. Number of ISO27001 certificates issued globally (Irwin, 2017) 
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Figure 2.2. PCDA Model applied to ISMS processes (BSI, 2002) 
2.2.2 The PCDA Compliance Model 
The ISO/IEC27001 is an international standard for best practices for 
Information Security Management Systems (ISMS), which outline 
comprehensive requirements for safeguarding organisation information 
assets. It defines baseline requirements and controls for organisation risk 
assessment [56]. It is imperative that, for an organisation to meet its ISO/IEC 
27001 requirements it must develop its Information Security Management 
Systems (ISMS) in line with a process model known as the Plan-Do-Check-Act 
(PCDA) model. The PCDA model ensures that the documentation, 
reinforcement and improvement of organisation best practices evolve with 
time [57]. The overall process covers three distinct stages as illustrated in 
Figure 2.2, where the model takes an input based on information security 
requirement and expectations; then produces an output of a managed 
information security. In-between the input and output, the PCDA model 
process goes through the development, maintenance and improvement cycle 










The plan phase: This phase ensures that the scope and context of ISMS are 
established correctly and takes into account plans to identify security risks as 
well as appropriate treatment for each risk. Basically, the planning phase 
covers information security policy, scope of the ISMS, risk identification, 
assessment and treatment plan.  
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The Do Phase: This cycle implements and promotes selected controls for the 
management of information security risk, in line with all decisions, taken in 
the planning phase. This phase covers resource training and awareness, and 
risk treatment. 
The check phase: This cycle is designed to check the effectiveness of controls 
and ensuring that they are working as expected; and if such controls are found 
to be inadequate either as a result of the change to the scope or assumption of 
security assessment, then necessary corrective actions are determined. The 
check phase covers routine checking, management review, ISMS audit and 
trend analysis. 
The Act Phase: This phase is concerned with the regular improvement of the 
information collected during the check phase in order to maintain effective 
ISMS. The purpose of this phase is to take appropriate action based on the 
result of the check phase activities. In fact, any non-conformity issues, i.e. 
failure or absence to implement any of the requirements of ISMS is acted upon 
by taking corrective action in the Act Phase. 
2.2.3 Information Security Cultural Framework 
Organisation culture is described as the shared norms, values and attributes 
of an organisation that forms the basis for a sense of shared purpose, and 
sustain connections among people, processes and policies. It suggests that the 
management and governance of security are most effective when they 
integrate into the culture of organisational behaviour and actions [58].  
 In respect to risk culture, however, Information security culture is the 
ability to collectively harmonise the norms, values and attributes of 
individuals or groups within the organisation and operate subconsciously to 
identify, understand and act on current and future risks [59]. Organisation 
security culture is one of the well-researched areas of IS, and a number of 
studies recognised the need for creating security culture [60], [61]–[63] where 
employees have the attitude, skill and knowledge to support information 
security objectives.  
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Many discussions on the topic suggest how to make the culture of security 
consciousness come naturally to employees while performing their jobs. 
Information security culture should be all-encompassing, such that it 
compliments technical security measures put in place by organisations while 
remaining ubiquitous to the daily activities of employees [64]. There are 
significant linkages between effective security culture in organisations and the 
performance of information security governance as described in an empirical 
study [65]. The study suggests that while not focusing entirely on definitions 
that describes the manifestation of information security culture, the factors 
and attributes that conceptualises the idea of information security culture are 
equally important. There is a strong emphasis on security culture as a factor 
that encourages secure behaviour [9], it is described as the stage between the 
Gulf of evaluation (influencing factor) and the Gulf of execution (sustaining 
factor). 
 
The intention to violate security protocols transcends some progressive stages 
before the intention actually translates to either secure or insecure behaviour. 
Figure 2.3 shows the antecedent of secured behaviour, starting with the Gulf of 
Evaluation where an employee cultivates behavioural intention and evaluates 
some precautionary steps like awareness and response cost. Then there is the 
Gulf of Execution where the employee carries out the intention to violate 
protocol. However, the Gulf of execution also depends on two factors: 1) 
Deterrence factors like low level of expertise, response cost and the time lag 
Figure 2.3. Antecedents of secure behaviour (Renaud, 2014) 
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since the behavioural intention was formed. 2) Sustaining factors like security 
performances feedback, visible monitoring activities and social norms. 
Between these two Gulfs is the security culture, which helps to subconsciously 
modify and propel employees’ intention from the Gulf of Evaluation, to secure 
behaviour at the Gulf of Execution. Organizational security culture entails that 
the assumptions, attitudes and perceptions that are accepted and encouraged 
must be maintained with the aim of protecting information assets so that 
attributes and custom of information security begin to emerge as the way 
things are done in an organisation [66]. Hence, a strong information security 
culture is vital for managing organisational information assets.  
 In addition, other studies described some reference points and 
comprehensive structures upon which organisations can cultivate an 
acceptable level of information security culture. For instance, the information 
security governance framework [48], shown in Figure 2.4 provides a starting 
point for the governance of information security. It explains how guidelines 
and control implementations can identify and address the technical, 
procedural and human components of information risks. The information 
security governance framework is derived from the integration of four 
different information security frameworks; ISO/IEC27001, PROTECT, 
Capability Maturity Model and Information Security Architecture (ISA) [48]. 
The framework comprises six key categories defined under strategic, 
managerial and operational; and technical domains. The categories that are 
most relevant to this work are discussed as follow: 
▪ Leadership and Governance  
This category comprises of the executive-level sponsor of policies and 
strategies for addressing the threats of information security. This 
category also covers the compilation and measurement of control 
effectiveness, in ensuring that organisation long-term security goals 
are met. 
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▪ Security Management and Organisations  
This category addresses organisations legal and regulatory 
requirements for information security management. For instance, it is 
now a regulatory requirement for all Nigerian banks to be ISO/IEC 
27001 certified. Also, the National Information Technology 
Development Agency (NITDA) guidelines on data protection draft 
(2013), requires that all federal agencies and private organisations that 
own, use or deploy information systems in Nigeria are covered by the 
guidelines [67]. Organisation information security design, composition 
and reporting structure are also addressed in this category. 
▪ Security Policies  
Security policies must be implemented through effective process and 
compliance while taking into account other components like legal and 
ethical considerations. Security policies are the overall organisation 
intention and direction as expressed by the management [68]. Policies 
provide a specific guideline for employee behaviour and procedures 
Figure 2.4. Information Security Governance Framework (Humphreys, 2008) 
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when interacting with information systems. An example may include a 
point specific policy statement covering acceptable internet use. 
▪ Security Program Management  
This category involves auditing and compliance monitoring of both 
technical and human elements of security programs. It ensures that the 
management of policies, processes, procedures and controls are 
continuously monitored, for timely response to security breaches. 
Employee behaviour monitoring could include internet usage, while 
technology monitoring could be a network traffic monitoring.  
▪ User Security Management  
User security awareness, ethical conduct and trust are all addressed in 
this category. Ethical conduct is a vital component of security culture, it 
must be developed and communicated as part of a corporate code of 
conduct. For instance, organisation ethics may include unauthorised 
data alteration or disclosure. Security awareness program needs to be 
promoted and maintained throughout the organisation, and the 
management needs to find ways to integrate the element of mutual 
trust between all stakeholders.  
▪ Technology Protection and Operations  
This category involves physical and technical protective measures 
around information assets. As part of the implementation of the 
security governance framework, it must be ensured that the inclusion 
of appropriate technology controls is in asset management, technical 
operations, physical environments and business continuity. 
Continuous monitoring of technical controls is also critical to keep pace 
with rapid technology changes. 
Habitual behaviour propagates, and it often requires concerted efforts to 
break the norm. If organisations want to project the habit of secure behaviour, 
perhaps a long-term goal that is in line with the direction of an organisational 
security culture is a better approach [9].   
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2.2.4 Information Security Risk Metrics 
In order to conform to regulatory expectations, organisations approach risk 
treatment process through technical and human-centric dimensions to either 
mitigate or minimise the impact of threats. Most often, security investment 
decisions are the prerogative of the top management, who weighs the value of 
every investment against the organisation overall profit, regarding business 
returns. If security risk cannot be measured, it is hard to understand how it 
can be quantified to influence security investment decisions.  Security metrics 
is defined as the values derived from the comparison of a predetermined 
baseline measurement taken over time, usually a product of data analysis 
derived from objective or subjective human interpretations [69]. However, 
measurement is the objective raw data generated from counting and provides 
a specific point-in-time view of situations. Security metrics allow 
organisations to measure its security initiatives against the backdrop of 
efficiency, effectiveness and return on investment (ROI). Metrics allows an 
organisation to take a bird view of its security awareness and provide insights 
regarding its information security program capabilities and regulatory 
compliance levels [70]. Security metrics is a vital decision-making tool 
regarding security measure impact to businesses, and it allows the questions 
of why the need for measurements, and what are the things to be measured? 
[71]. As shown in Figure 2.5, security metrics is an essential reference point in 
the organisational decision-making process that links organisation 
information security requirements with the need for measurements, so that 
resources can be optimised for the most critical security objectives. 
 In the context of ISMS, security metrics are concerned with system 
aspects that contribute to security and are somewhat more inclined towards 
qualitative measures that reflect the expertise and reasoned estimates of the 
evaluator. Often based on insight, intuition, subjectivity and induced ordering 
values that lacks the attributes of a useful metric [70]. When risk score is 
quantified on the ordering system of 1 = low, 2 = medium and 3 = high, which 
is often the case in an enterprise environment, results from specialised skilled 
risk assessors like a Penetration Tester are not always repeatable because they 
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heavily rely on the experience and knowledge of the evaluator. Ordinal 
numbers that grade relative score ratings in terms of low, medium and high 
are examples of the wrong application of metrics and does not measure 
anything [72]. In contrast, the right application of metrics is expressed as a 
cardinal number that can be counted and denotes a position of one thing with 







The difficulty involved to obtain right security metrics measurement is not to 
be underestimated [73], and enterprise-level security metrics, in particular, 
has been identified as one of the hard problems in the area of security research, 
from the perspective of INFOSEC Research Council [70]. Even, the overly 
exuberant use of ISO 27002/17799 and annual loss expectancy (ALE) scores 
are also considered to make the wrong metrics [72] as they do not guarantee 
consistency. The ISO 17799 for instance, focuses more on security control 
requirements enumeration and auditing rather than a comprehensive and 
balanced system of measurement. Hence, merely implementing security 
controls recommended in security frameworks does not necessarily equate to 
security measurement. Although, a correlation could be established that risk 
is significantly reduced by implementing a certain number of critical controls 
 
Figure 2.5. Security Metrics as management’s decision-making tool (Vogel, 2017) 
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of the ISO Standards, what reasoning could be put behind the selection of those 
critical controls rather than a different set of controls without any useful 
metrics? [72].  Correlation analysis is useful for establishing patterns, but if it 
fails to lead to the understanding of the dynamics that leads to the correlation, 
it is not much of use either.   
2.2.5 Organisation Security Compliance Challenges 
One of the ways that organisations manage ISMS is through the interventions 
of through security standards and compliance.  Security standards like the 
ISO/IEC27000 series and the NIST SP 800 series address both technical and 
human aspects of information security by providing broad security framework 
and best practices applicable to different organisations requiring compliance. 
Actually, most organisation communicate their security capabilities through 
certification, as evidence of compliance with these standards [30]. The first 
challenge of information security management in organisations is the balance 
of incentives for the optimal mitigation of cybersecurity risks. Cybersecurity 
economic model suggests that depending on a combination of incentives, 
organisation policymakers may eventually stop investing in risk assessment 
and only focus on compliance-based security, which could lead to unintended 
consequences [74].  
 In addition, Standards don’t quite often evolve as fast as technology 
and adversary technical expertise, but the most significant limitation to 
compliance-based security is the human factor. Research suggests that the 
human element is the dominant uncertainty variable of security [9], [75], as 
humans have the independent choice to uphold compliant behaviour 
intentions [76]. Security auditors and management may combine efforts to 
develop useable security policies, but employee compliance with policies 
cannot be guaranteed. In a publicly reported 2014 cyber heist [77], [78], a 
Nigerian bank lost £23.5m through an insider operating with rogue third-party 
contractors. Incidentally, the bank has been certified ISO/IEC 27001 
compliant, in line with the regulatory requirement of the CBN.  
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 Furthermore, some organisations apply deterrence measures to 
enforce policy compliance, but studies [79], [80] based on the deterrent theory 
suggested that employees’ motivation differs across organisations. Hence, 
deterrent measures that work with one organisation may not necessarily fit 
into another. Deterrence also implies rational behaviour and even standards 
like ISO/IEC27001, COBIT and NIST draw on the principle of General 
Deterrence Theory [81], where rational users of information assets are 
expected to fit within a certain frame of reference. Although standardisation 
and regulatory demands play an essential part in attracting budgets and 
attention of C-level executives in the areas of information security, there are 
increasing challenges to balance real information security threats with 
compliance requirements [82]. Compliance security often leads to a 
heightened false sense of security and vulnerability perception. 
 Security standards and written policies assume sound rationale of 
users that interact with information assets. Humans are not programmable 
machines and often behave in manners that are entirely out of the norm [83]. 
There are many studies on why it is challenging to enforce compliance in 
humans. Consider technical security for organisations; it is difficult to audit 
human behaviour in the same way that technical auditing tools work [60], [84], 
because irrational behaviour borders on frustration, anger or despair 
propelled by lack of job satisfaction, vendetta, financial and personal problems 
[81]. Log files may capture and report unauthorised insider activities, but the 
insider behaviour and motives are not necessarily captured. Therefore, 
technical security audits verify the consequences of behaviour but not the 
actual behaviour itself.  
 There is a thin line between security and productivity [85], while 
compliance processes are aimed at hardening organisations security defence, 
sometimes, how standards are interpreted can contribute to porous security 
postures. If employees consider guidelines to be challenging to interpret or 
irrelevant to a business unit, it can easily give ground to non-compliance by 
way of accidental or deliberate introduction of threats to the environment 
[86]. It has been suggested that users often fail to adhere to policy 
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requirements because it is burdensome and there is no rational justification to 
comply from users’ economic perspective; especially if the benefit is mainly 
speculative, or the consequence is of little or no harm to the users [87]. Some 
employees often felt compelled to opt for productivity at the expense of 
security or compliance, especially when additional steps are required to 
complete a task. In a survey of more than 500 professionals, over 60% 
admitted to using personal accounts to store and disseminate sensitive 
organisation data [88], because they felt that consumer options like free cloud 
storage accounts are more intuitive and easier to use than approved 
technology that sits within policy guidelines. The policy is an essential aspect 
of security, but it is only as effective as the technology and people backing it.  
 Apart from technical risk factors, the most significant threat to IS, 
leveraged through malicious and unintentional security protocol violation, is 
the human security behaviour [89]. There have been suggestions for more 
empirical research to link employee non-compliance with psychosocial factors 
and behavioural theories [90], in the attempts to explain the reason why 
employees fail to comply with regulations relating to cybercrimes. In today ’s 
fast-paced threat environments, the fundamental question is that, if 
organisations meet compliance requirements, does it actually translate to 
security? 
 Insider Threats: Theoretical, Behavioural, Modelling 
and Simulation Perspectives 
This section introduces the insider threat challenges in the cybersecurity 
domain explained by theories that rationalise security behaviour. 
Organisations continuously face the challenges of insider threat on different 
fronts from data leakage to outright circumvention of critical information 
resources. The struggle for security experts to mitigate these threats is 
increasingly difficult as well, partly due to the proliferation and free 
availability of malicious tools as well as the anonymity these tools can provide 
for the adversaries [14]. Although, by default, decision makers in most 
organisations are more focussed on external attackers and business 
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continuity, in reality, the most expensive form of a security breach and highest 
business impacts are ascribed to malicious insider activities [23] [91]. Many 
kinds of literature agree that insiders are responsible for system exploits more 
than the failure of technical and procedural measures [7][8].  
 Insider problems are also widely documented in security reports. For 
instance, based on the U.S Secret Service and Verizon reports of confirmed 
security breach cases in 2009 alone, insiders are responsible for 46% of data 
breaches, of which 90% were malicious and deliberate acts  [24]. Trusted 
users’ elevated access to information utility is a primary concern when 
addressing the problems of insider threat, given that these users already sits 
behind organisations firewall. 
2.3.1 Threat Agents 
A threat agent is any person or entity that maliciously or accidentally initiate 
an attack to exploit system vulnerabilities. Threat agents are classified based 
on the access mode of internal and external threats. Threat agents are often 
considered malicious employees, but they do come in different variants, 
methods and objectives [92]. In general, abusive users of information systems 
that undermine the confidentiality, integrity and availability of organisations 
resources could have an internal or external affiliation with the organisation. 
Threat agents could manifest in the form of external attackers like vandals and 
data miners who operate for financial motives, competitors who operate for 
business advantage reasons, hacktivists who hacks into organisations for 
moral reasons or former employees who still harbour serious grudges [93].  
 Insider threat agents are mainly in an advantageous position based on 
the familiarisation with an organisation’s security terrain, architecture and 
weakest points. Malicious insiders whose actions always put the 
organization's resources, processes and data under threat represents a serious 
breach of trust to organisations [94]. Insiders misuse of information systems 
mostly centres around destroying, modifying and stealing corporate data [26], 
and some of these illicit acts are carried out through technical capabilities. A 
study [95] of 36 illicit cyber activities in the government sector suggests that 
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24% of incidents are due to unauthorised privilege users, of which 11% 
involves the installation of backdoors. Similarly, in a case study of 52 cyber 
incidents  [96], it is shown that 57% are detected through system irregularities 
of which 73% involves remote access logs and 57% involves unauthorised file 
access logs.  
 It is considered that malicious insiders require three distinct elements 
to violate security policies; motive, opportunity and capability. Motivation 
comes from internalising drivers like disgruntles, while the opportunity and 
capability are usually linked with the platform offered to those employees to 
perform their roles, like privilege access and training. Likewise, opportunity 
and capability could be attained secretly to circumvent organisation security 
as long as the motivation is present [97]. In terms of opportunity, however, 
security violations often occur as a result of negligence, carelessness or 
recklessness which are by no way malicious but accidental, while employees 
are trying to perform their job functions [98]. However, within the context of 
this work, malicious and accidental security protocol violations are all 
considered under the broad categorisation of the insider threat. Also, by 
definition, the meaning of insiders may be stretched to include affiliations like 
families, friends, spouses and client of insiders [98], but the definition and 
scope of an insider within the context of this research are limited to employees 
working in an organisation. 
2.3.2 Threat Vectors 
Information security threat vectors are the attack surfaces that an adversary 
can utilise to get past organisation defences, to infiltrate and propagate the 
network. As the threat vector increases so are the potentials for exploits. A 
single threat vector may contain multiple vulnerabilities, and the combination 
of these vulnerabilities is referred to as the attack surface [45]. The 
opportunities for cybercrime have exploded exponentially with the estimated 
46% of the world’s population (3.4 billion users) having access to the internet 
[45]. In today’s threat landscape, the level of sophistication of hackers is 
growing, and the attack methodologies available to these hackers are also 
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becoming quite vast [99]. There are variations in the attack vectors by which 
industries are compromised as shown in Figure 2.6, with privilege misuse 
mostly notable in administrative, healthcare and mining industries [45]. 
The ease of proliferation of today’s data-laden environment has turned 
‘hacking’ into a highly specialised profession with different layers of 
involvement.  At the primary layer are hackers who are only interested in zero-
day vulnerability discoveries and software exploits. Then, there is the second 
layer where a specialised group of professionals often buys the discoveries and 
run the packaged exploits through botnets. At the last layer are the individuals 
that flood the dark marketplace to rent botnets with the aim of gaining 
unauthorised access to other networks and computer systems [45]. Some of 
the routes that can be employed by hackers to proliferate network defences 
are briefly described as follows [45], [93]: 
▪ User  (Social Engineering, Insider Privilege ): This type of attack may 
take years to develop, and it could even take longer to detect. It is the 
misuse of privileged access for malicious use of organisation resources. 
This attack could be initiated by an external entity that utilises social 
Figure 2.6. Threat vector by industry (Clive, 2016) 
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engineering to obtain compromised credentials or an insider that is 
already residing behind organisation defence perimeters. 
▪ Network Perimeter  (DDoS): This type of attack mainly targets the 
availability and security of organisations resources, the underlying idea 
is to overwhelm network systems and applications by flooding it with 
service requests. Ultimately organisation resources like the email 
server may become temporarily unavailable or shut down entirely in 
some cases. 
▪ Web Applications (SQL Injection): This category of attack is often 
carried out through botnets by injecting malicious codes or setting up 
phishing within application databases to steal personal information. 
▪ Crimeware and Ransomeware: These are considered one of the biggest 
cybersecurity threats today. They are mostly bots designed to automate 
the theft of proprietary information and personal entities. They can also 
spread viruses, spyware, worms and trojan horse. 
▪ Session Highjacking (Man-in-the-middle Attacks): The session 
established between a computer and a remote server for the exchange 
of secure information can sometimes be intercepted by a third party 
pretending to either be the computer posting a request or the server 
posting a response. An attacker posing as a valid party in a session 
captures the session ID established between two parties and hijack a 
session to access unauthorised information on the server. 
▪ Cyber Espionage, Cyber warfare and State Affiliation: This is mostly a 
form of organised cybercrime that targets nation states, public sectors, 
corporations and manufacturing industries. The same proliferation 
tactics of hacking, phishing and malware are deployed to seek similar 
outcome as hackers, except that these attacks are targeted, specific and 
extremely persistent. The proliferation of the cyberspace is sometimes 
from propaganda perspectives, to cause fear and discord, undermine 
economic confidence, and to disrupt and destroy strategic 
infrastructures. 
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▪ Payment Card Skimmers and POS Intrusion: This type of attacks mostly 
involve tactics like keylogging and RAM scrapping to access financial 
information data on credit cards, card skimming gas pumps and ATMs. 
The retail and food services industries are often the victims of these 
attacks. 
This is not an exhaustive list by any stretch of the imagination, but the threat 
vectors are a few elements that seem to be common with almost every major 
security breach that happens today.  
2.3.3 Insiders’ Theoretical Frame of Reference 
There has been a considerable number of studies in different fields like 
criminology, economics and social studies,  that suggests that there is a strong 
link between individual’s self-control, rationality, disposition and situational 
factors and the intention to violate information security policy [25], [100]–
[102]. In the context of information security, the ability to predict human 
behaviours with precision is challenging, that is why there has been a plethora 
of independent studies on human behaviour and motivation, leading to 
theories in the field of psychology management and economics.  
 Starting with the Protective Motivation Theory (PMT), which is based 
on the natural predisposition for humans to protect themselves [103], 
suggests that when individuals perceive severe threats with a high degree of 
threat susceptibility, the natural reaction is to adopt the appropriate response 
to that threat as long as there is sufficient reason for self-efficacy. Therefore, 
self-efficacy strongly influences how individuals react to perceived threats or 
sanctions of security protocol violations [104]. 
 The Theory of Planned Behaviours (TPB) suggests that human 
expresses certain cues in advance of security protocol violations [105] and 
that a person’s perceived expectations, subjective norms and attitude 
perception towards crime are vital indicators of behavioural intention [106]. 
TPB suggests that human is fundamentally steered by three different types of 
beliefs [107]: The behavioural belief which is an individual expectation and 
evaluation of an outcome given an event. A normative belief which is the 
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willingness of an individual to comply with an expectation in respect to the 
expectation of others about the same event; and a control belief which is the 
individual intention facilitated by external factors. Therefore, motivation, 
environment and opportunity are linked to individual behaviour. Studies that 
explored the theory of planned behaviour [108], [109], also suggests that 
compliant behaviour can be attained through training and awareness 
programs. However, training is not sufficient to enforce compliance, despite 
the number of resources that organisations disburse to address security 
awareness gaps through training [9].  
 In the aim to enforce compliance, some organisations often introduce 
motivation elements of reward and punishment as a form of deterrence, so 
that employees can be discouraged from violating cybersecurity protocols. 
The argument on Deterrence Theory (DT) is that if an individual has the 
perception of severity and sanction for a particular behaviour, e.g. policy 
violation, then that individual may be dissuaded from engaging in such 
behaviour [110]. However, applying deterrence through reward and 
punishment does not always have the desired effect, as inferred by security 
practitioners and scholars in the field of social sciences [111]. This is because 
deterrence is subject to individual’s rationality and relative morality.  
 In addition, studies [22] also shown that deterrence draws on the 
principle of rational behaviour, and information security standards like 
ISO/IEC27001 is also based on the assumption that people fit within a certain 
rational frame of reference. Therefore, contrary to logical assumption, 
deterrence measures often yield negative consequences, given that motivation 
that drives security consciousness differs across organisations [112], [113]. 
Instead, taking proactive steps to lower the perceived benefits of security 
violation and applying a high level of pre-employment screening for sensitive 
positions are the two directions for effective management.  
 In terms of the Neutralization Theory, it is a very relevant theory in 
the field of criminology. It describes the techniques adopted by individuals to 
justify deviant behaviour that violates expected norms and beliefs [114]. In the 
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context of information security, an individual may pre-emptively seek ways to 
promote episodically and neutralise guilts associated with security policy 
violations, through neutralisation techniques like denial of responsibility or 
denial of the victim. This is an essential element of human behaviour that 
influences the intention to violate organisation policy [115] because 
neutralisation techniques can be used to rationalise behaviour and to convince 
others why certain wrong action is justifiable. 
 Regarding human Personality traits, some studies suggest that 
individual Personality may be a critical indicator of what influences 
cybersecurity compliance [116]. Factors promoting the compliance or non-
compliance outlook of an individual within an organisation could be 
unravelled through the understanding of a subject’s psychological profiles 
[104]. According to the Big-5 personality dimensions measured by the NEO PI-
R [117], the personality traits of openness, conscientiousness, extroverted, 
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Table 2.3. Personality dimensions measured by the NEO PI-R [47] 
Also, the way individuals that are having any of the Big-5 personality types 
interact with situational factors is considered to be the strongest determinant 
of how they comply with security protocol [104]. Situational factors are 
external elements that can be influential as internal traits or motivation. In 
respect to information security, situational factors can interact with 
individuals’ rational calculus to either comply with security policy or not  
[111], as defined in Table 2.4, based on the study of personality and 
compliance[104]. Individuals are different, so is their personalities which 







Anxiety Warmth Fantasy Trust Competence 
Hostility Gregariousness Aesthetics Straightforwardness Order 
Depression Assertiveness Feelings Altruism Dutifulness 
Self-
consciousness 











Values Tendermindedness Deliberation 
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Situational Factor  Definition  
Self-Efficacy  
Perceived confidence in the ability to comply with 
cybersecurity policy  
Sanction Certainty  
Perceived likelihood of being punished if the cybersecurity 
policy is violated  
Sanction Severity  
Perceived harshness of the punishment associated with 
violating cybersecurity policy  
Threat Vulnerability  
Perceived risk of something negative occurring if 
cybersecurity policy is violated  
Threat Severity  
Perceived seriousness of the risk associated with violating 
cybersecurity policy  
Response Efficacy  Perceived effectiveness of cybersecurity policy   
Response Cost  
Perceived negative consequences associated with complying 
with cybersecurity policy  
Realism  
Perceived likelihood that a scenario such as the one presented 
could occur in the workplace  
Table 2.4. Definition of situational factor (McBride, 2012) 
2.3.4 Insiders’ Behavioural Frame of Reference 
Research linking cybersecurity compliance and human factor has expanded 
over the years, in an attempt to establish how individual differences shapes 
security policy compliance intentions. Security-related behaviour in 
organisation continues to generate research interest in the information 
security literature. Behavioural theories provide guidelines on how behaviour 
may manifest at different stages of an insider threat scenario by recognising 
observable ‘concerning behaviour’ that insider exhibits in advance of security 
exploits [24]. A study [118] shows that in 23 cases of insider threat in the 
banking and finance sector, 33% is due to personal problems that are 
unrelated to employment, like breakup and anxiety; 23% is due to revenge, 
27% is due to debt, and 81% is due to financial gains. Also, based on a case 
study of 52 illicit cyber activities in the IT and Telecommunication sector [96], 
33% of illicit activities are as a result of intolerant to criticism, 57% involves 
disgruntled employees, 47% is revealed through overt behaviour, and 58% 
involves direct communication of threat online.   
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There have been a variety of approaches to solving the malicious insider 
problem; some studies are based on behavioural analysis of a malicious insider 
to understand the key drivers of malevolent intentions.  A review of some 
research done in an attempt to model insiders’ threat behaviour in 
organisations is carried out, but this is by no means an exhaustive list. In terms 
of understanding the primary driver for malicious behaviour, some of the 
work in this area [95], [119]–[123] use decision algorithms to assess the 
predisposition to malicious behaviour by combining psychometric test scores 
data and real-time technical data obtained from users’ information systems. 
Another literature describes malicious insider threats through a devised 
taxonomy of attributes; access, risk, knowledge, process and motivation, in 
order to analyse how each or a combination of these attributes stimulate 
malicious insiders’ behaviour [124]. Bayesian network model [125] is applied 
to study the motivation and psychology of malicious insiders, while [126] 
evaluates the probability of insider threat detection through a conceptual 
model that connects real-world measurements and a hypothesis-tree, and [98] 
describes how technical assessment can be combined with information assets 
categorization and agents behaviour in order to mitigate insider threat 
problems through resilience, survivability and security. 
 In addition, research also shows that employees do not just carry out 
malicious acts randomly but show some signs of malicious behaviour well in 
advance of cyber attacks. In this light, some work emphasizes the importance 
of recognizing early signs of risky behaviour. For instance, [24], described a 
predictive modelling framework for automated support and detection of high-
risk behavioural indicators that may help form risk mitigating decisions. 
Similarly, the work proposed by  [127], evaluates the probability of IT misuse 
through the lens of multilevel hierarchical layers of threat components, the 
work provides an insight on how users’ behaviour at the system level can be 
harnessed to predict computer misuse that originates from legitimate users. 
In terms of technical assessment, [128] shows how technical tools like the 
intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS), and log analysis can be 
leveraged to uncover insider activities. 
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In terms of personality attributes, some research emphasises the link between 
personality traits and the tendency to become a malicious insider. For 
instance, [104] presents a personality evaluation approach that links cyber-
security protocol violation to the personality trait of a malicious insider, 
depending on deterrence, protection motivation or efficacy factors. 
Importantly too, some studies also suggested that people’s personality can be 
revealed through the online social media platforms like the Facebook, Twitter 
and YouTube posts, from which personality types can be mapped to specific 
job roles, in order to mitigate insider threats [129], [130]. In particular, [120] 
reveals how it is possible to harvest publicly available information from 
YouTube video comments, that may identify personality traits through 
combined dictionary-based text classification and machine learning 
techniques. Similarly, [131] suggests that the personality trait of narcissism is 
a common characteristic of malicious insiders and that information shared in 
the public domain like Twitter can be utilized to establish predictive actions 
and deterrence measures against malicious insiders.  
 Although the approach adopted by some of the studies are criticised 
in [100], it is suggested that the data collection methods in most of the studies 
about human motivation and behaviour are plagued with common method 
biases, given that most of the behavioural studies are conducted through self-
reporting and surveys. It is further argued that applying brain imaging 
technologies like electroencephalography (EEG) and functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) can increase the accuracy of data collection by 
observing the brain of research subjects as they contemplate decisions while 
interacting with information systems. It is assumed that this approach will 
allow researchers to establish neural correctness between brain processes 
and decision outcomes [100]. However, this approach is not within the scope 
of this study. Instead, relevant theories on human behaviour, motivations and 
personalities are explored within the context of information security 
management. This study extends the presumption that application of 
behavioural theories to human intentions and motivation to commit computer 
crimes are vital to the understanding of insider threats.  
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Finally, it is clear that personality drives behaviour, and behaviour influences 
how individuals interact with situational security factors. Previous studies 
have considered behavioural theories and technical solutions either in 
isolation or as a combined study. While recognising that insider threat 
constitutes a problem which already has damaging consequences for 
organisations, insider threats cannot always be detected or appropriately 
addressed with technical solutions alone  [132], and there is a need for a 
framework that encompasses multiple risk indicators for a holistic and 
predictive threat detection [133], [134]. In this work, the behavioural, 
personality and technical risk indicators are combined and explored in a single 
study, to understand if there are inherent risks in certain personality types 
that can be expanded when aggregated with other risk factors from unrelated 
domains. 
2.3.5 Modelling and Simulation 
The challenge of enforcing cybersecurity controls against malicious insiders is 
to predict the presence of insider activities before it becomes a full-blown 
attack. One approach to overcoming these challenges is to model insider 
behaviour by aggregating some variables to reveal developing insider exploits. 
However, modelling human behaviour in a way that is entirely devoid of false 
positives is difficult [135]. Models are handy tools to replicate the real-world 
scenarios and reduce prediction error surfaces [3]. By moving away from 
forensic investigation whereby security analysts have to correlate and analyse 
an enormous amount of data, a predictive model offers the ability to infer 
underlying motivations and indicators for malicious exploits [24]. 
Unfortunately, the challenge around cyber data restriction limits research 
efforts in this area. It is increasingly difficult to obtain data regarding cyber-
attacks either because organisations are not keen on sharing data breach 
information, defenders obtain data for specific purposes or attacker conceal 
their exploits [3]. However, data sets can be generated by simulation software, 
and some can be fabricated or obtained from security reports to test different 
aspects of a model [135].  
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
50 
    
Managing the insider problem is increasingly difficult and complex because 
organisations can concentrate on technical security features like intrusion 
detection systems (IDSs), firewalls and other authentication mechanisms, yet 
insiders may have the authorisation to bypass the checks to perform their job 
functions [3]. This is where behavioural analytics is useful for managing 
insider problems. The ability to simulate or model insider interaction with 
information system is vital to the analysis of insider threat root causes; also, 
for the evaluation of risk mitigation strategies in terms of people, process and 
technology [136]. However, the most difficult challenges in modelling insider 
threat are establishing precursors in terms of observable indicators [135], and 
verifiable data set.  
 Organisations are now embracing behaviour analytics solutions by 
focusing on the prerequisites for behavioural analytics, through policies.   For 
instance, some organisations now modify policies to include the  blockage of 
unwanted websites, remote access, two factor authentication and mobile 
device management, in order to create and store sequence of pattern for 
employees through role-based access control (RPAC), Mandatory Access 
Control (MAC) and Discretionary Access Control (DAC) Models [23]. This 
allows administrators to control and observe the way employees interact with 
organisation information assets. In a complex environment, where the 
distribution of uncertainties is not intuitive, it becomes even more important 
to have a system with the ability to define complex feedback from uncertain 
variables [137]. This is one of the important elements of the research space 
that this study seeks to address. 
 Risk Assessment, Incentives and Resource Allocation 
There is a fundamental issue with the traditional method of risk calibration 
because some risk managers are not privy to the awareness of the full range of 
actions that can be implemented for risk reduction [5]. Information security 
risk analysis has always been viewed and evaluated from audit perspective 
whereby security auditors base their judgement on the use of checklists to 
verify that different elements of sound security ethics are in place and to 
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specify internal controls [138]. Central to organisation cybersecurity risk 
evaluation and investment decisions are C-level executives; who may not have 
a comprehensive understanding of their organisation security capabilities, 
information assets and threat vectors, yet decide the budget for security 
investment.  
 Most often, the C-level executives’ understanding of risk tolerance is 
disproportional with the IS risk faced by their organisations and usually opt 
for compliance-based security solutions because it is easy to implement [139]. 
One specific shortfall of audit tools and checklist is that new threats and 
technological advancement catch up very quickly and checklist approach tend 
to become obsolete in no time [140], thereby requiring constant updates. Also, 
audit tools do not lead to advancement in scientific knowledge for information 
security design. The bottom-line is that, in the information security 
management realm, constructing tools that genuinely satisfy measurement 
theory is difficult [141], [142]. Even ISO Standard 27005 designed to help with 
the implementation of Information Security, does not recommend any specific 
risk assessment analysis method.  
2.4.1 Appropriating Security Risks 
Information Systems Risk Analysis (ISRA) has its root in decision theory, 
especially, the expected value (or utility theory). The expected value or utility 
of action may be thought of as having an underlying utility function, which 
represents choices in risky situations [143]. It can be calculated by defining a 
set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possible outcomes from a 
particular cause of action, then, multiplying the probability of each possible 
outcome by its utility. The expected Utility model is an empirically relevant 
model that could be applied to work out management preferences under a 
risky situation, especially where decision makers cannot tell which ‘State of 
Event’ will occur in a list of various possibilities and associated probabilities. 
For instance, given the function U(.) which specifies how much utility is 
expected from a consumption; with probability 1, State1 happens, and c1 is 
consumed, from which we get utility U(c1). Likewise, with probability 2, 
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State2 happens, and c2 is consumed, from which we get Utility U(c2). Hence, to 
consider the Utility that decision makers can get from a risky bundle (c1, c2); 
the expected Utility is specified as follows  [144]: 
 
The expected Utility model is a better empirical approximation of the reality 
for choosing between risky bundles or situations as the case may be. It is about 
people’s preferences with respect to the choices that have uncertain outcomes; 
where moral expectations contrast with mathematical expectations. 
 In contrast, the risk assessment methodology and formula that 
equates risk to the product of threats, vulnerability and impact of the threat, 
as proposed in [145], [146], as well as other relevant papers, could be 
described as unclear and mathematically over amplified. 
 
The above formula is a popular and familiar format of Risk Matrix used as part 
of the risk assessment with applications across diverse fields like the project, 
climate, highway, cybersecurity, and terrorism risk management domains 
[147]. The risk matrix table shows a gradual response between the lower 
possibilities to the highest possibilities of threat and lowest impact to the 
highest impact of threat. The formula “R = T x V x I” may violate the axioms of 
logical reasoning as it is quite unclear how to literarily plug-in this concept into 
a mathematical formula. The evaluation of risk likelihood based on the 
probability of occurrence and impact is clogged with different shortcomings 
that are associated with subjective risk assessment; also, the theoretical basis 
for this approach is highly superficial [148]. Subjective probability estimates 
and can lead to overestimation of risk, a wrongful perception of the significant 
gap between lower probability and impact events as well as disproportionally 
viewing those with the higher risk. If there is no mathematical process or 
empirical data, mainly what it comes down to is inductive reasoning and trying 
to guess the odd. It becomes what may be considered as the developed 
methodology of chance and associated numerical values, which may lead to 
misrepresentation of the threat landscape [147].  
Risk = Threats (T) x Vulnerability (V) x Impact (I) 
U(c1, c2) = 1U(c1) + 2 U(c2) 
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2.4.2 Misaligned Incentives 
The study of perverse incentive is a growing area of research in the 
information security management and cyber defence. A classic example of 
misaligned incentive as stated by one of the earlier proponents of research in 
this field is that banks in the UK typically spend more on cyber defence yet 
suffers more loss as a result of fraud compared to banks in the USA [149]. 
Misaligned incentives have been ascribed to the disparities in the way the body 
of proof is allocated in both jurisdictions. In the UK banking industry, the body 
of proof lies primarily with customers. Hence, banks may be less incentivised 
to manage risks associated with ATM Frauds compared to the banks in the USA 
where the body of proof lies with the banks. The US banks musk either prove 
that a customer is trying to cheat or bear the cost of ATM card frauds, whereas, 
the UK banks generally get away with the claim that customers must be 
mistaken or lying because ATM system was secure [149]. Misaligned 
incentives also have a knock-on-effect on principal-agent relationships in 
many forms. 
 The problem of principal-agent relationship in respect to security 
investment decisions is not novel. Several reports touched on the recursive 
influence of perverse incentive on the overall security decisions in corporate 
organisations. In order to get security investment decisions correctly, the 
feeling of security needs to be aligned with the reality of security. Otherwise, 
the trade-off would always be wrong [27]. Also, the experience and 
background of independent monitors influence how responses and 
prioritisation are framed; this may lead to indirect ‘manipulation’ of principals 
perception and misinterpretation of the ‘true state’ of security  [150]. For 
instance, Information Security risk assessor’s background, experience and 
methodology are direct pointers to the risk score and the recommendation 
that determines management risk perception and security investment 
decisions. It is not surprising therefore that, independent evaluator’s 
performance appraisals are subject to a significant amount of personal 
influence and subjective judgement [151]. When the interplay between risk 
perception and the reality of risk diverges,  then risk calibration can be affected 
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in five major areas. Which in turn leads to poor investment decisions [27]: 1) 
Risk severity assessment 2) Risk probability assessment 3) Cost 4) Risk 
countermeasure, and 5) Security trade-off (between risk and costs). 
 At the enterprise level, incentive plays a significant role in the 
organisational reward system and how resources are allocated to defend 
enterprise information security. In the cybersecurity context, incentives are 
described as ‘the motives that system defenders have to do their jobs properly 
and also the motive that attackers have to defeat the defenders’ efforts’ [152]. 
Even defenders of systems that are motivated by the same goals, often get their 
incentive structures wrong. For instance, lack of symmetrised and effective 
incentive structure within an organisation may result in a clash of interest 
whereby the effort of system defenders, i.e. the Chief Information Security 
Officer (CISO)/employee is not aligned with the interest of system owners, i.e. 
CEO/Stakeholders [153]. This can lead to a distortion of risk perception and 
breach in security defence systems. The underlying problem in most 
information security policy is a misrepresentation of risk, informed by 
misaligned incentive [153]. A relevant analogy to elaborate this problem 
domain is a case of CISO of a business who is motivated to keep a system 
secure. There may be a performance metric associated with that, e.g. 
rewarding the CISO for maintaining the integrity of the system. However, 
business owners like the CEO and principal shareholders may be motivated by 
keeping low overhead costs, including IT budgets, to improve on annual profits 
and dividends. Perverse incentive presents a conflicting interest for security 
defenders even when working to achieving similar goals. 
2.4.3 Allocating Resources for Security Investment 
The budgetary allocation problems of information security investment have 
attracted contributions from several studies [154]–[157] in the attempt to 
propose justifiable optimum security investment decisions. Different 
approaches have been suggested, one of which is that the misaligned incentive 
scenarios can be presented as a game, where security defenders are modelled 
as participating agents in strategic interactions.  
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2.4.3.1 Game Theoretic Approach 
Researchers have used game theory extensively, in the attempt to address 
conflict situations. In work involving data privacy and users attitude towards 
potential data breaches, a buyer-seller game-theoretical model of e-commerce 
transaction is proposed in [158]. The interaction between online buyers and 
sellers is treated as a game whereby players’ maximising strategy depends on 
privacy policies, data usage and management. Similarly, [159] shows how user 
agents and cloud-based service providers like DropBox interacts in a trusting 
game concerning data privacy. Both works shed some lights on users’ sceptical 
disposition towards potential online data privacy violation. Regarding the 
traditional risk assessment, where risk is computed as a product of threats and 
vulnerabilities, the authors of [160], suggested a game theoretical model 
whereby subjective estimation of threats and vulnerabilities are substituted 
with the result of a game. They demonstrated how a user and owner of an 
online bookstore could engage in the strategic game on data privacy 
challenges, where the user may be truthful or lie about his personal 
information, and the owner may protect or sell users personal information to 
a third party. The work showed how estimated payoff could be used to analyse 
risk rather than the subjective probability of events.  
 A one-period game model was suggested by [161] to address issues of 
security investment budgets. Optimum investment budget has always been a 
conflicting issue between security stakeholders regarding what is too little and 
what is too much when considered against the backdrop of security breaches 
and potential losses. It is shown that given two classes of security breach 
probability function, the optimum amount spent on information security is 
typically low and in the region of 37% less than expected loss from a security 
breach. Although the model did not take into account, issues of perverse 
incentives, and how one agent's decision affects the other. The authors of  
[162] took a pragmatic shift away from the traditional risk assessment method 
and presented a viable system model (VSM) for risk assessment in Industrial 
Control System (ICS). They proposed an approach whereby traditional asset-
classification is replaced with VSM asset modelling in an ICS while taking into 
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accounts, the inter-relationship between those assets and (internal/external) 
environmental factors. The work provided new insight into risk assessment 
methodologies, especially at the asset classification stage. In a similar work, 
the authors of [163] proposed a model where a combination of VSM and game 
theory is used to manage cybersecurity risks in ICS. The approach was based 
on evaluating cyber components in an ICS with VSM modelling and then using 
the evaluation metric as input to a theoretical game between attacker and 
defender of an ICS. The work showed how strategies and payoff structures in 
the game could be used to propose a cost-effective protection solution. The 
study in [164] showed how system vulnerability could be reduced through 
security patches. A game-theoretic model was developed to study the strategic 
interaction between a vendor and a firm in balancing the costs and benefits of 
patch management.  
2.4.3.2 Expected Utility Value Approach 
Some studies also focus on the expected utility value of investment in order to 
determine the optimal resource allocation. For instance, the approach 
presented by [165] is based the on expected utility value suggesting that the 
level of investment for asset protection depends on the vulnerability of the 
asset and associated potential losses. The work further assumes that with 
increase information security investment, the probability of security breach 
decreases but the marginal improvement in security also decreases with 
higher investment. Hence, risk-averse management may maximise the 
expected utility of a budget to determine the maximum amount to invest, 
which should not exceed the potential loss of breach. The approach presented 
[166], uses the term ‘return on security investment’ (ROSI), which is similar to 
the traditional accounting figure. The approach incorporates one-time costs 
and benefits of information security while it discards running costs and 
benefits as well as non-financial security measures, in order to support 
investment decisions.  
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ROSI is calculated as: ROSI = ((risk exposure× risk mitigation) − solution costs) / 
(solution cost) 
where  
risk exposure = ALE×ARO 
ALE denotes annual loss exposure while ARO denotes the annual rate of occurrence.  
In work presented by [167], the information security investment decision is 
based on a balanced scorecard performance measuring system. This method, 
in its original context, evaluates organisation business performance from the 
angle of financial, customer, internal process and innovation. The authors 
extended and applied the balanced scorecard method in the context of 
information technology to support management decisions. The approach uses 
goal measurement to establish investment needs. Goal importance, e.g. server 
downtime reduction is weighted relative to other goals in order to set goal 
fulfilment minimum average degree. If an investment’s average degree is 
considered to be above the threshold, then it is deemed economically viable. 
This approach considers all financial and non-financial mitigation measures. 
2.4.3.3 Simulation Approach  
There are other research efforts that also propose Monte-Carlo simulation for 
information security. For instance, [168] presents the Monte-Carlo simulation 
method for evaluating and communicating security investment benefits, and 
to understand technology choices in a financial manner. In [169], the authors 
describe probabilistic risk assessment to ICT systems, through scenario-based 
estimation of agent attack plan and risk impact. Then applies Monte-Carlo for 
detailed simulation of threat agents’ behaviour to support assessment through 
statistical evaluation of risk. Similarly, [170] introduces Haruspex to simulate 
adaptive agents. The tool utilises a Monte-Carlo method to support evidence-
based risk assessment and management, in furtherance of justifying 
appropriate countermeasures. The work in [171] presents a different 
approach to information security assessment based on the analytic hierarchy 
process (AHP) and Monte-Carlo simulation. In particular, the approach applies 
weight elements to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information 
assets in order to improve the accuracy of results. The approach presented in 
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[172] addresses uncertainty elements in security risk assessment and 
visualisation. It combines system level process through risk analysis and 
probabilistic survivability assessment (RAPSA) and expert estimation through 
Monte Carlo, in order to quantify information risks as financial variables.  
 However, with respect to the related publications, this study uses the 
Monte-Carlo simulation approach to optimise resource allocation for security 
investment from a different perspective. This and other research space are 
discussed in the literature gap section   
2.4.4 Some Prima on Interdependent Decisions and the Game 
Theory  
Game theory offers a perfect tool for understanding human behaviour, 
incentives and motivation in a collaborative environment (that is, to either be 
honest and altruistic or dishonest and egoistic), where the result is a product 
of collective choices made by each participant. Game theory assumes that by 
default, rational players will make choices that maximise their payoffs, i.e. 
players will only be honest if it is more beneficial to do so. Otherwise, players 
will be dishonest, even though; it may be logical that participants will gain 
more from the alliance if all parties play the honest game. Game theory is an 
abstract framework-modelling tool for testing interdependent choices. It is a 
logical framework for understanding expected rational behaviour in human 
agents, but it does not solve the problem of how people behave. The empirical 
analysis is required to understand how human agents deal with problems of 
interdependent choices. Through experimental games in controlled 
environments, human agent’s interdependent decisions can be observed and 
analysed to obtain empirical evidence that can help isolate the explanatory 
power of a variety of theories [173]. Theories are only logically correct, but we 
need to conduct some experiments to obtain empirical evidence to support or 
disprove theories. 
2.4.4.1 Minimax Principle 
Minimax principle is referred to as the cautious policy of avoiding the worst 
possible outcome in a strategic game. Following similar description in [173], 
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fundamental analysis of the minimax principle is shown as a payoff structure 
between player A and player B. In a finite 2-person zero-sum game, 
rectangular arrays of number always represent payoff matrix (𝑎𝑖𝑗) with row 
(𝑚) and column(𝑛). The rule of the game is that if player ‘A’ choses a strategy 
corresponding to row-i and player ‘B’ choses a strategy corresponding to 
column-j, the number (𝑎𝑖𝑗) at the intersect represents the payoff gained or lost 
by either ‘A’ or ‘B’. If complete information is assumed, both players know that 
their payoffs are inversely related. However, instead of selecting a pure 
strategy, a player may adopt a mixed strategy, thereby randomising his choice 
of row and column. For instance, a player may let his choice depend on an 
unbiased toss of coin. 
 A Mixed Strategy for player A is written as: (𝒙)  = (𝒙𝟏,………..𝒙𝒎) 
A Mixed strategy for player B is written as:  (𝒚)  = (𝒚𝟏,………..𝒚𝒏) 
Assuming player ‘A’ uses a mixed strategy (𝑥) , row-i will be chosen with 
probability (x1). If player ‘B’ uses mixed strategy (𝑦), column-j will be chosen 
with probability (j1), leading to a payoff of (𝑎𝑖𝑗) with probability(𝑥𝑖𝑦𝑗), since 
both events are independent. Expected payoff is therefore the weighted 
average of all payoff (𝑎𝑖𝑗) occurring at probability(𝑥𝑖𝑦𝑗). 
This is written as  ∑ =  𝒂𝒊𝒋𝒙𝒊𝒚𝒋 
We know that the average payoff between player ‘A’ and player ‘B’ is inversely 
related, hence each player wants to maximise his payoff by minimising the 
other player’s payoff. If either player knows in advance what strategy the other 
player will adopt each player will strive to use a corresponding strategy. 
Assuming that player, ‘A’ is aware that player ‘B’ will use a mixed strategy  (𝑦′), 
the strategy player ‘A’ will adopt would be such that it maximises his expected 
payoff against player ‘B’s (𝑦′). 
Hence, the expected payoff would be:   𝑴𝒂𝒙
(𝒙)
  ∑ =  𝒂𝒊𝒋𝒙𝒊𝒚′𝒋 
Likewise, if player ‘A’s strategy is known in advance to player ‘B’, the counter 
strategy for player ‘B’ would be such that it minimises player ‘A’s strategy. 
Hence, player B’s expected payoff would be:   𝑴𝒊𝒏
(𝒚)
  ∑ =  𝒂𝒊𝒋𝒙′𝒊𝒚𝒋 
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In practice, these counter strategies may not be possible since both players do 
not have a pre-knowledge of each other’s move. However, a player can 
maximise his payoff by assuming that any strategy (𝑥)  he plays will be 
minimised by the other player’s counter strategy. In other to maximise 
expected payoff under this assumption, player ‘A’ will ensure that expected 




  ∑ =  𝒂𝒊𝒋𝒙𝒊𝒚𝒋 
 Likewise, with similar corresponding assumptions in mind, player B will 
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In the context of this work, the initial plan is to treat security investment 
decision as a multi-level game between different classes of players. Starting 
with a game between system adversaries that are continually seeking ways to 
attack organisation assets and system defenders that are continually seeking 
ways to mitigate the attacks, given limited resources. Then focus on sub-games 
between systems defenders (organisation stakeholders) that are incentivised 
differently to allocate budgets for security investment. In the sub-game, the 
idea is to apply a variant of the mixed-motive [2 x 2] experimental games like 
the Game of Leader or the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game to explore how incentive 
influences cooperation and competition. Mixed-motive games are strictly non-
zero-sum games. In economic and game theory, zero-sum games represent a 
situation where each participant’s utility (gains) is the exact opposite of the 
other participant’s utility (loss). By nature, zero-sum games are non-
cooperative games where there exists a conflict of interest between 
participating agents. It is a game where the sum of payoffs for all players is 
zero whatever strategy each player chooses, in effect, what one player wins, 
the other player must lose [174]. Incentives to maximise payoff in zero-sum 
games is often predefined and non-negotiable, as such, zero-sum games would 
not have been an appropriate model for this work. Mixed-motive games, 
however, represent interesting psychological phenomena upon which precise 
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incentive models can be developed, i.e. risk tolerance and investment decision 
challenges.  
 As mentioned earlier, the initial plans to treat security investment 
decision as a multi-level game between different classes of players are 
dropped due to logistics constraint. The game theoretical element of this 
research is now being considered as part of the future work.  
 Gaps in the Literature 
Following an extensive literature review, some gaps in the literature are 
identified that helps formulate the research questions in this thesis. Starting 
with the traditionally challenging cybersecurity problems,  like compliance 
and malicious insider threats. Some literature suggests that additional 
researches are still needed in these problem domains [175]; and that a more 
holistic approach to security management is still very much needed [176]. 
 The importance of standardisation is apparent, though it is uncertain 
how applying a blanket ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to security as entrenched 
in standards can solve compliance problems [116]. There are questions on the 
practicality of Standards and Compliance alone when it comes to holistic 
security coverage for information systems. There is a gap between 
organisation compliance and organisation security since almost half of the 
organisation employees do not follow security policies either due to lack of 
awareness or as a result of incomplete or poorly defined policies [82]. The 
bottom line is that sometimes security breaches due to negligence errors are 
more prevalent than malicious acts.  
 In addition, studies reiterate the need to beware of information 
security stressor and work overload while enforcing compliance [177], 
therefore, a high impact compliance program that is delivered with minimum 
employee resistance is required. Also, works that explored the theory of 
planned behaviour [178], [179] suggested that training and awareness are the 
most significant factors that influence human behaviour and attitude towards 
information security. It was argued that attitude, perceived expectations and 
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subjective norms are the incentive components of behavioural intention. 
Hence, the change in employee attitude that is in line with corporate 
expectations can be addressed by information security awareness campaigns. 
Although some organisations put a concerted effort into training with the hope 
of addressing security awareness gaps, it is clear that training is not sufficient 
to ensure compliance and training is not the same as security culture [9]. What 
then can be done to ensure compliant behaviour? Can change be unforced? 
These questions represent the open space that this study tries to address. 
 Furthermore, a number of studies clearly recognises the importance 
of security culture [60], [61]–[63] to support organisation security objectives 
and compliance initiatives. However, steps on how to embed security into the 
culture of organisations are not addressed [180]. Similarly, the framework 
adopted for this study from [48], did not explicitly elaborate on how to embed 
security practices in organisation culture. How can compliance be integrated 
into organisation security culture? This is also one of the important gaps in the 
literature that this study strives to addresses by suggesting how this can be 
achieved based on the information security governance framework [48], 
discussed in the literature review. Later on, in this thesis, we explored a study 
based on security by compliance is undertaken while using Nigerian banks as 
a regional case study, to understand the implications of compliant security. 
 In terms of malicious insiders, the work in the domain of insider threat 
prediction is not a new area of research, but it has continued to generate 
interest among researchers. Previous studies indicate the inadequacy of 
attempts to address the human factor in cybersecurity despite the evidence 
that a malicious insider exhibits an observable ‘concerning behaviour’ in 
advance of the actual exploit  [24]. The effort to curb insider problems continue 
to evolve, other studies on the malicious insider problems also suggested that 
an interconnected approach based on technical controls and behavioural 
methods can help security managers to curb the deviance of malicious 
employees  [181]. In addition, relevant literature argues that detecting insider 
activities requires more than a single indicator, recommending the need for a 
framework that encompasses multiple risk indicators for holistic and 
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predictive threat detection [133], [134]. This study recognises the vital 
contribution of other models. However, it is believed, to the best of our 
knowledge, that previous studies have not considered the crucial element of 
personality trait along with behavioural and technical risks in a single study, 
in order to model the insider threat scenario. In this study, the personality 
dimension is included in the study of insider threat. If each individual’s 
personality trait interacts differently with security scenario effects and also 
determines the susceptibility to violate security protocols [104]; it is, 
therefore, essential to include personality traits to the insider's threat 
landscape. This study considers a model of insider threat from different 
perspectives and domains that are naturally unconnected and then try to use 
some form of analytic approach to connect security risks from these domains; 
to showcase the activities of a malicious insider with presumably increasing 
accuracy.  
 Finally, to encapsulate the first two identified problems of compliance 
and malicious insiders. There is a need to consider how to allocate budgets for 
security investment as a single block while taking into account, the increasing 
number of assets and the risk of a security breach to those assets from  the 
perspectives of organisation stakeholders [182]. However, with respect to the 
related publications, our work uses the Monte-Carlo simulation approach to 
optimise resource allocation for security investment from a different 
perspective. The work discussed in this thesis is based on a predictive 
modelling approach and offers a different dimension to information security 
resource allocation problems. This study applies Monte-Carlo simulation in 
the context of information technology to a single block optimal resource 
allocation at an organisational level.  Information security management is an 
evolving security problem with different layers of complexities. All these 
complexities have made security more challenging for system defenders, and 
the purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the human aspect of information 
security and management against the backdrop of compliance, malicious 
insiders and security resource allocation problems. These identified gaps in 
the literature are addressed in chapter 4 to chapter 8 of this thesis. 
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 Conclusion 
A thorough review of academic literature is provided to aid an in-depth 
understanding of compliance issues relating to ISMS in organisations. Also, the 
human factor element of enterprise security is intensely reviewed while 
touching on relevant behavioural theories from other disciplines. In the 
literature review, the current challenges and research efforts in information 
security management with respect to compliance, malicious insider problems 
and the resource allocation problems for security investment are presented. 
This study looks at how to improve the gaps identified in the literature review 
and propose an improvement to holistic security management. In particular, 
this study looks at organisation compliance problems and the factors 
undermining compliance effectiveness. Then linking the findings to malicious 
insider problems and how insiders rationalise their behaviour to violate 
security protocol.  
 The topic of the insider threat is an elusive one for most organisations, 
such that it is often met with resistance or denial that insider threat is a very 
likely event with devastating consequences. A simple case of lousy action or 
judgment from a third party and privilege users present the same security 
concern as external adversaries, if not more. Also, it is apparent that even if 
insider actions are not necessarily malicious but inconsistent with 
organisations security policy and guidelines (e.g. clicking on links in phishing 
emails), that significantly places attackers at an advantage against system 
defenders and broadens risk exposure to organisation security. In the security 
game, ignorance is not an excuse for complacency. Dealing with unintentional 
or malicious insider threat comes down to organisation resilience. Security 
resilience entails the design of a network with the presumption that there will 
be a compromise and be able to mitigate that compromise in a timely fashion.  
When there is a security breach incidence, the quicker it is spotted and 
mitigated, the quicker damage can be controlled. Through architectural 
security choices, an organisation can increase its visibility towards a better 
resilience in the phase of increasing insider activities.  
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Organisation continue to invest in cyber resilience, for instance, VPNs and 
Firewalls are the two most prominent traditional security features that 
organisations use today, but they also present many weaknesses. The problem 
with firewalls, for instance, is limited operational fluidity, as they are static 
defence mechanism and controls deployed in dynamic environments. 
Firewalls do not automatically respond to infrastructural or environmental 
changes. Once firewalls are configured, they do not necessarily dynamically 
respond to infrastructural changes without administrators’ interventions, or 
policy and rule changes. Firewalls are not specific to address granular user’s 
access to resources instead it is focussed on large-scale networks by focussing 
on ports and IP addresses. However, real users are not devices and IP 
addresses, most importantly system adversaries do not always reside outside 
the security perimeter. VPNs and firewalls are single ingress-point border 
control devices and once authenticated, VPNs can access the whole network 
that is exposed to in many cases. Therefore, a better approach to security must 
be humancentric focused, where users’ behaviour and personality traits are 
linked with how they interact with organisation resources, then, constantly 
monitored and dynamically evaluated against organisations overall security 
goal. 
 Finally, this study reviews how the interplay between risk 
management approaches and diverse incentives affects resource allocation 
decisions for security investment in organisations. In addition to investing in 
countermeasure capabilities to prevent loses and system failure as a 
consequence of cyber-attacks, organisations must budget for the right level of 
investment to mitigate those risks. However, because of the lack of an accurate 
measurement of the cost of security breach or impact of the attack, it is often 
difficult to estimate budget for risk mitigation initiatives; a problem space that 
is still valid and needs to be addressed. In the next chapter, the proposed 
research design is introduced, then each of the research questions is linked to 
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 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
“It takes 20 years to build a reputation and few minutes of cyber-
incident to ruin it.”  
-Stephane Nappo 
 
In this chapter, an in-depth approach and justification for the research design 
are presented. After identifying the literature gaps in chapter 2, this chapter 
shows how each of the research questions is formed and how they are linked 
to the research process. The research methodology, data collection methods 
and simulation steps that are followed to answer the research questions are 
also covered. For completeness and ease of understanding for the reader, this 
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 Introduction  
Research methods are predominantly applied to problems to find viable 
solutions that are testable and verifiable. Research is described as a systematic 
and unbiased approach to answering questions and support hypothesis 
through verifiable data with the aim of solving a problem [183]. Various 
research methods can be applied to different problems scenarios depending 
on how the research method fits with a long-term solution to the research 
problems. In this study, a mixed methodological approach is adopted. It is 
based on qualitative and quantitative analysis, leading to an explanatory and 
predictive output to answer the research questions and explain the findings of 
this research. Elements of theory, modelling and simulation are also applied to 
enhance the narratives of this work.  
 The research design is structured, such that, each research question is 
framed based on gaps identified in the literature reviews, and the response to 
each question is addressed based on the best-fit research methodology. Figure 
3.1 shows the high-level overview of the research process, starting with the 
establishment of the research domain. At the infancy stage of this work, an 
extensive literature review and critical analysis of the current approaches is 
Figure 3.1. A high-level overview of the research process 
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carried out. The output from the stage is covered in chapter 2, the literature 
review. Follow on from the literature review stage, gaps in the literature are 
identified, which leads to the three research questions in this thesis.  
 Two parallel methods for data collection were set for this research; 
the first one is based on primary and secondary data collection through 
surveys, academic articles, white papers and data breach reports. The second 
is based on the identification of appropriate theories which helps answer each 
research question. All the relevant theories are extensively covered in chapter 
2. The output from this work is in the form of exploratory study results, 
simulation, conceptual modelling and measurement validation, parts of which 
have been published in journals and conference proceedings. In the next 
section, key elements underpinning each of the research questions and the 
steps taken to address them are presented. 
 Research question 
In this section, each research question is presented followed by a brief 
description of the research focus, the relevance of each question to the overall 
research output and the steps taken to answer each question. The order of the 
formation of the research questions and how they link to the domain of study 
as shown in Figure 3.2. A low-level overview of the research process is also 
shown in Figure 3.3, demonstrating the phases of the research process and what 
the research output is in each phase.  
 
RQ1: “Is security by compliance adequate for the protection of 
organisation information assets?” 
 Information security policies, guidelines and regulatory standards 
describe the security requirements expected of an organisation to protect its 
information assets. In some cases, these standards are industry-specific and 
obligatory; and in other cases, they are compulsory requirements enforced by 
the regulatory bodies for that industry. The banking and financial institutions 
are more vulnerable to cyber-attacks given that they present most public-
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facing products and services, consequently, they are always faced with the 
challenges of managing security [45]. In recognition of this, some jurisdictions 
have enforced regulatory standards and compliance initiatives to combat 
cyber risk in financial institutions. 
 
Figure 3.2. Research Questions 
 In the united states, the jurisdiction adoption is the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cyber-security Framework (CSF). In the 
United Kingdom, the jurisdiction adoption is the Bank of England’s CBEST 
Framework, for the delivery of intelligence-led security tests; and in Hong 
Kong, it is the Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative by the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority (HKMA) [184]. However, in Nigeria, the jurisdiction 
adoption is the ISO/IEC 27001 Standards mandated by the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) for all Nigerian Banks and Financial Institutions. In this study, 
we explored the Nigerian jurisdiction adoption of ISO/IEC 27001 Standards as 
a regional case study for security compliance in banking organisations. 
The steps taken to answer the first research question are summarised as 
follows: 
▪ Identify how Nigerian banks are certified for the ISO/IEC 27001 
Standards as a compliance requirement of the apex bank CBN. 
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▪ Identify the effectiveness of the ISO/IEC 27001 Standards and 
compliance regarding the banks’ overall security posture. 
▪ Identify relevant behavioural theories that may undermine the 
effectiveness of security through compliance. 
▪ Apply theories and develop a survey questionnaire for quantitative 
analysis to help draw an inference and generate descriptive results. 
▪ Perform Partial Least Square Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) 
for validity testing. 
▪ Result analysis and discussion. 
Chapter 4 and 5 presents a detailed answer to research question 1, parts of the 
research output for this piece of work have been published in HAS2016 and 
WMSCI2017 conference proceedings as well as the JSCI2017 Journal. 
  
  
Figure 3.3. A low-level overview of the research process 
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RQ2: “How can we profile malicious insiders by aggregating risk 
indicators from unrelated risk domains and safeguard security protocol 
violations?” 
Following the research question 1, it was established that security by 
compliance is a far-fetched approach regarding organisation security posture.  
In many cases, it is not the security policies or standards that is inadequate but 
because of the human element, which is the weakest link [9]. Human behaviour 
is an unpredictable variable in any security effort, and the insider problem 
continues to generate interest among researchers [3]. The second research 
question is to address the malicious insider problem by aggregating risks 
indicators from unconnected risk domains. The idea is based on the fact that 
insiders do not violate security protocols on a whim. Instead, they show in 
advance of attack some subtle behavioural patterns. Although, behavioural 
risk attributes may be nuance and appear to be unconnected with the intention 
to violate security protocol, especially when treated in isolation. However, 
when risk indicators are aggregated from other risk domains as well, this study 
assumes that the chances of positively profiling a malicious insider increases. 
 The steps taken to answer the second research question are 
summarised as follows: 
▪ Identify relevant behavioural theories that provide guidelines on how 
human behaviours manifest at different stages of an insider threat 
scenarios. 
▪ Identify literature that links human behaviour to the intention to 
violate security protocol. 
▪ Identifies theories and literature that statistically links personality 
profile to the susceptibility to violate security protocols. 
▪ Identify the frequency and pattern of a technical security breach from 
relevant literature, data logs and information security data-breach 
reports. 
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▪ Develop a System Dynamic Model that describes the dynamic 
relationship between an insider’s behaviour, personality and the 
probability of a cyber security incident. 
▪ Perform simulation analysis showing how the aggregation of risk 
variable from unconnected domains can indicate early signs of the 
intention to violate security protocol. 
▪ Result analysis and discussion. 
Chapter 6 and 7 present a detailed answer to research question 2, parts of the 
research output for this piece of work have been published in HAS2017 and 
SPI2017 conference proceedings. 
 
RQ3: “How can we address the issue of misaligned incentives and 
improve resource allocation decisions for cybersecurity investments?” 
After addressing the research question 1 and 2, our findings lead to research 
question 3 which is based on cybersecurity planning, resource allocation and 
decision support. Ultimately, organisations want to defend against security 
breaches and ensure compliance by its employees. Security incidents can be as 
a result of external attacks, malicious insiders or unintentional security 
violation [91], either way, the financial impact of cyber-attacks is often 
colossal, extremely damaging to business continuity and challenging to 
quantify [45]. More so, the decision process to allocate resources for 
cybersecurity investment is often difficult because of the diverse incentives 
and preferences over risks prioritisation between security managers, 
investors and C-level executives [153]. Security managers are interested in 
security-enhancing assets at the expense of cash flow; while C-level executives 
are interested in productive assets that guarantee a long-term profit. Although, 
cybersecurity is increasingly considered vital for managing organisations 
financial risk but how to measure high-impact security risks, plan for 
mitigation efforts or prioritise resource allocations is difficult, given limited 
security budget. 
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The steps taken to answer the third research question are summarised as 
follows: 
▪ Identify relevant literature that links optimal resource allocation 
problem to the disparities in resource allocation decision. 
▪ Develop a conceptual model of an enterprise as a case study for 
resource allocation decision support. 
▪ Identify the verifiable historical cost of data breaches in organisations 
from security reports as parametric values for the conceptual 
enterprise model. 
▪ Perform Monte Carlo simulation within the context of information 
security to show how to reduce the disparities in resource allocation 
decision. 
▪ Result analysis and discussion. 
Chapter 8 presents a detailed answer to research question 3, parts of the 
research output for this piece of work have been published in the IJCIS2017 
Journal. 
 Research Methodology 
The research methodology adopted for this work is based on the combination 
of qualitative and quantitative study as well as modelling/simulation-based 
approach. The appropriateness of these research approaches lies in the 
applicability of this study. Qualitative research is particularly appropriate for 
situations where a detailed understanding of the subject matter is required 
[185]; especially where the outcome of situations can be affected by the 
underlying perception of the participants. The outcome of the qualitative study 
is a product of quantified elements expressed regarding contextual 
implication. Quantitative research allows the presentation of a snapshot view 
of samples for generalisation purposes, especially where a standardise 
comparison is vital to the breath coverage of many people or events [186]. 
Also, the ability to apply statistical methods for validity testing, measurement 
and analysis improve the soundness of the approach regarding an objective 
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outlook. Modelling and simulation-based approach offer a platform for 
developing insights to model real-world scenarios [137]. Models are 
particularly useful where problems are complex, and real-life experimental 
solutions are impractical [187]. In the case of enterprise cybersecurity, where 
critical information assets cannot be subjected to real-life experiments or 
human behaviour which is difficult to predict; modelling and simulations are 
valuable platforms where the interplay of complex variables can be simulated 
in abstraction to explain the phenomenon that may be too costly to experience 
directly. This work combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research 
from which primary and secondary data were obtained as parametric 
variables for the research modelling and simulations. 
3.3.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Research Approach 
As described in section 3.3, a combination of qualitative and quantitative or 
what may be considered as a mixed methods research design is adopted for 
this work. This approach allows the exploration of a single research problem 
by integrating elements of both quantitative and qualitative methods, 
regarding data collation and analysis  [188]. A qualitative approach 
investigates local knowledge and understanding of a given issue or people’s 
expectations while a quantitative approach explores specific and clearly 
defined questions that examine the relationship between two events. Starting 
with a qualitative approach through semi-structured interviews of a small 
number of information security officers, some factors that may undermine 
employee compliance to information security protocols in banking 
organisations are identified, while using Nigerian banks as a regional case 
study. The interview approach has been considered to be useful to generate 
true feelings of respondent on contextual issues especially at the early stage of 
research [189]  The qualitative data obtained is used in the design of the 
survey questionnaire in order to generate quantitative data. In particular, 
through the information security survey questionnaire designed for 
employees of the banks, it is possible to establish an understanding of 
respondents’ attitude to security policies by capturing survey responses to 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN 
78 
    
“security culture statements” and “security knowledge and awareness 
statements”.  Also, the quantitative data generated is used for model validity 
testing. There are significant advantages in adopting mixed model research as 
explained in literature because it broadens the range of data sources and 
methods of data collection; therefore, the quality of research outcome is 
considerably increased in terms of result validation, interpretation and 
context [185]. The following sub-section describes how data are collected from 
primary and secondary sources for this work. 
3.3.1.1 Primary Data 
Interview: The research interview is one of the most important qualitative 
research data collection methods [190]. Semi-structured interview questions 
are developed specifically for CISO of the participating banks (as a regional 
case study) in order to capture the depth and effectiveness of compliance with 
the ISO/IEC27001 Standardisation. Case studies are best chosen when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are blurred; and allows the 
exploration and understanding of complex issues particularly when a holistic, 
in-depth investigation is required [191]. In the context of this study, it is hard 
to understand how security protocols are violated without obtaining first-
hand accounts from the banks CEOs, especially, since the focus of this study is 
on ISO/IEC27001 certified banks. In order to help overcome this initial 
challenge, the interview aspect of the primary data collection stage is set out 
based on the guidelines in [192]. Where it is suggested that open-ended 
questions allow detail responses that are necessary to understand a 
phenomenon of which little is known, as in the case of the compliant security 
model in this study. It is also suggested that a sequence of question and 
consistency should be maintained during the interview. All the suggestions are 
significant to the design of the interview questions for IS officers in this study 
(included in Appendix I). Responses from the interview questions are 
evaluated along with the IS survey design in literature, to help develop the 
survey questions in this study. 
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Survey: Survey research methodology is generally applied to elicit important 
constructs from the phenomenon of interest and the best ways to measure 
those constructs [193]. Survey research has been suggested [194] to be most 
appropriate for research design if it satisfies four important aspects of 
research, all of which have been considered appropriate for the current 
investigation. The conditions are as follows: 
▪ The question about the research interest is on “What is happening?” or 
“Why and How is it happening?”. In the context of this study, the quest 
is to understand what factors undermine compliant security in banking 
organisations. 
▪ The control of dependent and independent variables are not either 
possible or desirable. This study uses the perception of compliant 
behaviour as a primary observation unit. 
▪ The subject of interest must be explored in their natural settings. In the 
context of this study, individuals security compliant behaviour is 
explored with respect to their organisation settings. 
▪ The subject of interest must occur in the current time or in the recent 
past. Ongoing compliant security behaviour in banking organisations is 
the phenomenon of interest in this study. 
This study’s survey is designed to capture how ISO/IEC 27001 compliant 
banks that take part in this study implements policies and how employees 
respond to situations within the context of information security. The survey 
questions are structured to provide numerical data that can be explored 
statistically, and yield results that can be generalised to some larger 
population. The recruitment strategy for this part of the work is based on a 
presumably representative sample and randomly selected bank employees. A 
detailed recruitment strategy is discussed later in chapter 4.  
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3.3.1.2 Secondary Data 
Scientific Publications: Some of the secondary data obtained for this work 
comes from scientific journals, conference proceedings and white papers. For 
instance, through relevant behavioural theories, extensive personality 
research and experimental results, it is possible to obtain parametric variables 
for our models and simulations. 
Data Breach Reports: Reports of data breach incidents obtained from 
independent studies, governmental department and other non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) provides vital information essential to the 
understanding of the current threat landscape across organisations. For 
instance, the Verizon enterprise solutions’ data breach investigation report 
[195] and the Ponemon Institute/IBM Security cost of data breach study [196] 
help identify technical security breaches, nature of security incidents and what 
triggers security breach in most cases. This information also helped to 
developed parametric variables for our models and simulations. 
3.3.2 Modelling and Simulation-Based Approach 
As mentioned earlier, modelling and simulation-based approach are essential 
for exploring complex real-world problems in an abstractive environment. In 
this study, different modelling and simulation approaches are applied to 
address each of the research questions. The following subsections describe the 
models and simulations used for different elements of this work: 
3.3.2.1 PLS-SEM Model 
As part of the efforts to answer research question 1, this study applies Partial 
Least Square Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) to test the model 
construct and the validity of the research measurement model. PLS-SEM can 
test both measurement and structural models and also has less stringent 
distribution assumption [197]. Similarly, the reliability of the model construct 
is tested through the measurement of Cronbach’s alpha to establish the 
consistency of survey responses across the scale. 
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3.3.2.2 System Dynamic Model  
To address the research question 2, System Dynamics Modelling is used to link 
hypothesised structure with the observed behaviour of model entities over a 
period. Ventana Systems (Vensim PLE) is a fully functional system dynamics 
software package that can be used to address a variety of problems, and the 
causal loop tracing enables accurate and fast analysis of model dynamics. In 
the context of this work, Vensim is applied to establish causal tracing, 
dependencies and dynamic relationships between different domain risk 
indicators and the overall implication for cybersecurity incidents. 
3.3.2.3 MATLAB (Matrix Laboratory) Simulation Model 
As part of the efforts to address research question 2, modelling and simulation 
are also conducted in MATLAB. Developed by MathWorks, MATLAB is a 
versatile and powerful multi-paradigm computing environment that allows 
matrix manipulation for problem-solving. In the context of this work, MATLAB 
is applied to simulate a matrix table of values for an employee. The output from 
the simulation is used to establish the susceptibility of the employee to violate 
security protocols.  
3.3.2.4 Monte Carlo Risk Modelling (ModelRisk) 
In order to address the research question 3, Monte-Carlo simulation is 
conducted using the ‘ModelRisk’ software. Model risk is a quantitative risk 
analysis tool that is entrenched with probability distribution functions to 
describe uncertainties about input variables. Within the context of this work, 
‘ModelRisk’ is used to generate 3-point estimation based on thousands of 
possible scenarios, to address the security resource allocation problems. 
3.3.2.5 Model Validation and Verification 
All models require some forms of justification that it is fit for purpose. 
However, random variables make it hard for modellers to determine and 
reason about the behaviour of a model under unknown conditions; and check 
that it is a good fit [187]. Replacing random variables with deterministic ones 
can help ascertain if the model is behaving correctly [198]. When the 
behaviour representation of a model is known to be correct, then random 
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variables can be introduced using continuous time distribution. In the context 
of this study, the soundness of model assumptions is compared with 
simulation output from different models, under known conditions. 
 Research Ethics 
It is important that when conducting research studies, the legal requirements 
of data protection and the confidentiality rights of research subjects are 
respected at all times [186]. There are many professional bodies that provide 
guidelines on research survey ethical conducts [199], all suggesting that 
ethical consideration in research is critical. There should be respect for 
organisations’ autonomy while also respecting organisations concern for the 
safety of human subjects in the research. In this respect, this study includes 
important ethical statements in the recruitment method. Firstly, the issue of 
consent was addressed prior to the commencement of the survey exercise, 
making it clear that participation was voluntary, to which prior approval was 
received. Secondly, the collected data are confidential and anonymised; and 
lastly, the privacy of participants and organisations are ensured. In addition, 
at the end of the survey/study, links to the online survey tool is deactivated, as 
can be seen in Appendix VI. 
 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the research design, presented the research questions 
again and itemised the steps taken to address each of the research questions 
in this study. The chapter also presents the research methodology, touching on 
the research approach, data collection methods, modelling and simulation 
tools and the relevance of each element of the research methods to the 
research questions. The chapter also touched on the important ethical 
considerations of this study. The next section presents the research 
contribution focus of this thesis; covering the exploratory study results, 
developed methods and models that address the compliance, malicious insider 













































SECTION 2: DEVELOPED METHODS AND MODELS 
This section introduces the core part of this doctoral work by presenting the 
methods and models developed to answer all the research questions in this 
thesis. Each chapter represents a substantial piece of work and contributions 
that complement the efforts to address compliant security problems, malicious 
insider problems and cybersecurity resource allocation problems. The 
breakdown of the chapters are as follows: 
▪ Chapter 4: Security by Compliance and The Implications for Banking 
Organisations. 
▪ Chapter 5: Exploratory Study of Compliance-Based Information 
Security Management in Banking Organizations. 
▪ Chapter 6: System Dynamics Approach to Malicious Insider Cyber-
Threat Modelling and Analysis. 
▪ Chapter 7: Malicious Insider Threat Detection: A Conceptual Model. 
▪ Chapter 8: Towards Understanding Incentives and Security Investment 
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by Compliance? A Study of Insider Threat Implications for Nigerian Banks’, 
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Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Toronto, Canada: Springer, Cham, pp. 128–






CHAPTER 4: SECURITY BY COMPLIANCE AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR BANKING 
ORGANISATIONS 
88 
    
 Introduction 
The ubiquitous and interconnected nature of information systems, coupled 
with the ever-increasing cyber-capabilities of adversaries, means that 
information security (IS) is central to the protection, dependability and 
management of information assets for businesses and organisations. Banking 
and financial organisations operate in a dynamic and complex environment 
where risk management is an endless game between system defenders and 
adversaries, such that, threats to critical assets could compromise capital 
gains, human resource, time and competitive advantage for businesses [200]. 
Organisations take measures to protect information assets, ensure business 
continuity and reduce the risk of security breaches by implementing 
information security guidelines and protocols.  
 In response to the increase in cyber security incidents on critical 
infrastructures, industry regulators make it a mandatory requirement for 
operators to implement security policies in accordance with industry 
standards and regulations. For instance, under the Executive Order 13636, the 
US Federal Government introduced a technical framework and regulation 
aimed at protecting critical national infrastructure (CNI) cybersecurity and 
buildings [201]. Likewise, the EU put forward a proposal for a specific 
European Directive relating to the CNI operators, in both private and public 
enterprises for the management and regulation of cybersecurity issues [74]. In 
banks and financial organisations, information security risk is part of the 
overall management of operational risk. Any failure to implement appropriate 
security controls is considered a compliance issue, which can attract sanctions 
from industry regulators [200]. Compliant security is the acceptance of 
external entity defined controls, in the form of corporate governance, 
legislative and industry regulations. However, compliance-based security is 
determined by factors like the level of organisation security control 
requirements, the adoption, application and interpretation of different 
standards within the context of specific need [202].  
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This chapter introduces the first phase of the compliant security study and the 
discussion in this pilot study explores the behavioural dimension of 
compliance with information security standards. Based on the review of past 
literature, this study focuses on the factors that are integral to compliant 
security in Nigerian banking organisations. Based on the recommendations of 
an established model of information security governance framework [48], 
discussed in the literature review, and the application of the “Broken Window” 
theory [203] [204] from the field of criminology, to shape the narratives of 
compliant security; the study proposes how information security may be 
embedded into organisation security culture in that context.  
 The rest of this chapter is organised as follows; Section 4.2 covers the 
research method where the research case selection, data collection, sample 
demography and survey development are discussed. Results and analysis are 
presented in section 4.3. Section 4.4 covers a case scenario of how to embed 
security into organisation culture, while section 4.5 overs the conclusion, 
research implication and suggestions for future work. 
 Research Method 
In respect to the overview of research methodology described in chapter 3, the 
following sections describe the design approach, method, and steps taken to 
address the compliance element of this study. 
4.2.1 Case Selection 
In line with the purposeful sampling technique to identify the critical case, in 
order to test theory within a real-life context [205], the case selection for this 
study is based on four major commercial banking organisations in Nigeria 
(using Bank A, B, C and D as a pseudonym). The four banks (ABCD) provides 
financial services to the three tiers of Nigeria government (local, state and 
federal agencies), also operating in all the 36 states of Nigeria, some African 
States and in European countries. Recently (in 2015), under the directives of 
the CBN, banks A, B, C and D achieved the ISO/IEC27001 certification and 
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compliance statuses, thereby driving their ISP program through the 
certification guideline. 
Prior to the CBN directives, there was not a single unifying certification status 
or standard adopted for the Nigeria banking industry. The norm was that 
different banks develop, communicate and enforce their Information Security 
Policy (ISP) programs through various initiatives. The four selected banks for 
this study are all considered appropriate to investigate the first research 
question of this thesis. The management contact in CBN was very supportive 
of this study as it provides the opportunity to gain an insight into the 
effectiveness of the compliance program. 
4.2.2 Data Collection 
The data collection stages are shown in Table 4.1, involving the banks A, B, C, D 
and the CBN was carried out over two weeks between January and February 
2016. At the first stage of the data collection, a semi-structured interview was 
conducted with the CISOs of the banks, and in cases where the CISO is not 
available, the interview was conducted with the next most senior security 
manager. The CISOs understanding of the research context was vital to this 
study, and the interview responses were instrumental to the design of the 
survey questionnaire. A sample of the interview question is included in 
Appendix II. 
 
Stage Method Contact Output 
Stage 1 Interview 
CISO Bank A 
Interview 
Responses 
CISO Bank B 
Snr Security Manager Bank C 
CISO Bank D 
Stage 2 Survey Pre-test 
CISO Bank A 
Recommendation 
for adjustments & 
Approval 
CISO Bank B 
Snr Security Manager Bank C 
CISO Bank D 
Stage 3 Online Survey 






N/A Survey Data 
Table 4.1. Data Collection Stages 
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Responses from the interview questions are analysed, then in conjunction with 
established constructs from IS surveys [206], [207], a survey instrument was 
developed to fit the research model in this study. The preliminary version of 
the survey questionnaire was pretested with the security managers for 
feedback on comprehension, wording and fit-for-purpose. The final version 
was deployed in the form of an online survey through Google Forms, targeting 
(potentially) 800 participants over 2 weeks. There were 507 total respondents 
of which 7 invalid responses were recorded, and the rest of the valid 500 
responses were considered for this study. 
4.2.3  Sample Demography 
4.2.3.1 Demography 
All the participants in this study are employees of the banks discussed in the 
previous sub-section are drawn from different units/job positions in our 
target population. The participants are categorised under the 
Executive/Senior Level Managers, HR and Administration, IT Department, 
Operations and Others. Although not captured in the survey questionnaire 
(but based on the feedback from the pre-survey interview), all the survey 
respondents have been working in the banks between two and over ten years. 
Importantly, also, the study focus is on generic employee approach to security 
compliance. Therefore, sample characteristics are not distinguished by gender 
or job tenure. 
4.2.3.2 Sampling 
Sampling is described as the systematic inclusion of selected cases in a 
research project [208]. since it is operationally and economically impractical 
to collect data from every single person in a given population, a sample of the 
population needs to be selected for generalisation purposes [186]. in that 
context, the sample selection for this study is based on the interest of the banks 
to take part in the study.  In addition, each of the participating banks A, B, C, D 
and the CBN have more than 1000 employees; and all the participating banks 
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have been certified ISO/IEC 27001 compliant. Importantly too, all the banks 
are using ISO certification to drive information security awareness. 
4.2.3.3 Sample Frame 
The recruitment strategy for this work is based on random selection from a 
representative group of bank employees. In terms of the sample frame, 
important steps have also been taken to prevent/reduce sample bias by 
including various representative units in this study, i.e. various bank branches 
from different states in Nigeria. For instance, the sample frame is drawn from 
bank branches from different districts in Abuja (the Federal Capital Territory 
of Nigeria) and branches from different local government areas Lagos state 
(the Commercial Centre of Nigeria). It is also ensured that respondents are 
drawn from different departments within the banks. 
4.2.4 Survey Development 
Survey methodology can be used to study employees’ opinion, attitude and 
behavioural patterns within the context of information security [209]. This 
study surveyed four banks in Nigeria to gain the understanding of how security 
awareness and employee behaviour impacts on policy compliance. The survey 
is designed to capture how compliance-certified financial institutions 
implement policies and how employees respond to situations in the context of 
information security. It is important to point out again that results are 
obtained anonymously for the survey element of this work; due to data 
protection issues and the participating banks’ reluctance to share vulnerability 
information,  
 An online survey was adapted from the survey methodology  
described in [206], [207], [209], which provided insights on how to design 
information security survey questions, to maximise response rate and 
minimise error. The literature also provided insight on how to make 
questionnaire short, easy to read, comprehend and using appropriate 
languages. Again, rather than using one of the standard information security 
survey questionnaires, this study combined interview responses with the 
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adopted survey methods in [206],[207], to develop survey instruments that 
are presumably more focused to the participating subjects, as a regional case 
study.   
The survey questions are divided into three parts; security culture statements, 
knowledge and awareness statements and demography. Security culture 
statement assesses the behavioural pattern of employees that could 
undermine the effective implementation of policies. Knowledge and 
awareness statement assess the understanding of security policy 
requirements, while the demographic question captures survey 
representatives for segmentation analysis.  
 The survey questions follow a Likert scale response model (strongly agree, 
agree, uncertain, disagree and strongly disagree), except for question 1, which 
only measures the survey demography. Table 4.2 shows an extracted sample of 
questions from the online survey, and a complete survey questionnaire is 
included in Appendix III. A breakdown of the survey instrument and the 
literature from which they are adapted is also included in Appendix IV. Survey 
tool chosen for this work is Google Forms, an online survey application that 
allows real-time responses, data collation and analysis. The survey was 
Table 4.2. Extracts from the online information security survey 
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conducted over two weeks, and respondents were invited to take part in the 
survey through email communication, following the initial clearance from each 
of the participating bank’s CISO. Additional recruitment information is 
included in Appendix V. 
 Results and Analysis 
The Likert-type 5-point scale system used in this study is applied based on the 
survey data analysis in [210], whereby the numbers assigned to the 
measurement scale are treated as interval data, from which different 
responses can be calculated to obtain a measurable outcome. In that respect, 
our data is analysed by assigning a range value from 1 to 5 for each of the 
survey questions categorised under the security culture statements and the 
knowledge/awareness statements. Such that, if a statement is true from a 
security standpoint, five corresponds to ‘strongly agree’ and one corresponds 
to ‘strongly disagree’. Respondents are then analysed by demography based 
on collective points. The maximum score per respondent is 55 points, which 
implies good security behaviour and compliance, while lower scores down to 
the minimum of 11 points lean towards poor security posture and non-
compliance.  
 The demography of respondents is shown in Figure 4.1. 15.8% 
represents the executive/senior manager level, 12.3% from the IT 
department, 14% from HR and administration, 40.4% from Operations and 
17.5% represents other categories. Job functions of other categories include 
marketing, accountancy, risk management, sales and predictive analysis.  
 Results from the security culture statement and 
knowledge/awareness statements are shown in Figure 4.2. More than 50% of 
respondents’ view security measures as an inconvenient add-on but agrees 
that security is a necessary part of the secured work environment. 
Organisations need to take extra steps in ensuring that employees view 
security measures as necessary part of job requirements. 
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It is interesting to see that 12.1% strongly disagree and 9.1% disagree with the 
statement that their “organisations have information security policy, and they 
know where to locate a copy”. The implication of this result is that users who 
are not aware of organisation information security policy or know where to 
locate a copy can pose a significant risk. It could be that such users simply 
forget that security policy exists or find policy statements hard to understand. 
When asked if respondents know how to report actual (or suspicious) security 






































Figure 4.1. Demography of respondents 
Figure 4.2. Information security compliance results 
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cannot identify a potential security threat or whom to contact when there is a 
breach/compromise, such users may continue to expose information assets to 
threat by making further use of compromised devices. A significant number or 
respondents constituting 28% are misinformed on how to carry out secure 
disposal of sensitive electronic information. They assumed that data is lost 
permanently when deleted or when hard drives are formatted, this can pose a 
significant risk to an organisation. Forensic solutions that can erase end-of-life 
classified data need to be integrated into asset disposal policy. 
 The survey findings indicate that there is a high sense of security 
awareness, but secure practice and secure behaviour is low, which can have a 
significant impact on compliance. Although, not surprisingly, there seems to 
be higher evidence of compliance by employees in the IT department more 
than any other respondents. Considering that this survey is administered to 
employees from the financial institutions that have been certified ISO/IEC 
27001 compliant, the study supports suggestions in literature [86], [87], [89], 
[90], that security by compliance is a far-fetched approach in terms of a holistic 
information security management. 
 Embedding Security in Organizational Culture 
An organisation’s compliance status is not necessarily a true indication that 
the desired changes in the behaviour of employees are achieved. However, 
given objective situations, it is unlikely that employees would be tempted to 
break the law if compliance is ingrained into organisation culture and 
everyday routine [211]. Embedding security into organisation culture is an 
important aspect of the compliance program. Security culture must adopt a 
top-bottom approach, starting with management buy-in and then gradually 
including everyone else in the organisation. It has been shown that top 
management buy-in and support has an enormous impact on policy 
enforcement and organisational culture [212]. The claim is also supported by 
behavioural theories like the “Broken Window” theory of policing [203], which 
suggests that inadvertently and seemingly unserious behaviour or incivility 
subsequently leads to serious crimes within the community. The translation of 
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this theory into practices in a cosmopolitan environment sees a dramatic 
decrease in high-level crimes when acts of misdemeanour were punished 
[204]. The application of this to security culture is that management top 
hierarchy is responsible for imposing measures which can have considerable 
influence on employee attitude, behaviour and motivation. By paying attention 
to little security details within an organisation, the big picture in the context of 
secured behaviour will begin to take shape. There has to be a demonstration 
of commitment by the management before there can be any success in 
integrating security in organisation culture. 
4.4.1 Compliance Gap Mitigation: Data Security Scenario 
In response to the gaps in the literature on the specific steps that could be 
taken to embed security into organisation culture [180], this section proposes 
conceptual principles and practical guidelines for the enforcement of 
employees’ compliant behavioural changes. It suggests how compliant 
behaviour might be achieved by using data security case scenario and the 
information security governance framework [48]. Consider data security as an 
example; there are possible steps that can be taken to promote the concept of 
security compliance gaps mitigation. All traditional enterprises, organisations 
and government agencies, consider data as a critical and pervasive asset that 
requires top priority response. As such, most organisations understand the 
need for data security but may not necessarily know how to prioritize that for 
all employees. Since national or international data protection acts cover most 
organisations; this should be the starting point for embedding data security 
into organisation culture.  
 The first step to mitigating compliance gaps with respect to data 
security starts with the management top hierarchy, as illustrated by the 
security culture integration concept shown in Figure 4.3. Executive level 
sponsors and management top hierarchy should be able to understand, 
communicate and demonstrate the commitment to address the threats of 
information security in an organization.  
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The second step is that management top hierarchy should also recognise the 
importance of security management organisations by accepting their 
organisations’ legal/ regulatory obligations under the data protection laws of 
relevant jurisdictions (for instance, the ISO/IEC 27001 Standard, in the case 
the Nigerian banking organisations).  
 The third step is to express policy statements and specific guidelines 
for employee behavioural expectations. Data protection should then be 
included in organisation information security policy, which may further 
include point specific statements and policy subsets like regular data backups, 
and unauthorised use of portable devices on corporate computers. Policy 
subsets should show clear guidelines and best practices for ensuring data 
confidentiality, integrity and availability always.  
  
Figure 4.3. Security culture integration concept 
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The fourth step is that technical solutions that complement data protection 
policies can then be introduced as part of the security plan. Policy subset that 
safeguards data loss may suggest that employees regularly backup data, but 
compliance can be enforced if data backup becomes part of job functions. 
Technical solutions that can be leveraged as part of a data security strategy 
may just be a system, which forces or reminds the employee to do a data 
backup every day. Perhaps, if all employees that interact with information 
systems cannot log off after a day’s work without completing backups to the 
central server, this function will become embedded in the organisation 
security culture where data backups become part of the job requirement, 
rather than being seen as an inconvenient security measure. Other policy 
subsets can then be applied to support compliance, for instance, disabling the 
USB ports on all organisation computers to control unauthorised copying of 
confidential information. Also, implementing a system that compels users to 
change passwords at intervals may ensure compliance and reduce threats 
posed by employees that are susceptible to social engineering. To avoid 
productivity challenges often brought about by extra layers of technical 
security; technical solutions can be introduced gradually while focusing 
initially on components that constitute everyday security issues. Therefore, 
employees that often see extra security steps as in-convenient add-ons may 
not be overwhelmed by the perception of reduced productivity, as a result of 
those extra security steps.  
 The fifth step is security program compliance monitoring; continuous 
auditing and compliance monitoring that involves technical and procedural 
controls, there is a better chance of timely response to identifying and 
managing compliance gaps. By identifying compliance gaps, security 
management programs can be set to promote and maintain security 
consciousness throughout the organization. Also, through improved 
resilience, security protocol violations could be significantly reduced. In the 
case of data security, improving resilience may include heightening 
employees’ sense of responsibility surrounding data disclosure and 
unauthorised alterations.  
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 The sixth and final step is user security management. Through user 
awareness and the reinforcement of ethical code of conduct programs, 
employees should become sensitised about company position on data 
protection. Organisations should communicate why data is vital to business 
continuity, how data loss may impact business and what measures can be 
taken to ensure data security. Most importantly, data security should become 
the responsibility of all employees and not only dedicated to a small unit of 
staff.  
 Through these measures, employees will become involved in the 
process of security whereby security requirements are incorporated into 
the organisation system architecture. As employees learn to comply with the 
requirements of a policy, and observed behavioural change starts to emerge to 
the point where secure behaviour becomes second nature, a change in 
organisational culture which is also security driven will become evident. After 
that, management can begin to gently introduce other policy requirements in 
stages until the entire policy becomes embedded in the organisational culture. 
Through continuous assessment, the effectiveness of each security component 
embedded in the organisation culture can be measured over a given period. 
Security metrics may be based on how many times an organisation has 
recorded incidents of data loss since data backup. Employees will ultimately 
identify those changes as part of corporate culture and may not require extra 
motivation, reward or punishment to perform those functions. There are 
additional benefits of improved reputation and efficiency for organisations 
that have sound security practices integrated into its culture; ultimately such 
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 Conclusion 
It is arguable that security compliance is not a novel area of research. However, 
review of the literature confirms that compliance issues are still very valid and 
that the problem space still exists; even in recently ISO/IEC 27001 certified 
banking organisations. The findings of this study suggest that security by 
compliance as a campaign for information security assurance in the Nigerian 
financial institution is a far-fetched approach. In addition to standards, 
banking regulators should promote a holistic change of security culture across 
the sector. The general notion of compliant security is that organisations can 
defend security adequacy through compliant consistency. For instance, if an 
organisation is security focused rather than compliance and a security breach 
occur; it is not as easy to justify the organisation's security efforts, regardless 
of whether the organisation has a substantially grounded security program set 
up. This dynamic has led to a situation where many organisations opt for 
security through compliance, even though it may not be in the best interest of 
the organisation in the long run.  
 Certification is good, as it demonstrates compliance in highly 
regulated industries, but the downside is that business executives often focus 
on the cost of implementing compliance programs and once achieved; they 
operate under the assumption that compliance equates security. In practice, 
the control baseline may be enough for business executives and regulators, but 
it is insufficient in providing holistic security protection. For instance, one of 
the compliance requirements of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) is that data should be encrypted at the FIPS 140 level. If full 
disk encryption is carried out, but the encryption key is stored on the same 
disk, compliance requirements may have been addressed while still insecure. 
A secure and compliant approach would be full disk encryption and 
independent key management. Organisations may demonstrate compliance by 
focusing on the terms of frameworks and regulations but may still be not be 
secured in the context of general security initiatives as evident in the survey 
result of this study.  
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 Policy development is meant to support employees and organisations 
with respect to the culture, workforce and the processes that must be adhered 
to fulfil business objectives. In reality, security policies are often developed 
with a myopic plan of actions by taking best practice and trying to overlay it 
into an organisation while the organisation may not have the tool, the 
capability or the maturity to implement those policies. Security professionals 
need to understand what type of behaviour and actions are currently taking 
place in an enterprise so that security policies that are more targeted and 
actionable can be planned. In particular, behaviours in a certain organisation 
like the banking and financial sectors should continuously be tracked and 
analysed to inform or help how policies should be developed or modified. It is 
believed that in addition to compliance, organisations need to cultivate 
information security culture because compliance is only a part of information 
security, and people rationalise compliant behaviour differently.  
 The strongest influence on organisation culture begins with the 
position of leadership. Leadership acceptance and active participation is a 
crucial aspect of information security. Executive level security representation 
and a change in management behaviour will reflect on employees’ behaviour 
too. Information security channel of communication should be defined, and all 
employees need to be part of security. Also, some organisations have dedicated 
IT units that coordinate the implementation of information security policies, 
rather than promoting a sense of shared responsibility where security is a 
required function for everyone. If policy compliance comes natural to 
employees, it will be much easier for new employees to emulate acceptable 
behaviour through observation.  
 It is unlikely that information security culture can be covered by a 
single framework or few technical solutions. Future research may consider 
how to integrate other frameworks with the one adopted for this work and 
also suggest how human-centric technical solutions can be integrated into 
organisation security culture. In the next chapter, this work is extended by 
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 EXPLORATORY STUDY OF 
COMPLIANCE-BASED 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
MANAGEMENT IN BANKING 
ORGANISATIONS 
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the 
result of a hundred battles.”  
-Sun Tzu (The Art of War) 
 
This chapter has been published in the following journal and conference 
proceeding: 
Fagade, T. and Tryfonas, T. (2017a) ‘Hacking a Bridge: An Exploratory Study 
of Compliance-based Information Security Management in Banking 
Organization’, Journal on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics: JSCI, 
15(Number 5), pp. 74–80.  
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Fagade, T. and Tryfonas, T. (2017b) ‘Hacking a Bridge: An Exploratory Study 
of Compliance-based Information Security Management in Banking 
Organization’, in Nagib Callaos, Elina Gaile-Sarkane, Shigehiro Hashimoto, 
Natalja Lace, and Belkis Sanchez (eds) Proceedings of the 21st World Multi-
Conference on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics (WMSCI 2017), vol. 2. 
Orlando, Florida: International Institute of Informatics and Systemics, Winter 
Garden, Florida. ISBN 978-1-941763-60-5., pp. 94–99. The papers were rectified 
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 Introduction 
The pilot study on compliant security in the previous chapter highlights that 
the problem space in organisations information security awareness (ISA) 
program is still very much valid. The preliminary study is consistent with other 
studies [111][211], that compliance-based security has the propensity for a 
heightened sense of false security and vulnerability perception. An absolute 
compliant security behaviour assurance from all employees is the holy grail 
for most organisations not only because security violations could sometimes 
be accidental but also because human behaviour is unpredictable, and the 
rational calculus of individual behaviour is dominated by benefits over risks 
[111]. In this respect, several kinds of literature have suggested the 
importance of applying behavioural theories to investigate employee 
compliance behaviour [213]. The argument is that behavioural theories will 
allow a deeper understanding of how employees rationalise security 
behaviour and shed light on the appropriate interventions that are most 
effective to improve compliance. 
 In this chapter, the behavioural dimension of information security 
policy compliance is explored by building on different models of human 
behaviour, including the deterrence theory and the rational choice theory. In 
particular, this work is approached through the lens of personality traits (a 
prominent postulation in the criminology domain), and the neutralization 
theory, to show that the level of systemic risk of security protocol violation in 
compliance-based security model can be explained by the level of linkages 
from the personality construct and the neutralization theory.  
 The research is conducted based on a case study of ISO/IEC27001 
Standard certified banks, to empirically evaluate the link between 
cybersecurity protocols violation and how employees rationalise security 
behaviour. Based on the survey responses from banking organization 
employees and the application of Partial Least Squares Structural Equation 
Modelling (PLS-SME) analysis to test the causal model, the hypotheses and 
validate the survey samples, the study infers the importance of individual 
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security scenario effect as a vital element of compliance-based security. It is 
believed that this study will complement the broader body of information 
security research by highlighting the relevance of personality traits and 
neutralization techniques to compliance-based security management.  
 The rest of this chapter is organised as follows; Section 5.2 covers the 
theory development. Research model and hypotheses are described in section 
5.3. In section 5.4, the research method, including the validation of 
measurement, a test of hypotheses and structural model analysis are 
presented. Section 5.5 focuses on the discussion of results. Finally, the 
conclusion is covered in section 5.6, where the study implications and the 
proposition for the next phase of work are presented.  
 Theory Development 
Another gap identified as part of the literature review in chapter 2 is the role 
of personality traits and neutralization theory in organisation compliance 
programme when both factors are considered together in a single study. This 
study draws on prevailing human behaviour theories to explain how 
individual calculus may lead to the intention to violate organisation security 
protocols. Information security literature has shown that security culture and 
awareness is very significant to attitude formation that could either be 
favourable or unfavourable towards compliant behaviour [214]. Therefore, 
organisations conduct awareness training and comprehensive procedures for 
employees to forestall misconduct and security protocol violations [111]. 
However, because human behaviour is very difficult to lock down, and given 
the similarities between criminal behaviour in societal setting and information 
security violation behaviour in organisations, scholars have started to apply 
theories from criminology literature as the foundation for information 
security research [215],[115]. For instance, the Rational Choice Theory 
suggests that the decision to engage in criminal behaviour is subject to two 
different motivational elements; the benefits of the criminal act and the 
perceived cost of carrying out the act [216]. Hence, individuals have some 
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awareness of security protocol violation consequences, but makes a reasoned 
judgement based on the cost-benefit evaluation of the intended act [217].  
 Furthermore, individuals often exercise some restrains even in highly 
rewarding criminal situations, as informed by the Deterrence Theory. When 
faced with the conscious choice to violate protocol or commit crime, 
deterrence theory suggests that based on the fundamental rationality of 
human; only when the act is rewarding would that choice be made, but when 
the perceived certainty and severity of sanctions against the act are greater, 
there would be less motivation to commit the same crime [218]. In that 
respect, some organisations introduce the elements of punishment and 
reward to influence security compliance. Equally interesting also, is how 
humans try to dampen their internalised guilt and justify non-compliance 
security behaviour. Deterrence mechanism is not always effective at curbing 
security protocol violations [115], because individuals tend to conceptualise 
personal norms and justify actions that are otherwise not acceptable, through 
the application of neutralisation techniques. 
 Neutralisation theory suggests that individual act of defiance or rule 
breaking can be rationalised by absolving from all sense of responsibility as to 
why the defiance act took place; this can be achieved either in response to 
cognitive dissonance as a precondition to the act, or to be free from personal 
sense of guilt after the act [219]. However, Self-Control Theory suggests that 
the potential to commit a crime may domicile in everyone but in the end, not 
everyone commits crime because of the individual differences in the ability to 
exercise self-control. Self-control ability is established early in life, and similar 
to the Personality Traits, it remains fairly stable throughout an individual’s 
lifetime [220] and [104]. It is, therefore, safe to assume that the rational choice 
to violate security protocol is a function of individual and situational factors 
[221]. Hence [104] concludes that individual personality traits and the cross-
level interaction with security scenario effect determine the propensity to 
violate security protocols. In the context of information security, this study 
adopts the technique of neutralization, personality traits and security culture 
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to test the causal relationship between theories and organisation security 
compliance programs. 
 Research Model and Hypotheses 
The research model is based on three constructs; the personality traits, the 
security culture and the neutralization technique. Description of the three 
constructs with respect to this study and the hypotheses derived are as 
follows:  
5.3.1 The Role of Personality Traits and Security Scenario Effects  
Evidence from the literature has shown that individual personality traits 
described by the ‘Big Five’ psychological constructs of Openness, 
Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism (OCEAN), 
can reveal a significant aspect of human behaviour [104]. In the context of 
information security, it is suggested that individuals with the same personality 
traits react differently to the same condition depending on the associated 
security scenario effect like self-efficacy, sanction severity, sanction certainty 
and response cost [116]. Therefore, differences in compliant behaviour 
intentions are based on the cross-level relationship between personality types 
and the way we respond to the security scenario effect. For instance, as 
illustrated in Table 5.1, two different employees with ‘agreeable’ personality 
and Narcissistic personality are likely to violate security protocols, if, under 
security scenario effects, they both show a low sense of sanction certainty. 
 
Personality Notation Security Scenario Effect 
Openness O Low sense of sanction severity 
Conscientiousness C Low sense of response efficacy 
Extraversion E Low sense of threat severity, threat 
vulnerability and response cost 
Agreeableness A Low sense of sanction certainty 
Narcissism N Low sense of sanction certainty 
Table 5.1. Cross-level interaction between personality traits and security scenario 
effects (McBride, 2012)  
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Similarly, an employee with openness personality but a low sense of sanction 
severity or another with conscientiousness characteristic but a low sense of 
response efficacy is likely to violate security protocols. Therefore, this study 
hypothesizes the following based on three types of personality traits, which 
are supported by literature [104]: 
H1a: Personality trait of ‘Openness’ and a low sense of sanction 
severity can negatively affect compliant security model. 
An individual that has the ‘Openness’ personality trait; anchors on being 
consistent and cautious, as opposed to being inventive and curious. If the 
person’s situational factor is low sanction severity, the perceived harshness of 
the punishment associated with security protocol violation will be 
undermined. 
H1b: Personality trait of ‘Conscientiousness’ and a low sense of 
response efficacy can negatively affect compliant security model. 
A person with ‘Conscientiousness’ personality trait, anchors on being easy-
going and careless, as opposed to being efficient and organised. If the person’s 
situational factor is a low sense of response efficacy, the perceived 
effectiveness of organisational security policy will be undermined. 
 H1c: Personality traits of ‘Extraversion’ and a low sense of threat 
vulnerability can negatively affect compliant security model. 
An individual that has an ‘Extraversion’ personality trait; anchors on being 
solitary and reserved, as opposed to being outgoing and energetic. If the 
person’s situational factor is a low sense of threat severity, threat vulnerability 
and response cost; the perceived risk, seriousness of risk or the perceived 
consequences of security protocol violation will be undermined. 
5.3.2 The Role of Neutralization Techniques  
Neutralization theory, introduced by [222], suggests that most adolescents are 
dissuaded from activities that violate societal norms because of associated 
guilts and shames. However, in order to obtain episodic relief from moral 
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constraint, individuals adopt the technique of neutralization to offset their 
guilt and freely engage in delinquency without impacting their self-image 
[223]. Researchers have applied neutralization techniques in various forms of 
rule-breaking or deviance behaviour that are not necessarily criminal [115]. 
Neutralization theory provides explanatory insight into how people are able 
to justify and break loose from restrictive societal norms and are able to 
rationalise rule-breaking actions without remorse [224]. Neutralization 
techniques have gained increasing appeal from behavioural scientists to 
understand and mitigate workplace deviance. The five neutralization 
techniques outlined in  [222] are: 1) denial of injury, 2) denial of responsibility, 
3) appeal to higher loyalties, 4) denial of victims, and 5) condemnation of 
condemners.  
 This study considers three neutralization techniques within the 
context of Information Security (IS) and hypothesizes the following, which are 
also supported by literature[222]: 
H2a: Denial of Responsibility negatively affects compliant security 
model. 
Denial of Responsibility: this is a technique adopted to justify security risk 
behaviour by acknowledging that although certain actions are wrong, the 
offender claims that the situation is forced upon them and they had no choice. 
This could be a case of taking home sensitive corporate data in the bid to meet 
up with project deadlines. 
H2b: Denial of Injury negatively affects compliant security model. 
Denial of Injury:  this technique is a case whereby an offender admits to the 
violation of security protocol but try to justify his action by assuming that, no 
one is harmed because of his action. A typical example of this technique in IS 
context is the sharing of passwords with colleagues. 
H2c: Blaming the Victim negatively affects compliant security model.  
Blaming the Victim: with this technique, an offender acknowledges that there 
may be some damaging consequences associated with risky behaviour, but the 
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offender blames the victim, e.g. an organisation, a manager or a supervisor as 
the reason for his action. An example of this in IS context is the installation of 
unauthorised software to access restricted websites on corporate networks.  
5.3.3 The Role of Information Security Culture, Knowledge and 
Awareness 
The general assumption is that training and awareness, as well as security 
culture, can counteract individual neutralization technique, leading to 
significant improvement in organisation compliance level [225]. In that 
respect, and also based on the pilot study in chapter 4, this study hypothesis 
that: 
H3a: Security culture positively affects actual compliance level. 
A strong information security culture helps to subconsciously modify 
employees’ intention from the evaluation stage to the execution stage, 
whenever the security policy violation is contemplated [9]. Security culture is 
therefore vital for managing organisational security compliance programs. 
 Research Method 
The survey methodology for this study is based on the same approach 
discussed for the study in chapter 4; it covers the same banking organisations 
and the same number of respondents. In order to avoid unnecessary 
duplication, the reader should refer to sections 4.2.1 (case selection), 4.2.2 
(data collection), 4.2.3 (sample demography) and 4.2.4 (survey development) 
in chapter 4 of this thesis. However, the survey instrument in this study is 
adapted from the literature on personality traits and the techniques of 
neutralization studies, in the context of information security. 
5.4.1 Survey Development 
The survey questions are divided into three constructs; personality traits, 
neutralisation techniques and security culture based on the hypotheses 
described earlier. There are also sixteen measurement items developed for the 
three constructs. Also, all the constructs are measured with multiple items on 
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the 5-point Likert-scale response model (strongly agree, agree, uncertain, 
disagree and strongly disagree) as described in chapter 4. It is important to 
note here that six of the measurement items relating to the constructs under 
personality traits are adopted from the studies of [104], [224]. Also, another 
six measurement items relating to the construct under neutralization 
techniques are adopted from [206], [76]. The last four measurements under 
the knowledge and awareness construct are included from the survey 
instrument in chapter 4. A copy of the survey measurement model and the 
literature from which they are adapted is also included in Appendix VI. 
5.4.2 Validation of Measurement  
Validation and reliability test of the result as shown in Table 5.2 follows the 
recommendation of data measurement goodness-of-fit in the literature [197], 
[226], while the measurement constructs and survey items are also tested for 
cotemporary recommended goodness-of-fit criteria based on PLS-SEM.  
 







































Table 5.2. Latent Variables validity and reliability measurement 
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To ascertain error-free, construct reliability, and internal consistency of result, 
values for the composite reliability (C.R) index for all constructs are assessed. 
Composite reliability is obtained by combining all the true score variances and 
covariances in the composite of indicator variables, and by dividing it by the 
total variance in the composite. C.R is used to check the internal consistency, 
which should be greater than the benchmark of 0.7 to be considered adequate. 
In this result, the C.Rs are higher than the critical threshold of 0.70, indicating 
adequate reliability for all constructs as can be seen in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 
respectively. In order to accept the criteria of indicators reliability, the outer 
loadings are expected to be greater than 0.70. Although, in terms of the 
relevance of indicators examined through p-statistic. The p-value of the two 
indicators from two different constructs are not significant. However, when 
the outer loadings of these constructs are examined, they are both above the 
0.70 that is recommended for all indicators; which are conditions suggesting 
that the indicators can be kept in the model [197]. 
 
  
Figure 5.1. Structural Equation Model Results 
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Similarly, the measure of convergent validity based on the average variance 
extracted (AVE) for each construct exceeds the recommended 0.5 threshold 
criteria. The measurement items discriminant reliability assessment for 
almost all samples produced acceptable results. In addition, the loadings for 
all indicators are above 0.70, except for DR2 and KA1, which are very close to 
the recommended threshold at 0.69 and 0.64 respectively. Hence, we conclude 
that contemporary recommendations for the convergent and discriminant 
validity have been met. 
5.4.3 Structural Model Analysis  
All hypotheses are tested to measure the effect of neutralization and 
personality traits alongside different variables on the compliance-based 
security model. Further data analysis is conducted with IBM SPSS Statistics 
23.0 [227] and SmartPLS 3.0 [228] packages. In addition, the t -statistics is 
calculated by conducting bootstrapping with 3,000 subsamples as a non-
parametric re-sampling procedure, to evaluate the significance of the data 
coefficient. Table 5.3 shows the structural model result including the path 
coefficient for all hypotheses and the significance of the path (p-value). 
 
Hypothesis Path coefficients t-value p-value 
H1a: LSS➔ Compliant security model  0.45 2.42 n.s. 
H1b: LRE➔ Compliant security model -0.39* 1.95 P<0.01 
H1c: LTV➔ Compliant security model -0.68*** 0.18 P<0.01 
H2a:  DR➔ Compliant security model 0.27** 2.47 P<0.05 
H2b:    DI➔  Compliant security model 1.30*** 3.64 P<0.01 
H2c:  BV➔ Compliant security model -0.02 0.17 n.s. 
H3a:   SC➔   Actual Compliant Level 0.91*** 2.99 0.01 
Note: n.s. not significant  ***p<0.01 **p<0.05    
Table 5.3. Findings on structural relationship showing path loadings and t-values  
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As hypothesized, this study found that H1b, H1c, H2a, H2b, and H3a are 
supported, while H1a, H2c are not. This implies that the compliance-based 
security model is significantly influenced by neutralization techniques, 
especially DR and DI in this case. Similarly, personality traits and cross-level 
interaction with security scenario effects have a direct bearing on the 
effectiveness of compliance-based security model. This result is also 
supported by the results obtained in [224], [229], although, this work is based 
on slightly different constructs. 
 Discussion of Results 
The results of this study show the extent of coping with the appraisals of a 
security violation. In terms of personality traits and the interaction with 
security scenario effects, the result shows that both conscientiousness 
personality with a low sense of response efficacy H1b (p<0.01); and 
extraversion personality with a low sense of threat vulnerability H1c (p, 
<0.01), have a weak negative effect on the compliance security model. This 
result is consistent with the study in [104], and also indicates that employees 
with a limited appraisal of the vulnerabilities that are introduced by non-
compliance may have a higher chance of violating security protocol.  
 However, the openness personality with a low sense of sanction 
severity H1a is not supported in this study. This is contrary to the results of 
[104], and also indicates A possible explanation for this is that, while the 
personality of openness on its own does not necessarily mean that an 
individual is more or less likely to violate security protocol, individuals with 
different personalities also interact differently with the same situational factor 
[104], thereby suggesting that personality/security scenario should be 
evaluated on individual levels. 
 In terms of the neutralisation techniques, the results also indicate the 
importance of personal norm and individual rationale on the compliant 
security model. The results show that two of the neutralisation techniques; 
‘Denial of responsibility’ H2a (p<0.05) and Denial of injury’ H2b (p<0.01) have 
weak negative effects on the compliant security model. This is consistent with 
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other studies [10], suggesting that the neutralisation construct in this study 
indicates possible employee compliance violation intentions. Again, the 
‘blaming the victim’ technique H2c is not supported in this study. The possible 
explanation for it is that while some employees may try to neutralise non-
compliant behaviour, it is also possible that the employees could view 
themselves not to be at fault at all [230].  
 In terms of security culture, this study emphasises the important role 
of security culture in the management of organisation security compliance 
programs. The study shows a strong positive effect of significant impact on the 
compliant security model; thereby supporting H3a (p<0.01). An organisation 
with a strong security culture is more likely to have a sustainable ISA program. 
This result is consistent with previous studies [231],[121] on the persuasion 
and improvement of employee security  compliance that can be achieved due 
to strong organisation security culture. 
 The findings in this study support most of the hypotheses. Hence, the 
conclusion is that in response to research question 1, security by compliance 
is not adequate for organisation security management because of the variation 
in individual personality traits. Similarly, employees sometimes internalise 
elements of the neutralization techniques to justify non-compliant behaviour. 
Therefore, security managers should consider the links between personality 
types and personal norms as part of risk management, to determine if they 
strengthen or constrain the compliance security model. 
 Conclusion 
Human factors continue to represent the gap between processes and 
technology, and there is no difference between malicious intent, negligence or 
external attacks regarding diminishing IT functions. There is no guarantee that 
employees will comply with policy requirements and there is insufficient 
understanding of the risks posed by users of information assets when 
behaviour variation is narrowed down to individuality.  
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Organisations can implement the most stringent security policies, but 
performance is mostly down to users. Cybercriminals would rather target 
authorised users who already sits within an organisation, than having a crack 
at multiple layers of external facing firewalls. That is why Organisations 
continue to device measures and other discipline mechanisms in order to 
deter non-compliant security behaviour. Unfortunately, the anticipated 
objectives in this respect are not always attained. Deterrent actions, through 
reward or punishment, has been shown to fail in organisations. Again, contrary 
to perfect rational assumption, punishing employees for accidental misuse or 
negligence may yield negative consequences. Besides, it is impractical, time-
consuming and expensive to monitor employees continuously in order to 
enforce or deter certain behaviours. Without a grounded insight into the 
understanding of employees’ motivation, deterrent measures as a means to 
address insider threat may not necessarily work.  
 Although this study is qualified by some limitations, the result 
highlights the importance of personality traits and neutralisation techniques 
in the design of organisational security policies. It is shown that, with respect 
to employee’s personality dimension and security scenario effect, Low sense 
of sanction severity (LSS) and Low sense of response efficacy (LRE) negatively 
affects compliant security model. Similarly, in the context of neutralization 
technique, we show that Denial of Responsibility (DR) and Denial of Injury (DI) 
negatively affects compliant security model. However, for both personality 
trait and neutralization technique, the results have not been able to support 
the hypothesized negative relationship for a Low sense of sanction severity 
(LSS) and Blaming the Victim (BV) respectively. Nonetheless, it has been 
shown in this chapter that individual attributes and norms can influence the 
intention to comply with cybersecurity policies. Therefore, when 
organisations develop policies, the security awareness need of each employee 
should be factored into customized training programs. It is believed that this 
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 SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
APPROACH TO MALICIOUS 
INSIDER CYBER-THREAT 
MODELLING AND ANALYSIS 
“Cyber-Security is much more than a matter of IT.”  
-Stephane Nappo 
 
Part of this chapter has been published in Fagade, T., Spyridopoulos, T., Albishry, 
N. and Tryfonas, T. (2017) ‘System Dynamics Approach to Malicious Insider 
Cyber-Threat Modelling and Analysis’, in Tryfonas T. (ed.) Human Aspects of 
Information Security, Privacy and Trust. HAS 2017, Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, Springer, Cham, pp. 309–321. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-58460-7_21. The 
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 Introduction 
The high complexity of information systems along with the socio-technical 
nature of insider threats require a robust mechanism that can fuse numerous 
detector alerts, to establish and analyse patterns as a precursor to threats [3]. 
This is particularly important because when activities are performed to 
varying degrees by both benign and malicious insiders, the accuracy of isolated 
detector alert becomes uncertain.  As explained in the previous chapters (4 
and 5), the most significant challenge to organisations security efforts are the 
employees, and predicting human behaviour is a hard problem. It is shown 
that compliant security also falls short of providing a complete solution to this 
challenging problem because employees rationalise their behaviour 
differently. Even, Standards expect employees to behave within a certain 
frame of reference, which is not always the case, especially for determined 
malicious employees. Therefore, addressing malicious insider cyber-threat 
requires a more dynamic approach for analysing patterns as a precursor to 
threat, perhaps, a holistic, interdisciplinary approach that blends 
technological, psychological and organisational elements of the insider threat 
problem is required [232].  Following the literature review in chapter 2 and 
the gaps identified therein, this problem space is addressed in the current 
study through the application of system dynamics model. 
6.1.1 Why System Dynamic Models?  
Literature shows that security safety failure of any kind is mostly preceded by 
certain indicators [3]. For instance, the publicised software time bomb 
incident at Omega Engineering. A resentful employee of Omega intentionally 
destroyed the company’s NetWare computer network, costing irreparable 
damage worth millions of dollars. The incident was said to have been preceded 
by many indications that the malicious insider intended to attack [233]. Hence, 
a system that can recognise and analyse the pattern of these indicators are 
necessary. The challenge, however, is that to have a system or a model of this 
nature, a modeller needs data. It is common knowledge how difficult it is to 
obtain real information about security breaches, including methodologies and 
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effect of attacks. This is why scholars continue to argue for the need to make 
cyber-attacks public, and that secrecy only aids the attackers [234]. However, 
system dynamic models can overcome cybersecurity data challenges because, 
rather than incident specific data about security breaches, the model 
aggregates data stocks and flow in quite an abstractive nature [3]. System 
Dynamics Modelling can be used to link the hypothesized structure with the 
observed behaviour of systems over a period of time, thereby allowing 
feedback to uncover certain types of endogenous phenomena [235]. The 
model is particularly useful for identifying causal structures leading up to 
attacks without necessarily having access to real cyber incident data [3]. This 
study, therefore, applies system dynamics modelling to understand the 
interrelationships between three distinct indicators of malicious insider 
activities, in order to determine the possibility of a security breach through 
developing trends and patterns. Risk indicators from different domains are 
aggregated as a precursor to a security breach, based on how the indicators 
influence one another.  
 The study combines the observable behaviour of actors based on the 
well-established theory of planned behaviour; technical footprints from 
incident log information and personality traits, based on the ‘Big Five’ 
personality model [104]; to demonstrates how system dynamics as a risk 
modelling approach can flag early signs of malicious insider threats, by 
aggregating the associative properties of different risk elements. The structure 
of this chapter is as follows; an overview of the model interconnected risk 
domains is presented in section 6.2. The methodology and simulation 
environment including model assumptions, analysis and results are presented 
in section 6.3, while section 6.4 covers the conclusion and discussion on future 
work extension. 
 Overview of model interconnected risk domains 
For the purpose of this work, the model of malicious insider detection takes 
into account the personality, the behavioural and the technical risk indicators. 
Simulating multiple indicators of risk, based on the activities of an employee 
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illustrates a broader implication for a holistic information security 
management. Insider threat detection requires proactive analysis of multiple 
trigger factors far beyond network analysis alone. Hence, the idea of 
interconnected domains approach is based on the notion that different 
elements of risks are inextricably linked, therefore making each contributing 
factor a function of the malicious insider problem. 
6.2.1 Personality Risk Indicators 
Although personality traits are relatively stable through individuals’ lifetimes, 
the ability to establish a statistically significant relationship between various 
personality profiles can provide guidelines for implementing security 
protocols that meet individual needs in a diverse workforce [104]. There are 
different ways of assessing personality types based on the five-psychological 
construct of Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness and 
Narcissism (OCEAN). Some methods involve the use of measurement 
instruments like survey questionnaire and the NEO PI-R test [117]. However, 
people also reveal certain attributes through social media platforms, relating 
to psychosocial states like anxiety, debt, adjustment disorder and medical 
conditions, from which psychosocial risk factors could be drawn. For instance, 
by using the publicly available information on Twitter alone, it is possible to 
predict personality trait to within 11% [236], because certain words tend to 
be repeatedly used, leading to a pattern that can be correlated with a specific 
personality trait. Also, some studies [237] added that, through category-based 
textual analysis of browsing behaviour and webpage content, the Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) dictionary method could be applied to 
linguistically group and link some terms, from which personality traits can be 
profiled.   
 Other work claims that employees do not only transfer offline 
behaviour to online social network platforms, but there is also evidence to 
suggest a connection between the excessive use of social media and narcissist 
personality trait [238]–[240]. For instance, self-promoting contents combined 
with a high level of online activities are also strongly correlated with low self-
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esteem, malevolent system use, narcissist personality and delinquent 
behaviour [241]. The personality trait of Openness is linked to being 
susceptible to phishing, while narcissism, agreeableness and excitement 
seeking is linked to insider threat and antisocial behaviour  [121], [237]. 
Furthermore, the work described in  [104] suggest that personality is a direct 
determinant of intention, individuals with different personality traits are more 
likely to react differently to the same security scenario, threats and 
organisation sanctions based on their perception of deterrence, protection 
motivation or efficacy factors. Therefore, when the ‘Big 5’ personality traits are 
treated as the moderating factor to security scenario effect (efficacy factors), 
they can reveal how likely it is for an individual to violate security protocol, as 
shown in Table 6.1. 
 
Individuals who are less likely to violate 
cybersecurity protocol  
Individuals who are more likely to violate 
cybersecurity protocol  
• Open individuals with a low sense of 
Self-Efficacy 
• Open individuals with a low sense of 
Threat Severity 
• Open individuals with a low sense of 
Response Cost 
• Conscientious individuals with a low 
sense of Threat Severity 
• Extroverted individuals with a low 
sense of Sanction Severity 
• Agreeable individuals with a low sense 
of Self-Efficacy 
• Agreeable individuals with a low sense 
of Sanction Severity 
• Neurotic individuals with a low sense of 
Self-Efficacy 
 
• Open individuals in general 
 
• Open individuals with a low sense of 
Sanction Severity 
• Conscientious individuals with a low sense 
of Response Efficacy 
• Extroverted individuals with a low sense of 
Threat Severity 
• Extroverted individuals with a low sense of 
Threat Vulnerability 
• Extroverted individuals with a low sense of 
Response Cost 
• Agreeable individuals with a low sense of 
Sanction Certainty 
• Neurotic individuals with a low sense of 
Sanction Certainty 
Table 6.1. The Big Five personality traits and security scenario effects (McBride, 2012) 
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Figure 6.2. Cybersecurity risk increases due to personality traits under specified 
conditions 
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In order to dynamically model the effect of personality on efficacy factor 
conditions and security protocol violation, consider the generic personality 
model shown in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2, developed from the personality types 
described in [104]. It can be seen from Figure 6.1 that an individual with 
‘Extraversion’ personality trait, but with a low sense of sanction severity, is 
less likely to violate cybersecurity protocols than an individual with 
‘Openness’ personality trait and low sense of sanction severity shown in Figure 
6.2. Likewise, as shown in Figure 6.1, an individual with ‘Extraversion’ 
personality but with a low sense of threat severity, threat vulnerability or 
response cost is more likely to violate security protocols than an individual 
with ‘Conscientiousness’ personality trait with a low sense of threat severity 
or someone with ‘Openness’ personality trait with a low sense of response 
cost, shown in Figure 6.2. 
6.2.2 Behavioural Risk Indicators 
Theory of planned behaviour has its foundation on a number of constructs, and 
it helps us to understand the reason for the deliberate behaviour. It explains 
why it is hard to change how a malevolent insider perceives security protocols. 
Security managers may provide training, implement policies and guidelines 
but users may not necessarily comply, even when it is mandated. An important 
aspect of the theory of planned behaviour is that, given a degree of control over 
events, people are expected to carry out their behaviour. However, intentions 
can change on the emergence of new information [242]. Previous behaviour 
and actions of the malevolent user can help inform future actions, but the 
challenge is that behaviour could change if triggered by external events. Also, 
behaviour may not be readily quantifiable if there are irregular intervals 
between malicious activities or there are no prior established patterns.  
 Behavioural theories provide guidelines on how behaviour may 
manifest in different stages of an insider threat scenario through certain 
indicators. The theory of planned behaviour suggests that a person’s intention, 
perceived behaviour towards crime, subjective norms and attitude are key 
factors in predicting behaviour [106]. Pre-employment background checks, 
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360 profiler and other profiling mechanisms, may help to identify agents that 
constitute a behavioural risk, some of which may be unrelated to employment, 
like anxiety, breakup, depression, debt and medical conditions [243]. 
Psychological state is often evident in the way people behave, and behavioural 
risks can reflect through a variety of psychosocial risk indicators as shown in 
Table 6.2, describe in [135]. HR personnel are positioned to capture these 
behaviours and understand the severity, in terms of how the behaviours can 
undermine organization security efforts.  
 
Indicator  Description  
Disgruntlement  Employee observed to be dissatisfied with the current position, 
chronic indications of discontent.  
Accepting Feedback  The employee is observed to have a difficult time accepting 
criticism or becomes defensive when the message is delivered.  
Anger Management  
Issues  
The employee often allows anger to get pent up inside; the 
employee has trouble managing lingering emotional feelings of 
anger.  
Disengagement  The employee keeps to self, is detached, withdrawn and tends not 
to interact with individuals or groups.  
Disregard for Authority  The employee disregards rules, authority or policies  
Performance  The employee has received a corrective action that is based on 
poor performance.  
Stress  The employee appears to be under physical, mental, or emotional 
strain or tension that the employee has difficulty handling.  
Confrontational Behaviour  Employee exhibits argumentative or aggressive behaviour. 
Personal Issues  The employee has difficulty keeping personal issues separate and 
interfering with work.  
Self‐Centeredness  The employee disregards need or wishes of others, concerned 
primarily with own interests and welfare.    
Lack of Dependability  The employee is unworthy of trust; unable to keep commitments 
or promises.  
Absenteeism  The employee has exhibited chronic unexplained absenteeism. 
Table 6.2. Psychosocial risk indicators (Greitzer, 2010) 
Although, some risks may not directly link psychological behaviour to a 
criminal background but may help address the psychological factors required 
to form group homogeneity [131], [135]. Based on 23 cases of insider threat in 
the banking and finance sector, 33% is due to personal problems that are 
unrelated to employment, like breakup and anxiety; 23% is due to revenge,   
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27% is due to debt, and 81% is due to financial gains  [118]. In another report 
[96], based on a case study of 52 illicit cyber activities in the IT and 
Telecommunication sector; 33% is due intolerant to criticism, 57% involves 
disgruntled employees, 47% is revealed through overt behaviour, and 58% 
involves direct communication of threat online. Behaviour and external 
environmental influences can indicate early signs of cyber-security risks, as 
shown on the generic system dynamic diagram in Figure 6.3. The more 
individual exhibits one or more combinations of the behavioural risk elements, 
the more likely it is to violate cybersecurity protocols. Human resource staff 
are particularly well trained to apply observation techniques, recognize and 







6.2.3 Technical Risk Indicators 
There are six categories of critical log information that can be used to identify 
suspicious activities. These include authentication, system and data change, 
network activity, resource access, malware activity, failure and critical error 
logs. Security tools like SIEM/log analysis, data access monitoring, intrusion 
detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS) can be leveraged to provide 





































Figure 6.3. Cybersecurity risk increases due to individual’s behaviour or external 
influence with negative psychological effects 
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Changes to configuration file binaries, network assets authentication and 
authorization log reports can be tracked to monitor employee activities. For 
instance, different patterns of system usage based on defined attributes can be 
combined with log information, job roles and privileges to create a profile for 
a regular user in a particular role. If there is an irregular pattern in the log 
information for a particular user compared to the activity of a regular user for 
the same role, then, that may suggest potential insider activities. A case study 
of 52 cyber incidents [96] shows that 57% of incidents are detected through 
system irregularities; of which 73% involves remote access logs and 57% 
involves unauthorised file access logs. Based on another study [95] involving 
36 illicit cyber activity in the government sector, 24% of incidents are due to 
unauthorised privilege users, and 11% involves the installation of backdoors. 
Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 shows how technical risk may be influenced by 
the interplay of other variables like personality traits and behaviour. 
 Methodology and Simulation Environment 
6.3.1 Model Analysis 
System Dynamics can be used to link the hypothesized structure with the 
observed behaviour of systems over a period of time, thereby allowing 
feedback to uncover certain types of endogenous phenomena [235]. Ventana 
Systems Personal Learning Edition (Vensim PLE), a fully functional system 
dynamics software package, is used to conduct the simulation in this chapter. 
It is proposed that when behavioural, technical or personality risk, are 
considered in isolation, it may not be a true indication of the possible presence 
of a malicious insider. Irregular intervals between illicit cyber activities or 
inconsistent overt behaviour are difficult to apply independently as evidence 
of malicious insider. In order to prevent false positive triggers, each element 
of the risk indicators can be inextricably linked and modelled to draw more 
valid inferences. When risk factors are combined and observed as they change 
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over a period of time, developing patterns can provide significant confidence 
in identifying potential malicious insider.  
Consider the high-level abstractions for the conceptual model shown in Figure 
6.4. Organisations can define an employee’s ‘normal’ security profile based on 
different risk indicators, deterrence, protection motivation, efficacy factors 
and job roles. Employee activities are then monitored over a period of time e.g. 
monthly, based on combined data flow from three domain streams. Social 
network data can be leveraged to determine personality trait for a particular 
employee. This could be a contentious issue; however, we suggest that data 
from open social networks such as Twitter may be used legitimately and are 
made available by employees themselves. Human resource (HR) data provides 
input from constantly monitoring and analysing behavioural risk indicators 
for that employee, in addition to the employee’s psychological state (PS). 
Monitoring psychosocial behaviour is crucial because it could be exacerbated 
by external factors that are not necessarily related to an employee’s job. 
Likewise, incident log data obtained from the IT department is used to 
determine technical risk indicators.  
Figure 6.4. High-level abstraction of the insider threat modelling process 
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In order to determine the security status of an employee, inputs from the 
external environment that forms PS are combined with behavioural risk 
factors from HR. The output from this can be influenced by the personality of 
a user. Then, depending on the personality of an employee and the employee’s 
perception of deterrence, protection motivation and efficacy factors, the 
likelihood of a cyber-security protocol violation can be determined. For 
instance, people with ‘Narcissistic’ personality and low sense of sanction 
certainty are more likely to cause cyber leakage, espionage or delete critical 
system files, if associated PS and HR variables are true. Similarly, someone 
with ‘Agreeable’ personality with a low sense of sanction certainty is more 
likely to be susceptible to phishing, if associated PS and HR factors are 
triggered. 
6.3.2 Model Results and Discussion 
The dynamic relationship diagram in Figure 6.5 presents the stocks and flows 
that describes the dynamics between a person’s behaviour, personality and 
the probability of a cyber-security incident (data corruption or unauthorised 
access), based on the generic system dynamics diagrams provided in Figure 6.1, 
Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3. In particular, we consider behaviour as the combination 
of a person’s psychosocial state (PS), sculptured by external triggers (e.g. 
breakup or debt), with employee’s internal behaviour (e.g. intolerance to 
criticism or negative sentiments) as observed by the HR department. Negative 
internal behaviour combined with an unhealthy psychosocial state can 
increase the probability of a cyber-security incident. On the other hand, 
personality can play a twofold role; as shown in our generic model (Figure 6.1, 
and Figure 6.2) that depending on specific conditions (e.g. low sense of sanction 
severity or low sense of response cost), certain personality traits (e.g. 
Openness) can either increase or decrease the probability of a cyber-security 
incident (e.g. Malware). 
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In order to simplify the stocks and flows diagram for our model, an assumption 
is made that for the employee under consideration, apply the following 
conditions: “low sense of self-efficacy” and “low sense of threat severity”. 
Under these assumptions and according to our generic diagrams, 
‘Extraversion’ increases the probability of a cyber-security incident while 
‘Openness’, ‘Conscientiousness’, ‘Narcissism’ and ‘Agreeableness’ decreases it. 
These relationships are captured in Figure 6.5, where all personality traits 
except ‘Extraversion’ contribute to the decrease of the cyber-security incident 
risk. All variables in Figure 6.5 take values from 0 to 1. Figure 6.6 shows the 
probability of data corruption in time for different combinations. Before the 
experiment commenced, all personality traits are set to 1, and all internal 
behaviour and external psychosocial variables are set to 0. Then the following 
variables are changed: debt, intolerance to criticism, negative sentiments and 
O.C.A.N. (Openness, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness and Narcissism) and 




























Figure 6.5. Dynamic relationship between personality, behaviour and cyber-security 
incident 
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Figure 6.6. Probability of data corruption in time based on personality 
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As evident in [104], personality plays a vital role to cyber-security; the more 
open, conscientious, agreeable and not narcissist someone is, and depending 
on the associated deterrence, protection motivation and efficacy factors, the 
less likely it is to be involved in a cyber-security incident. However, as shown 
in Figure 6.7, keeping constant the personality traits may still result in different 
cyber-security risk levels caused by the effect of external inputs (in this case 
debt) on the employee’s psychosocial state. All experiments were made taking 
into account a particular set of conditions described in [104]. By changing 
these conditions and according to the description of our generic diagrams in 
Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3; changes in the personality would have 
different outcomes than the ones presented in Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6. 
 Conclusion 
This chapter describes a continuous feedback process for the detection of 
malicious insider cyber-threats, based on a system dynamics approach. Some 
of the critical challenges to combating insider threats are uncertainty, 
irregular behaviour, intervals between malicious activities and the exclusion 
of personality traits in the design of cyber-security protocols. Similarly, there 
is a distinct limitation to the application of technical measures alone in order 
to mitigate malicious insider threats.  
 This study seeks to gain an understanding of how the interplay 
between individual personality traits, inherent behaviour and external 
influences are directly linked to the violation of cyber-security protocols. It 
concludes that although personality traits differ between insiders, the 
motivation to violate or protect security protocols also varies for insiders with 
the same personality traits. Having the personality trait of one of the OCEAN 
elements does not make an individual more or less likely to violate security 
protocols, but the psychological states and the external episodic incident that 
triggers behavioural change can also contribute to the likelihood of acting 
maliciously. The argument is that personality and efficacy factor affect security 
violation, the effect of behaviour on security violation is also of equal 
importance. If there is an absence of detection capability for behavioural 
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changes or ‘anomaly’ digital footprints; it may actually suppress the threat 
detection capability that is based on personality traits alone.  This observation 
is in line with the studies in [245], which argues that personality-based 
approach to profiling individuals may be limited by the way people actually 
manifest different levels of personality, at different times and to a different 
degree depending on what they set to achieve. It is believed that a model which 
is not inhibited by a strictly unilateral approach can significantly improve 
cyber threat detection.  
 This chapter shows that through combined behavioural analysis (HR) 
and externally triggered psychological factors (PS), technical footprints (IT) 
and personality types (OCEAN), the design and implementation of appropriate 
cyber-security protocols, should be based on a full understanding of insider 
psychological and security profiles.  Similarly, providing generic cyber-
security training and awareness programs without a deep understanding of 
employees’ psychological statuses is merely a one-size-fits-all approach that 
rarely ensures compliance. Based on this insight and as part of the future 
research, this study serves as the basis for the design of a conceptual model for 
insider threat, discussed in chapter 7.
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 MALICIOUS INSIDER 
THREAT DETECTION: A 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL  
 “An accurate vision of digital and behavioural gaps is crucial for a 
consistent cyber-resilience.”  
-Stephane Nappo 
 
“Part of this chapter has been published in Fagade, T. and Tryfonas, T. (2017c) 
‘Malicious Insider Threat Detection: A Conceptual Model’, in Jaroslav Dockal, 
Milan Jirsa, and Josef Kaderka (eds) Security and Protection of Information 2017. 
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 Introduction 
This chapter builds on the study in chapter 6 where the dynamic flow of insider 
risk indicators from different risk domains was discussed. In light of this, the 
current study proposes a conceptual model of insider threat prediction. 
Therefore, the narrative of the prior and the literature review are still 
consistent with chapter 6 and unnecessary repetition will be avoided in this 
chapter.  
 This chapter offers a different perspective to address the insider 
problem by drawing concepts from behavioural theory, personality profiling 
and digital trails to develop a conceptual model of malicious insider threat 
detection. In line with relevant research output on why trusted employees 
with elevated access continue to pose security challenges to organisation risk 
mitigation efforts, it is suggested that malicious insiders show certain 
personality traits [104], leave behind digital footprints and observable cyber 
risk behaviour [135] in advance of an attack. Instead of isolated treatments, 
our approach considers the intersection of different risk domains and 
aggregates risk scores from each domain as a predictor of malicious insider 
activities. The conceptual model of a malicious insider detection system 
discussed here combines threat indicators from different inter-related 
domains in order to prevent cyber risk while lowering false-positive 
thresholds and background noises. The model is based on hypothesised risk 
indicators supported with evidence from academic literature and subject 
experts’ opinion. Concepts are drawn from the theory of planned behaviour, 
the ‘Big Five’ personality dimensions and technical anomaly detection, such 
that, different elements of threat that are inextricably linked from different 
domains are treated as a function of the malicious insider problem. The rest of 
this chapter is as follows; the background description of our conceptual model 
is presented in section 7.2. Method and preliminary design are covered in 
section 7.3, while section 7.4 covers the conclusion and future work. 
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 Background Description of the Conceptual Model 
An important consideration here is that due to the introductory and analytic 
modelling of this work, an in-depth analysis of the quantifying metrics and 
weighting factors assigned to each insider threat indicators are not covered. It 
should be noted that assigned weights are subjective and depend on the 
expertise of the human resources, data analytics, cybersecurity teams and the 
risk tolerance of each organisation. 
 
Table 7.1. Risk indicators 
In Table 7.1, weightings associated with the risk factors from different domains 
are provided, tables of risk indicators as shown are maintained by the 
administrator from each risk domain. In the case of technical and behavioural 
risk indicators, weighting values are assigned based on the alert status/count 
Personality Notation Security Scenario Effect Weight 
Openness O Low sense of sanction severity 0.35 
Conscientiousness C Low sense of response efficacy 0.21 
Extraversion E Low sense of threat severity, 
threat vulnerability and 
response cost 
0.45 
Agreeableness A Low sense of sanction certainty 0.25 
Narcissism N Low sense of sanction certainty 0.65 
Technical Notation Alert Status/Count Weight 
Unauthorised logins UL 1 0.28 
VPN/Remote logins VRL 2 0.36 
Unauthorised Software 
Installation 
USI 1 0.38 
File Deletion/Modification FDM 1 0.32 
Viruses/Malware VM 3 0.25 
Behaviour Notation Alert Status/Count Weight 
Destructive Behaviour DB 2 0.38 
Intolerance to Criticism IC 3 0.43 
Security Violation SV 2 0.32 
Drug and Alcohol Abuse DAA 3 0.45 
Isolation and Seclusion IS 4 0.28 
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associated with each risk element; while scenario effect parameters are the 
determinants of weighting values in the case of personality risk factor. For 
instance, in the technical risk domain, unlicensed/unauthorised software 
installation requires just a single count (one occurrence) and a weighting 
factor of 0.38, before that activity is recorded as a technical risk for a specific 
user. The rest of this section provides a brief description of each domain and 
risk factors considered for this work. 
7.2.1 Personality Risk Factors 
There are different methods and assessment tools like the Myers-Briggs Type 
Indicator (MBTI), Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R), survey 
questions and social media profiling that can be utilised to measure 
personality traits based on the ‘Big Five’ psychological construct of Openness, 
Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism (OCEAN). 
Although, personality trait is fairly stable throughout an individual’s lifetime, 
and it could be a key determinant of intentions [104], but studies also suggest 
that individuals with the same personality react differently to the same 
condition depending on associated security scenarios like self-efficacy, 
sanction severity, sanction certainty and response cost [116]. The personality 
risk factors aspect of this work is mainly based on the empirical studies 
conducted in [104], [116] and summarised in Table 7.1 by showing the cross-
level relationship that exists between personality types and security scenario 
effects. Weight is assigned to the personality and security scenario interaction 
based on how likely or not it is, for an individual to violate cybersecurity 
protocol, as described in table 2.4 (Chapter 2) and table 6.2 (Chapter6). 
7.2.2 Technical Risk Factors 
There are varieties of security tools [246]–[248] that can be deployed for 
network and host level assessment. Although most of these tools are based on 
the audit process that performs security checks against known vulnerabilities, 
they can also provide a snapshot of technical risk factors within an 
organisation. For instance, tools like the Security Information and Event 
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Management (SIEM)/log analysis and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can 
provide sufficient information on the changes to configuration file binaries, 
access authentication logs and other anomalies from which a logical 
connection can be drawn about a user’s activities [244]. This can allow system 
administrators to profile a normal user based on job roles and privileges, such 
that, if there is an irregular pattern in the log information for a particular user, 
compared to a typical user for the same role, then that may be an indication of 
potential malevolent insider activities. Table 7.1 shows some of the 
hypothesised cyber risks included in this model, indicating the alert status 
(count) for each situational risk factor and the corresponding weighting factor. 
7.2.3 Behavioural Risk Factors 
Although some behavioural risks like disgruntles, destructive behaviour and 
policy violations could be triggered by external factors which are unrelated to 
employment or criminal backgrounds like anxiety, breakup, depression and 
debt; but they may help address psychological factors required to form group 
homogeneity [131], [135]. Behaviour and external environmental influences 
can indicate early signs of cybersecurity risks, and the more individual exhibits 
one or more combinations of the behavioural risk elements, the more likely it 
is to violate cybersecurity protocols. Human resource staff are particularly 
well trained to apply observation techniques, recognise and report high 
scoring risk indicators as a predictor of anomalous behaviour. As with other 
risk factors, Table 7.1 shows the behavioural risk indicators, alerts status and 
associated weight factor considered for this study.  
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 Method and Preliminary Design 
The model considers different types of situational risk factors in an 
organisation, i.e. behavioural, personality and technical/system-level risk 
elements from three different domains; the human resource (H.R), personality 
profiling (P.P) and technical (I.T) domain respectively. In line with evidence 
from literature, this study is based on the premise that when technical risk 
factors are considered in isolation, the result is susceptible to false positives 
and cannot be a strong indication of malicious insider activities. However, 
when an agent is suspected of violating organisation security protocols, other 
situational risk factors can be aggregated to detect with increased accuracy, 
the pattern of activities that can characterise a malevolent insider. By using 
this approach, organisations can build employee profile and define a ‘normal’ 
risk threshold (R.T), based on threat indicators and the job role for that 
employee. To determine R.T, consider the high-level abstractions for the 
conceptual model shown in Figure 7.1. Data flow from the 3 domain streams are 
combined and processed for a single value output. Data from social network 
platforms, surveys, 360-degree profiler and other personality tests can be 
leveraged to obtain personality trait for an employee. Also, by continually 
monitoring and analysing behavioural risks and psychological state for that 
employee, the human resource (H.R) can provide data for a given time, 
indicating the behavioural risks for that employee. Similarly, incident log data 
obtained from the IT department can provide input for the employee technical 
risk indicators. These inputs can then be analysed to determine an acceptable 
R.T for that employee.  
 Employee activities are then monitored over a period, e.g. monthly, 
and risk score (R.S) is compared to a defined risk threshold (R.T). If there is a 
significant deviation from the ‘normal’ pattern in each time period, the system 
flag warning triggers which signify a risk status for that employee, then the 
employee could be placed under close supervision. Thereafter, the 
organisation can invoke a standard threat mitigating procedure. If the risk 
threshold is not matched or exceeded, risk status will not be triggered, and 
observation simply continues.  
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Figure 7.1. High-level abstraction of the insider threat modelling 
 
The key assumption in this model is how weighting values are assigned to risk 
elements of the threat indicators, as shown in Table 7.2. For instance, the 
personality traits from the ‘OCEAN’ construct and the security scenario 
associated with each of the ‘OCEAN’ risk elements are combined to obtain 
cross-level interactions for the intention to commit computer abuse, as 
described in [116]. Then a weighted value is assigned to each personality trait, 
based on the security risk associated with each personality type, as described 
in the previous section 7.2. This step is then repeated for behavioural and 
technical risk indicators, such that, risk elements (Re) from each risk domain 
have corresponding weights (ReW), as shown in Table 7.2. 
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Table 7.2. Risk Elements 
To determine the security risk status for an employee and decide if such an 
employee constitute insider risk to an organisation, consider the high-level 
algorithm for the malicious insider threat detection in Table 7.3. Firstly, 
organisations decide the value of R.T for an employee, which is the number 
corresponding to the acceptable risk baseline for that employee. Each of the 
risk domains, i.e. personality risk indicators (prisk-i), technical risk indicators 
(trisk-i) and behavioural risk indicators (brisk-i) have associated risk elements Re. 
The input to the model has combined Re from each of the prisk-i, brisk-i and trisk-i 
domains. However, each Re has associated and predetermined weighting 
factor ReW. Also, each employee has a state for a given period with respect to 
Re, such that; if the state of Re is TRUE, the corresponding value for ReW is 
returned. The output from the model is a numeric value R.S. For a given period, 
R.S is obtained by aggregating all the ReW for that employee. If R.S is greater or 
equal to the R.T that has been set for that employee, then it is assumed that 
insider threat activity is detected. Therefore, the employee is flagged for 
further investigation. Otherwise, routine monitoring would continue until 
there is a threat detection. 
  
Domain Risk Factors 
prisk-i Re O C E A N 
 ReW 0.35 0.21 0.45 0.25 0.65 
brisk-i Re DB IC SV DAA IS 
 ReW 0.38 0.43 0.32 0.45 0.28 
trisk-i Re UL VRL USI FDM VM 
 ReW 0.28 0.36 0.38 0.32 0.25 
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Algorithm  
Personality risk indicators = prisk-i 
Behavioural risk indicators = brisk-i 
Technical risk indicators = trisk-i 
Risk-threshold (R.T) = acceptable baseline allowed for an employee. 
Risk Score (R.S) 
Risk Elements = Re 
Risk Element Weights = ReW 
STEP 1: FOR each EMPLOYEE:  
There is an input (prisk-i, brisk-i, trisk-i ); 
There is an output (R.S); 
              To determine R.S for an EMPLOYEE: 
              Organisation decide values for R.T: 1.55 
              Make a list of all possible Re = {r1, r2, r3……..rn} 
              Make a list of corresponding ReW = {w1, w2, w3……wn} 
 
              There is a STATE = TRUE, FALSE (1, 0) 
              Such that, in each month:  
STEP 2:  FOR each employee risk assessment (prisk-i , brisk-i , trisk-i) 
IF the State for Re = 0 
 Return (NULL) 
IF the State for Re = 1 
 Return (ReW); 
R.S = ∑(ReW); 
IF R.S ≥ R.T 
Insider threat is detected; 
Flag employee as malicious; 
             ELSE IF R.S ≠ R.T 
Return to STEP 1; 
Table 7.3. High-Level Algorithm for the Malicious Insider Threat Detection 
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 Simulation Result and Discussion 
The preliminary simulation is done in MATLAB by using matrix tables for all 
true states of Re and corresponding ReW. Simulation output of our model is 
shown in Figure 7.2. As independent variables change over the 12-month period, 
the user risk profile is shown as the sum of the ReW from the three risk 
indicators that are associated with that user, for each time period.  
 
 
For illustrative purposes, the R.T for the employee under consideration is set 
at 1.55. In month 7, the user risk profile is above the R.T value of 1.55, set for 
that user; indicating that insider threat is detected, and the user is flagged as 
malicious. In month 7, personality trait ‘O’ is recorded for the user based on a 
chosen profiling method. HR records 3 or more counts of ‘DAA’, 2 or more 
counts of ‘DB’ and 4 or more counts of ‘IS’. Similarly, IT security record shows 
2 or more counts of ‘VRL’. By aggregating all the risk indicators and comparing 
R.S to the user’s R.T, it shows early warnings of malicious insider activities. 
Crucially though, treating each of the threat indicators in isolation is not 
enough to trigger the user as malicious, even though there may be false 
positive indicators in some cases. Consider month 11, HR brisk-i record for the 
same user has a risk indicator value of 1.11; this value is quite a negligible 
Figure 7.2. Simulation output showing how to detect malicious insider 
activities from multiple risk indicators 
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difference to the record for month 7, which has a brisk-i value of 1.09. However, 
the IT trisk-i recorded in month 11 has a risk indicator value of zero, this is 
significantly different from the record for month 7, which has a risk indicator 
value of 0.36. The prisk-i for month 11 and month 7 is also similar, at risk 
indicator values of 0.25 and 0.35 respectively. Therefore, if the user is assessed 
based on brisk-i alone, activities for month 7 and 11 would be flagged, which 
could trigger a false positive alert. However, combining all threat indicators 
from different domains shows a significant difference in the user’s activities 
for both months, and only the activity of month 7 exceeds R.T. 
 The result from this model relates to the second research question on 
the importance of risk aggregation from unrelated domains in order to 
safeguard against cyber risk protocol violations. Importantly too, the model 
also complements the attributes of the system dynamics model discussed in 
Chapter 5. Thereby, suggesting that all the associative properties of employee 
behaviour discussed therein are required for malicious insider activities 
detection. This result also challenges the study in [104], in the sense that 
personality traits of individuals and efficacy factors alone are not strong 
enough for a conclusive and categorical prediction of employees’ violation of 
security protocol. This assertion is also supported by the study in [245], which 
argues that individuals can manifest different personalities to a different 
degree depending on what is at stake. This study, therefore, concludes that risk 
aggregation from a wider domain, including what is proposed in [104] is a 
better approach to insider threat detection. 
 Conclusion 
The starting point for managing organisation risk is the insider threat 
assessment, upon which management can build extra layers of controls like 
policy guidelines, awareness training and technical security solutions. 
Behaviour analytics is just one more tool in the arsenal of security analysts that 
can be deployed to support policies with the aim to get more secure. Taking 
something basic like web surfing as an example, if an organisation has a policy 
that banned employees from visiting certain websites sites during business 
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hours and those sites are not blocked; then the employees have to be trusted 
not to violate that policy. In order to ensure that employees adhere to the 
policy, it must be enforced; because a policy that can’t be enforced is just a 
piece of paper. The enforcement is more likely to be in the form of technical 
tools observable from the IT perspective. The policy, however, gives the 
administrative control that is observable from the HR perspective. Policies can 
then be enforced based on individual employee risk profile supported by 
detectable behavioural patterns that are obtained from both IT and HR. 
Employees don’t just turn up to do bad things; they also don’t suddenly 
become security conscious either, most of the time, employee behaviour 
reflects what they do when not at work. It is the organisation’s responsibility 
to ensure that businesses are protected from employees that intentionally or 
unintentionally violate security protocols. 
 This chapter proposes an approach that can get valuable insight into 
the activities of malicious insider so that organisations can have more 
information to draw inferences about insider actions during an investigation. 
This work describes an analytical model that considers risk elements from 
different risk domains, such that when each domain is treated in isolation, it 
may lead to insufficient evidence of malicious intent. However, when the 
intersection of different risk indicators is considered as a single block, it offers 
a considerable improvement in the possibility to detect an insider threat. The 
results in this chapter have been explained with reference to theories and past 
literature, and we suggest that future research examines the relationship and 
critical attributes that specifically link evidence of malicious intentions from 
technical log information, human behaviour and personality traits.  
 This model has significant implication for security professionals, to 
draw insight from inextricably linked risk domains within the context of 
cybersecurity management. However, substantial empirical work is still 
needed to evaluate the model in real-world cases, like banking organisations. 
Also, the model could be useful to order highly significant developing insider 
threats that require security analysts’ review and could also provide further 
insights into collective management of information security in organisations. 
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 INCENTIVES AND SECURITY 
INVESTMENT DECISIONS IN 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
“If you spend more on coffee than on IT security, you will be hacked. 
What’s more, you deserve to be hacked.”  
-White House Cybersecurity Advisor, Richard Clarke 
 
 
“This chapter has been published in Fagade, T., Maraslis, K. and Tryfonas, T. 
(2017) ‘Towards Effective Cybersecurity Resource Allocation: The Monte-
Carlo Predictive Modelling Approach’, International Journal of Critical 
Infrastructures, 13(2/3), p. 152. doi: 10.1504/IJCIS.2017.088235. The paper was 
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 Introduction 
The overall process of information security risk management is all-
encompassing, from risk identification to business impact and risk reduction 
decision [249]. Organisations invest in technical and procedural capabilities to 
ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information assets and 
sustain business continuity at all times. However, it is useful sometimes to 
express the cost of security as the economic activity function relative to the 
core business of an organisation, even, the key quantity of investment theory 
is expressed as a cost-benefit ratio of investment, regarding the production 
function and the amount of output per unit input  [250]. This is also applicable 
in the context of information security domain, where security investment 
models are built on parametric variables defined as inputs and outputs [154]. 
When information security system is evaluated from an economics 
perspective, it becomes apparent just how little metrics can be obtained from 
technical explanations to satisfy the questions of how “much should be 
allocated for security investment?” Or “What is the adequate level of security?” 
[251]; because optimal resource allocation for security is often affected by 
intrinsically uncertain variables, leading to disparities in resource allocation 
decisions.  
 In light of the literature review of the resource allocation problem 
discussed in chapter 2, this study explores how the Monte-Carlo simulation 
model can be applied to efficient cybersecurity resource allocation. It 
investigates how to make a business case for budgeting decisions within a 
conceptual enterprise/SMBs. Monte-Carlo simulations have been extensively 
used by risk analysts in various fields of study to make future risk estimations  
[252]. This is a popular method in different research domains like engineering, 
medicine, economics, biology and management finance [253]. It introduces 
randomness and simplifies computational complexity in the design, 
implementation and evaluation stages of theoretical models to estimate 
uncertainties [254]. Monte-Carlo simulation can perform quantitative risk 
analysis by assigning a probability distribution to uncertain parameters; and 
through random sampling of the distribution, it is possible to determine all 
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potential outcomes under those uncertainties  [137]. In this study, Monte-
Carlo simulation is applied to uncertain model variables like the impact cost of 
a breach to various information assets; in order to arrive at appropriate 
resource allocation in support of security investment decision for those assets.  
 The structure of the rest of this chapter is as follows; risk management 
overview is presented in section 8.2. The background description of our 
predictive modelling approach is covered in section 8.3. Model assumptions, 
scenario and methodology, are covered in section 8.4. Results and discussion 
are covered in section 8.5. Conclusion and future work implications are 
covered in section 8.6. 
 Risk Management Overview 
Information security risks are generally described under the broad 
categorisation of disaster or abuse. The top priority of chief information 
security officers (CISO) and management are to ensure continuous 
functionality of IT resources at critical levels of operations [255]. Risk 
management can be described as a systematic and logical approach to 
identifying, treating, analysing and monitoring risks in any process [256]. 
Managers benefit from risk management strategies because it has a direct 
bearing on how available resources are put to best use. Risk management is 
practised in both private and public sectors; including healthcare, government 
establishments, insurance, finance and investments. However, in the context 
of information security, risk management is about the protection of 
information assets. Information security risk management is defined [255] as 
the protection of information assets from a wide range of threats in order to 
ensure business continuity, manage business risk and maximise return on 
investment. Risk management within the context of an organisation involves 
the implementation of appropriate controls to mitigate, share, transfer, insure, 
accept and continually manage risks as set out in the ISO/IEC Standard [18]. 
The ISO/IEC2700 series of standards define best practices, baseline 
requirements and controls for information security management systems 
(ISMS), under the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) triad. In 
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addition, given that threat climate changes all the time, an essential element of 
the risk management cycle [256], is that the effectiveness of security controls 
be periodically reappraised by organisations. There are various reasons why 
an organisation may require some measures of security control against 
potential threats; these could stem from internal factors like corporate 
regulations and organisational policies or mandatory external influences like 
the data protection acts or compliance requirements of industry regulators 
[15]. Whatever the driver, it is apparent that risk management will involve 
some mitigation control investments and resource allocation decisions.  
 However, information security professionals often do not quantify 
and communicate risks effectively in order to attract the right level of resource 
allocation. Organisations may struggle to present a measure of accurate cost 
benefits of information security activities, primarily because, security 
investment results in loss prevention rather than profit margins [257]. Also, 
business executives often opt for compliant security, whereby, baseline 
requirements of standards like the ISO2700, NIST or other guidelines are 
implemented, then businesses operate under the assumption that compliance 
equates security. The costs associated with risk management range from 
personnel to hardware and software outgoings. Therefore, information 
security expenditure is a crucial resource allocation decision, yet little is 
known about the budgeting process used to ensure optimal investment in 
information security capabilities [258], or at best, the budgeting process is 
generally beclouded with ambiguities.  
 Traditionally, organisations use risk assessment model to determine 
the optimal allocation of resources to cyber capabilities. This approach is a 
flavour of risk-based regulation whereby firms determine their security 
investment based on risk assessment, potential losses and investment profile 
[259]. An organisation’s budgetary decision is then based on a risk scoring 
matrix and its threat tolerance, given the score value. Risk scoring matrix is 
calculated on the assumption that an event will happen given a probability of 
occurrence and impact or severity of security breaches. Information security 
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budget is then allocated based on the resultant estimated risk score. The risk 
scoring formula is given as: 
Risk = Probability(P)× Impact(I) 
The value of (P) and (I) for a given asset is assigned based on expert opinion, 
the statistics from reports, corporate level assessment or records from past 
events and the resultant single value represents the risk score for that 
particular asset. To suggest that the risk impact to information assets are 
subjective probability estimates is somewhat ambiguous and deterministic 
[148]. In practice, it is difficult to apply this calculation to real-world problems, 
in order to optimise resource allocation decisions. This approach raises the 
question of reliability [260], as risk predictions are misrepresented for 
effective mitigation. Information security risk and management is transitory; 
hence, the actual impact of risky events might not be an accurate reflection of 
the current deterministic estimation. 
 A Background Description of our Predictive Model 
8.3.1 Different Approaches to Resource Allocation Decision 
Processes 
When risk analysis is based on the traditional risk matrix approach, security 
assessors extrapolate that under certain assumptions, specific events would 
be true; while entirely discarding the possibility of least significant and 
extreme events as part of that extrapolation. 
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 Figure 8.1. High-level conceptual model diagram 
 
For organisations that base its threat tolerance on information security risk 
assessment, trying to guess the odd under so many uncertainties can only lead 
to erroneous results. The difficulty of this approach is further emphasised in 
[261], where it is stated that the efficient allocation of resources under the 
circumstance of uncertain risk and severity of breach cost is very hard. In 
order to explain how uncertainty affects security breach costs and resource 
allocation decision to mitigate those risks, this study presents a high-level and 
low-level conceptual enterprise scenario for a bank in Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.2 
respectively. 
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We assume that the bank only has five high-risk asset points that need to be 
safeguarded from security threats at all times. Also, stakeholders’ resource 
allocation decision is based on the severity of the breach of those assets and 
how it may impact banking operation. The reason for this assumption is to 
focus on only five hypothetical high-risk assets and to minimise the complexity 
of our simulation at this stage. For illustrative purposes, we consider DDoS 
mitigation system, personnel and third-party contractors, data backup and 
recovery system, incident response solution, and antivirus software as the key 
asset. 
  
Figure 8.2. Low-level conceptual model diagram showing key asset points 
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8.3.2 Deterministic Estimation of Security Breach Costs 
 
Table 8.1. Risk likelihood and severity 
This approach is based on the use of conventional risk assessment model to 
determine appropriate resource allocation. Deterministic point estimation is 
associated with random variability like a game of chance. In a roll of a die, 
probabilistically, there is a 1/6 chance that a certain number would come up, 
and it would have an interpretation given long-term frequency. 
Risk/vulnerability output based on five scale levels of very low, low, medium, 
high and very high also have the same element of chance, whereby risk ratings 
are assigned on a deterministic chance of occurrence. This is captured in Table 
8.1 showing the description of the likelihood and severity of risk for critical 
assets, especially in terms of financial impact. Likelihood of risk is ranked on 
the scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is rare or very low, and 5 is frequent or very high.  
Likelihood Description Frequency of Occurrences 
1 An incident is expected to occur in 
exceptional circumstances, e.g. once 
in 10 years 
Rare/Very Low 
2 An incident may occur at some point, 
e.g. once in 3 years 
Possible/Low 
3 An incident will occasionally recur, 
e.g. once in a year 
Probable/Medium 
4 An incident will occur in most 
circumstances, e.g. once every 4 
months 
Certain/High 
5 An incident is certain to occur in most 
circumstances, e.g. once every month 
Frequent/Very High 
Severity Description Example of Business Impact 
1 None:  no disruption of service Financial loss < £1000  
2 Minor Financial loss < £10, 000 
5 Moderate Financial loss < £100, 000 
10 Significant Financial loss < £1, 000 000 
15 High Financial loss > £1, 000 000 
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Similarly,  Table 8.2 shows the risk scoring matrix by taking into account the 
likelihood and severity value of each risk. Risk scoring is carried out by 
applying a simple multiplication process whereby the likelihood of risk is 
multiplied by the severity of that risk occurring. The risk rating is then applied 
after scoring each risk, by choosing the most appropriate definition under 
likelihood and the most appropriate definition under severity. This is achieved 
simply by looking up and matching the numbers on the risk matrix table to 
obtain the risk ratings. After the risk analysis phase, given an organisation risk 
threshold and the risk score number, security budget is then allocated for the 
countermeasures to mitigate risks in that context. The idea of risk assessment 
is to evaluate scenarios of security incidents and take proactive measure 
before it happens. Consider one of our scenario high-risk assets; a dedicated 
DDoS Mitigation System (DMS) that can deter DDoS attacks. How effective the 
DMS is to mitigate volumetric attacks may be uncertain, but it is unlikely that 
enterprise operations and vital computing resources will be subjected to 
complex layer 7 attacks, in order to ascertain if the defence mechanism is 
worthy of investment. Rather, it is more likely that historical data is used to 
assist with resource allocation decisions, but in the absence of data, 
estimations could be used. A risk analyst may make a statement that the 
probability of a successful attack without mitigation (the DMS) is three, and 
the impact cost is ($53,477).  
 However, when deterministic point estimate is used to score risk and 
model uncertainties; what that actually means is that based on the subjective 
estimates for each asset point, the total breach cost without security for all 
tangible and intangible assets in the enterprise will always be the sum of 
breach costs to each asset [260], as shown in Table 8.3. If it is certain that an 
expert’s deterministic estimate is 100% reliable, then the potential cost of a 
security breach should be fine. Hence resource allocation to mitigate those 
risks should correctly reflect the assessment.  
CHAPTER 8: TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING INCENTIVES AND SECURITY INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
IN INFORMATION SECURITY 
162 
    
 
 Table 8.2. Risk rating table 
In reality, security breach to some asset will cost less with insignificant impact 
while some may result in massive losses with catastrophic consequences. 
Therefore, resource allocation under uncertain risk-based assessment is 




Average annual cost of security breaches in the magnitude of $K/year 
Assets Security Incidents  C = Cost of breach 
DMS DDoS Attack  53,477 
Personnel & 3rd Party Malicious Insider  40,403 
Recovery System Data Loss  39,905 
Incidence Response Cyber Espionage  69,026 
Anti-Virus Software Malicious Code Infection  31,572 
  Total 234,383 
Table 8.3. Expert estimation of security breach costs 
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8.3.3 Probabilistic estimation of security breach costs  
In order to address the high-level of uncertainties associated with the 
deterministic approach, especially in view of increasing information assets; 
risk analysts can consider probabilistic estimation approach. Through Monte-
Carlo simulations, the probabilistic cost of a breach can be determined for each 
asset in a given scenario. The Monte-Carlo simulation works by sampling lots 
of scenarios from a probability distribution instead of static point estimates 
[137]. Probabilistic estimation assigns minimum and maximum cost 
boundaries for each security breach. The combined cost of all security 
breaches is then calculated as the total minimum and maximum cost of a 
security breach for each asset in order to project the total resource allocation 
for the enterprise. In that case, it is possible to establish absolute bounds for 
allocated resources to the entire enterprise. Monte-Carlo may not be able to 
tell with certainty the exact cost of a breach, but it can describe the probability 
of cost associated with security breaches, to aid resource allocation. In 
comparison to the deterministic approach, the probabilistic estimate is also 
based on random variables. However, each estimate follows a particular 
distribution, independent and unaffected by other variables. 
 Consider the deterministic cost of breach for the DMS as described in 
the previous subsection. Under probabilistic estimation approach, smearing 
out parameter can be used to suggest that in place of a fixed quantity like 
£53,477, the minimum value in of $30,000 and the maximum value of $65,000 
can be included in a distribution, as shown in Table 8.4 . Essentially, a fixed value 
is replaced with a probability distribution, which is an accurate representation 
of the state in the real world. Hence, the fixed quantity is now our most likely 
value, but it is not the only possible value in the distribution. The key to Monte-
Carlo simulation is that each variable is assigned a random value, and the total 
value is calculated thousands of times during the simulation. It, therefore, 
allows us to understand the risk that expectations may not match reality, and 
appropriate precautions can be taken [262]. It is difficult to compute values for 
multiple scenarios without some form of simulation [187], especially if 
multiple assets and security breach costs have to be factored in, as part of the 
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budgetary allocation process. Therefore, to reduce that complexity, the assets 
and scenario incidents considered for this study are limited to five. 
 
Assets Security Incidents 
The unit cost of a security breach without risk 
















20,000 40,403 50,000 




25,000 39,905 45,000 
Incident Response 
Solution 




15,000 31,572 37,000 
Total  123,000 234,383 272,000 
Table 8.4 Model simulation parameters 
 Methodology 
There are two underlying assumptions for this model:  
• Key information asset points are determined by an organisation CIO 
and the security team.  
• Minimum and maximum values of security breach costs are subject to 
expert elicitation, based on experience and previous security 
breach events. 
The work described in this chapter use some security breach cost parametric 
values obtained from verifiable information security breach reports. Model 
parameters are taken from the cost of a security breach report [263], and IT 
security risks special report series [264]. The study in [263]covered data 
breach cost and impact of 350 organisations around the globe. The study uses 
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activity-based costing (ABC) for data breach calculation which takes into 
account; direct cost, indirect cost and opportunity cost. It also takes into 
account a range of expenditure associated with organisation data breach 
detection, containment, response and remediation. The study in [264] covers 
corporate IT security risks survey of more than 5,500 companies in 26 
countries around the world. It covers IT threats and the cost of recovery when 
a security breach occurs. Values taken from both studies serve as input 
parameters for our simulation model as shown in Table 8.4. Error! Reference 
source not found.However, limitations of the costing methodology outlined 
in the studies are not validated nor described in this work.  
We identify uncertain deterministic security breach costs in our model and 
convert them into a range of values using a triangle distribution, as shown in 
Figure 8.3. For each breach cost estimate, given an asset, fixed values are 
replaced with a probability distribution. Triangular distribution used in this 
model is one of the most used probability distributions to elicit expert opinion, 
especially in the case of limited or absence of historical data [137]. It defines 
uncertain breach cost values as a minimum (Cmin), most-likely (Cml) and 
maximum (Cmax) range of values, for each asset in the model calculations. 
 This approach follows the model implemented in [168], whereby the 
(Cmin) and (Cmax) are held constant while the (Cml) is selected randomly from 
the distribution graph. (Cml) are non-negative random variables which follow 
Figure 8.3. Schema of the MC predictive model 
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a triangle distribution. For this simulation, MATLAB and Vose ModelRisk 
software [265] are utilised, both tools allow configurable simulations with a 
vast number of runs and can generate thousands of scenarios for each set of 
uncertain inputs. ModelRisk uses a mathematical model for input variables 
and triangle distribution function given as: 
𝒇(𝒙) =
𝟐(𝒙 − 𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒏)
(𝑪𝒎𝒍 − 𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒏)(𝑪𝒎𝒂𝒙 − 𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒏)




(𝑪𝒎𝒂𝒙 − 𝑪𝒎𝒍)(𝑪𝒎𝒂𝒙 − 𝑪𝒎𝒊𝒏)
    𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑪𝒎𝒍  ≤ 𝒙 ≤ 𝑪𝒎𝒂𝒙       
  
The simulated output is generated given the mathematical relationship with 
input variables, and the results provide predictive indicators to support 
decision-making processes. However, with Monte Carlo, input variables for the 
simulation model are uncertain, random and defined according to a 
probability distribution in order to capture and model those uncertainties. In 
this model, what happens is that thousands of scenarios are generated to 
reflect a probabilistic output for each uncertain input, according to triangle 
distribution, then, the resultant output values are computed thousands of 
times over again during the simulation. However, in order to obtain a 
convergence and more realistic values, a recommended run of 10000 
simulations is required, and 1000 iterations are the barest minimum 
acceptable [266]. We generate 50000 simulation runs; the model output is a 
probabilistic range of values and scenarios associated with security breach 
costs, as well as the probability distribution associated with those values. 
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 Simulation Result and Discussion 
Results of the Monte-Carlo simulation shown in Figure 8.4 add an extra 
dimension to the initial deterministic values. As the simulation begins, samples 
are taken from each of the security breach cost probability distribution. 
ModelRisk then computes the average random value at the end of each 
iteration. During the simulation, different scenarios are generated based on 
the frequency proportional to the probability of those scenarios occurring. 
 At the end of the simulation, the output histogram represents 50,000 
scenarios for security breach cost. The result of the simulation takes into 
account all uncertainties, and it is in the form of probability distribution 
similar to the input parameters. These distributions represent possible 
outcomes, rather than single point predicted outcome. 
 From the model result in Figure 8.4, it can be seen that the upper 5% 
and the lower 5% represents extreme cases that are ignored by the simulation 
output. From the parametric values in Table 8.4, it can be seen that the total 
resource allocation could be as low as $123K or as high as $272K, but the 
realistic chance of resource allocation nearing these extreme values is very 
Figure 8.4. Simulation result in ‘ModelRisk’ with cumulative overlay 
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unlikely. Hence the model ignored them. It can be seen that 90% of the 
simulation iterations fall under a value less than the upper bound estimated 
total values. Hence, we can say that 90% of the total allocation will meet our 
initial estimate. While this is not a guarantee, it allows us to adjust IT security 
budget to match the cost of potential breaches and also understand the risk 
that resource allocation may not meet initial estimates. 
Further analysis of the result in Figure 8.4 shows that given all the 
iteration of simulations, the absolute minimum value of $151.67 is much 
higher than the original deterministic lower bound value of $123k. Similarly, 
the absolute maximum probabilistic value of $255.15k after iteration is much 
lower than the deterministic value of $272k, with only 5% chance of the 
allocation going over the upper boundary.  
The most likely point estimate is around the value of $229k; from the location 
of the peak of the distribution, it can be seen that this value is somewhat more 
realistic than the deterministic value of 234,383. However, the cost of impact 
Figure 8.5. Simulation result in MATLAB showing values for Cmin and Cmax 
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could be significantly higher, possibly twice as high in terms of cumulative 
percentage or frequency distribution. 
 In an attempt to validate our model, the result is compared with 
another simulation in MATLAB shown in Figure 8.5, using the same input 
parametric values. The invariant that holds in both states of the models is that 
extreme values are ignored in the output of both simulations. While both 
models follow a similar distribution, it can be seen that not only did both 
simulations ignore lower and upper bound values, but also shows higher Cmin 
and lower Cmax than the deterministic values. This also confirms the 
correctness of the representation entities and the model behaviour. 
 Conclusion 
Many businesses have been obliterated as a direct consequence of security 
breach, leading to substantial economic impact and in most cases loss of 
intellectual assets to cybercriminals. In order to defend against cyber threats, 
organisations invest in countermeasures, to protect processes, people and 
information assets. However, deliberate evaluation of optimal resources for 
countermeasure investment is often hindered by intrinsic variables. This 
study explored how Monte-Carlo predictive simulation model can be used 
within the context of information technology to reduce these disparities. Using 
a conceptual enterprise as a case study and verifiable historical cost of security 
breaches as parametric values, our model shows why using conventional risk 
assessment approach as budgeting process can result in significant 
over/under allocation of resources for cyber capabilities.  
 In general, predictive models allow us to make more useful and less 
erroneous decisions. Making important decisions without diligent 
consideration of uncertainties in the budgeting process can lead to unrealistic 
values. Forecasting with accuracy, on how much damage a successful security 
breach can cause is a real challenge for risk managers, especially when 
multiple assets and associated threat exposure are considered. Again, three-
point estimates, for all assets tend to become unreliable as the complexity of 
asset classes in the model increases. Using probabilistic simulation, therefore, 
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simplifies the complexity of cost estimation processes. The application of 
Monte-Carlo simulation to security investment decision, in particular, allows 
us to visualise different probabilistic outcomes in view of what might go 
wrong; given best case, worst case and most likely case scenarios.  
 MC allows us to understand the outcome of scenarios and help to 
understand unexpected pattern without necessarily exposing information 
assets to real threats. The output of Monte-Carlo simulation is a range of values 
and risk assessor can derive confidence level from that range. It is expected 
that predictive models will enable management to make more effective 
decisions and be part of the analytical input for policy formation. If there is a 
sound understanding of what might go wrong, decision makers can utilise the 
model to implements appropriate risk mitigation strategies and budget 
allocation for security investment. This chapter will be expanded as part of 
future work to include resource allocation for different information assets. A 
model that breaks down security budgets into fragments for further allocation, 
such that, information assets with the highest frequency and impact of threat 



















































SECTION 3: CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
FOR FUTURE WORK 
In this section, the research findings of this work are presented along with the 
ideas for future work. 
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 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND 
FUTURE WORK 




This chapter sums up the thesis and presents the research contribution to the 
body of knowledge, especially the information security management research 
community. The work in this thesis covers exploratory studies, model 
developments and suggests alternative approaches to the management of 
information security problems. Some of the outputs from this research have 
been published in conferences and journals publication as indicated in the list 
of publications. Finally, this chapter concludes with the research implications 
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 Conclusion 
Following an extensive literature review of academic articles, this thesis 
identifies gaps in three specific areas of information security management for 
organisations. Th gaps identified suggests that there are some inadequacies in 
the current approach to risk management in the areas of compliant security, 
insider threat mitigation and resource allocation for security investment. The 
literature gaps have also lead to the research questions, to which this study 
have presented concepts and methodologies to answer each question.  
 The compliance-based solution for ISMS is conformity to security 
requirement, but it does not mean that an organisation is secured in the actual 
sense. The general notion of compliant security is that organisations can 
defend security adequacy through compliant consistency. For instance, in the 
event that an organization is security focused rather than compliance and a 
security breach occur; it is not as easy to justify the organisation's security 
efforts, regardless of whether the organization has a substantially more 
grounded security program set up. If compliance is evaluated against security, 
the assumption is that compliance is substantially less demanding to quantify, 
but easier to justify in the event of a security breach. This dynamic has led to a 
situation where many organisations opt for security through compliance, even 
if the heightened sense of security that compliance sometimes present may not 
be in the best interest of the organization at the long run. The prominent 
challenge to organisations’ compliance programs is the employees, whose 
malicious or inadvertent actions could lead to the violation of security 
protocols. 
 Malicious insider activities are difficult to lock down, given that 
insiders already reside behind organisations firewall. Insiders also constitute 
the most expensive form of security breach, and the trend is set to increase 
significantly, despite organisations spending a fortune on security tools and 
guidelines. In banking and financial organisations, the complexity of the 
operating environment is tied to critical information assets and business 
processes such that when adversaries carry out attacks, the effect often has a 
colossal impact on organisations in terms of the loss of time, capital gain, 
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human resources, reputation and competitive advantage. However, in line 
with previous literature on the connections between cybersecurity 
conventions, security protocols violation and how employees rationalise and 
defend security behaviour. The study examines how this knowledge can be 
explored to model and analyse a scenario for the prediction of malicious 
insider activities.  
 In terms of security budget, cybersecurity is one of the most 
significant difficulties confronting business organisations in the modern days. 
Although, when an organization operates on the small or medium scale, threat 
exposure is still imminent, it is comparatively easier to maintain and assign 
resources for information security investment. However, when IT budget is 
constrained, as organization scales up and the number of assets to be 
protected grows; there would be a point where a deliberate evaluation of 
information security investments will be needed to defend against the threats 
to information assets. Organisations invest in countermeasures to mitigate 
risk exposures and prevent events that could undermine the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of mission-critical systems. However, security 
resource allocation process is subjective and appeals to the risk appetite of key 
stakeholders in different ways. Therefore, optimal resource allocation to 
security is often affected by intrinsically uncertain variables that can lead to 
disparities in resource allocation decisions. This study explores how Monte-
Carlo predictive simulation model can be used within the context of 
information technology to reduce these disparities and aid security 
investment decisions, through a single block optimal resource allocation.  
 In conclusion, this study acknowledges that risk management is an 
ongoing game between security managers and adversaries who are either 
consciously or unwittingly violating security protocol. Through targeted 
training and information security culture, organisations can use policy-based 
segmentation to protect network infrastructure, such that policies 
dynamically control access. By starting with security policies, employees can 
be monitored for early signs of malicious activities through profiling, whereby 
individual users have different roles in different environmental context. 
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System users are part of organisations security problems and not necessarily 
the solution, as such; users should be given just the right level of access to 
perform their job roles. By using policy to define security and profile 
employees, then embedding security in organisation culture, users can only 
access the applications they are authorised to use, wherever they are, even if 
all the applications are bundled together in one place. If employees are profiled 
based on work schedules and authorised system interactions, and if the 
number of assets they can have access to is restricted to individual job 
functions. Then, organisations can limit the number of damages that can be 
caused by lateral movement, server exploitation, malware and so on. Even 
when employees can outstep their boundaries, the intention to violate security 
protocols can be captured when the variation (of risk indicators) from other 
domains are aggregated.  
 Findings 
The findings from chapter 4 and chapter 5 are the response to the research 
question 1. The study findings suggest that compliant security is not adequate 
as a holistic protection model for organisation information assets, primarily 
because of how employees rationalise security behaviour. While this is not a 
new discovery, the study shows that the problem is valid and it still exists. 
Importantly, the findings from both chapters 1 and 2 are that employees 
disregard the consequences of their behaviour either because of the effect of 
efficacy factors on personality traits or the effect of ‘Blaming the Victim’ and 
‘Denial of Injury’ on neutralization technique, as these effects are 
strong/significant on the intention to violate security protocol. This 
observation is also in line with the study in [267], which suggests that positive 
benefits are the primary consideration of employees that violate security 
protocols, rather than the negative consequences like sanctions. The piece of 
work discussed in response to the research questions one as follows: 
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▪ The application of quantitative analysis of survey data obtained from 
banking organisations to explore the viability of a compliant security 
model, as a regional case study (see in chapter 4). It also covers how 
relevant theories help explain the quantitative analysis of the survey 
data. 
▪ Extending the findings discussed in chapter 4 through the application 
of the Partial Least Square Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) to 
explain our results. The compliance survey data obtained from banking 
organisations and the application of neutralization theory to security 
scenarios are combined to form hypotheses on the effectiveness of 
compliance-based security (see chapter 5). 
The study in chapter 6 and 7 are the response to the research question 2. The 
study explores the risk factors that can be associated with personality traits, 
behaviour and digital footprints to explain how multiple risk factors can serve 
as a precursor to security protocol violation. It is apparent that risk factors 
aggregated from unrelated domains are better predictors of the intention to 
violate IS security policies rather than when these factors are considered in 
isolation. Although while previous studies may have already established that 
depending on security scenario effects, certain personality traits have the 
propensity to violate security protocol than others. However, the current 
study also shows that while that may be true, other factors are as important as 
individual personality. The argument is that, while personality traits are fairly 
stable throughout an individual’s lifetime, external factors that can trigger 
behavioural changes in individuals are equally important as personality 
profiling, in anticipation of a security violation. The piece of work discussed in 
response to the research questions two as follows: 
▪  System Dynamic approach to the modelling of malicious insider 
activities. The model input utilises risk indicators from different 
domains to dynamically analyse the interplay between different risk 
factors and show how those interplay can increase the chance of cyber-
security incidents in banking organisations (see chapter 6). 
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▪ The design of a conceptual model of malicious insider detection. The 
model aggregates the weighted values of different risk factors from 
unconnected domains and simulates the output using MATLAB. The 
result of the model can be used as part of the resources for managing 
organisation insider threat assessment. It can also be used to obtain 
insights about malicious insider activities to draw inference about 
insider action during security breach investigations (see chapter 7). 
Chapter 8 is the response to the research question 3. The economic impact of 
the cyber breach is huge, but lack of readily available data to quantify the 
potential losses associated with cyber-attacks also makes it difficult to allocate 
the right level of resources for risk mitigation efforts. This problem space is 
addressed through a model of a single block resource allocation. The piece of 
work discussed in response to the research questions three as follows: 
▪ The study applies a Monte-Carlo Simulation model for resource 
allocation and security investment. In particular, it shows how using 
“ModelRisk”, a risk analysis tool and a three-point probabilistic 
estimation of data breach costs, can simplify resource allocation for 
complex asset classes in an organisation (see chapter 8).  
 Contributions 
The gaps identified in the literature guided this study to construct three 
research questions. In order to answer the research questions, this study 
utilised the Standards Publications ISO/IEC 27001 and other human 
behavioural theories to explore the viability of compliance as a security model 
in banking organisations. In particular, the study links one research question 
to the other, such that, the problem of information security management is 
addressed at three sub-element levels. The study is, therefore, able to 
accentuate the need for the following: 
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▪ To understand the real value of compliance for organisations from the 
perspectives of information security. 
▪ A better understanding of how behavioural theories, criminology 
theories and personality dimensions can help manage security protocol 
violations in organisations. 
▪ A better understanding of the malicious insider problems through the 
aggregation of risk factors from unrelated domains. 
▪ A conceptual model for predicting malicious insider activities. 
▪ A model for reducing discrepancies in resource allocation for security 
investment decisions. 
Following the identified needs as itemised above, the study proceeds with the 
methodologies and model development that specifically addresses each need.  
 The study contributes to the body of knowledge and the research 
community by presenting different approaches to information security 
management in organisations while focusing on three sub-element areas. The 
research questions developed in this study and the specific contributions to 
knowledge as a consequence of that are summarised as follows: 
 
“Is security by compliance adequate for the protection of organization 
information assets?” 
▪ The study contributes to the research community by providing in-
depth analysis of the viability of compliant security. It is one of the first 
studies in the context of information security management for Nigeria 
banking organisation, as part of a sector case study. It evaluates 
employee security compliance against the widely adopted ISO/IEC 
27001 security standard and concludes that compliance often leads to 
a false or a heightened sense of security. The study then proposes how 
information security may be embedded into organisation security 
culture in that context. 
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“How can we profile malicious insiders by aggregating risk indicators from 
unrelated risk domains and safeguard security protocol violations?” 
▪ The study also contributes to the body of knowledge by building on 
relevant theories in psychology, criminology, economics and behaviour 
to present a conceptual model for the prediction of malicious insider 
activities, through the aggregation of risk indicators from different risk 
domains. In particular, it proposes a multi-domain approach model as 
a benchmark for malicious insider threat detection, by aggregating 
feedback from personality traits, behavioural changes and technical log 
information to simulate the behaviour of an insider. 
 
“How can we address the issue of misaligned incentives and improve 
resource allocation decisions for cybersecurity investments?” 
▪ The third research question encapsulates the first two because it is 
based on resource allocation to manage information security 
initiatives. The challenges of resource allocation for the protection of 
organisation cybersecurity initiative is underpinned by the uncertainty 
in the budgeting process and the lack of ability to forecast with any 
accuracy, the impact of security breaches. In response to the third 
research question, the study also contributes to knowledge by 
presenting a Monte-Carlo Simulation model in support of resource 
allocation decision for security investment. 
 Limitations 
It is important to reiterate that different elements in this study involve the use 
of models to explain our results. Models are important research tools that 
enable researchers to address complex real-world problems in abstraction; as 
such, even models that are based on poor data can be helpful to address 
phenomenon issues, if available data and expert judgement contribute to 
identifying important determinant structure [3]. The results of this study have 
shown that the models are reasonable and useful to explain behaviours and 
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processes, based on expert opinion, feedback from academic conferences and 
other stakeholders. Nonetheless, the work conducted in this thesis is not 
devoid of limitations. Some of the possible limitations identified are discussed 
as follows: 
▪ This study is able to develop a valid scale for compliant security 
construct. However, the relationship of this construct to security 
management in banking organisations cannot be empirically tested in 
a wider spread of banking organisations. Ths study is limited to few 
banks in the two major cities of Nigeria (Lagos and Abuja) and did not 
include other regions of the country. Further research may be required 
to make this construct functional and perhaps more representative by 
increasing the sample size of the study. Banks in other regions of the 
country need to be considered as part of a wider case study, and 
perhaps improves the robustness of the sample data. Nevertheless, 
literature review indicates that there is a need to investigate the 
inappropriateness of compliant security, as the sole means of security 
management in organisations. 
▪ The survey did not take other control variables into account like the 
size of the organization, age and education level of respondents which 
may lead to different statistical results when considered. Similarly, over 
40% of the survey respondents work in Operations department of the 
banks, the way these employees interact with information systems may 
not be representative of how employees from other departments 
interact with information systems. 
▪ In terms of other countries or sectors that are not banking or financial 
organisation specific, the research findings may not be generalisable, 
since compliance requirements and information security awareness 
varies across industries and sectors. The study may benefit from 
robustness by expanding the survey sample to include other non-
banking sectors like private enterprises, NGOs and government 
agencies. 
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▪ The proposed models in this research require further empirical 
evaluation to validate the applicability of the models to insider 
problems and resource allocation decisions. Simulations and models, in 
general, have some limitations because they could sometimes lead to 
false representations. Models often involve assumptions which may or 
may not invalidate the result; whereas, real-world scenarios involve 
systems of infinite complexities which may not match those 
assumptions. 
▪ Personality-based approach to profiling individuals may also have 
some limitations because depending on what people set to achieve, 
they can actually manifest different levels of personality, at different 
times and to a different degree [245]. Also, monitoring employees, 
especially when they are aware of being watched, they may become 
conscious of their actions, which may increase the stress level. In turn, 
this may trigger responses that could impact on security behaviour. 
 Directions for Future Work 
In the light of information security management for organisations, the 
motivation, identified literature gaps and the research questions have been 
presented; and this thesis is able to address each question through a series of 
approaches. However, there are still areas of possible contributions as part of 
the directions for future work, hence, future research is suggested to include 
the following: 
▪ More empirical studies are needed on the security by compliance model 
in organisations with the possibility of extending the study beyond 
banking organisations alone.  
▪ As part of future work for the compliant security, the plan is to expand 
and test the validity of the observations in this study and also, suggest 
ways to integrate human-centric technical procedure into compliant 
security model. 
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▪ Develop a framework for a customizable cybersecurity training that is 
fit for different types of personality risk attributes. 
▪ Application of the insider threat prediction model in a real-world 
enterprise environment and banking organisations, to empirically 
explore and further test the validity and sustainability of the model.  
▪ Expand the resource allocation model to include the breakdown of 
security budgets into fragments for further allocation; such that, 
information assets with the highest frequency and impact of threat 
events are allocated more resources than low impact events 
▪ A game theoretical approach to security investment decisions through 
experimental games whereby adversaries attack different organisation 
assets and defenders strategically chose from limited resources to 
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APPENDIX I: CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
It is necessary to clarify some terms, concepts and definitions used throughout 
this work as described in [7][8][57][45], and how the terms apply to 
information security risks within the scope of this thesis. 
Accountability: Security objective that generates a requirement for 
the action of an entity to be uniquely traced to that entity at the 
individual level. It supports intrusion detection and prevention, non-
repudiation, deterrence and fault isolation. 
Administrator: Individual who has administrative access to the 
account and manages a computer system or network. 
Assessment Method: This is one of the three types of action: examine, 
interview or test taken by assessors during an assessment in order to 
obtain evidence. 
Asset: General support systems and high impact programs including 
personnel, mission-critical systems, equipment, physical plant or 
logically related group of systems. 
Attack Attribution: The procedure or approach of determining, 
tracking and blaming the adversary that causes a cyber-attack or other 
security exploits. 
Attack: Any malicious action that attempts to compromise system 
activities or gain unauthorised access to information resources and 
system services. 
Availability: Protection of systems and data from intentional and 
accidental attempt to cause a denial of service, unauthorised deletion 
or unauthorised purposes. It is also about ensuring timely and reliable 
access to and use of information. 
Baseline Security: Minimum level of security controls required for 
safeguarding an IT system against the threat of integrity, confidentiality 
and availability protection. 
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Black Hat: computer Programmers (Hacker) who exploit system 
vulnerabilities for personal or financial gain. 
Business Continuity Plan (BCP): A document that describes a 
predetermined set of procedure, instructions and organisation plan of 
action to sustain any significant disruption to its mission/business 
functions. 
Business Impact Analysis (BIA): Analysis of enterprise information 
system requirements, interdependencies and processes used to 
characterise contingency requirements and priorities in the case of 
disruption of significant scale. 
Chief Information Security Officer (CISO): Organization official 
responsible for: 1) Providing advice to the head of the executive agency 
to ensure that information resources are managed and consistent with 
the requirements of legislation or industry Standards. 2) Develop, 
facilitate and maintain integrated information technology for the 
organisation. 
Confidentiality: Preserving authorised restriction to sensitive 
information from individuals, entities or processes while it is in storage, 
being processed or in transit. 
Control: Tools, processes, and measures put in place to reduce the 
impact of attack as a consequence of vulnerability exploitation.  
Countermeasures: Techniques, processes, devices, actions and other 
measures that reduce, prevent or eliminate the vulnerability of an 
information system. 
Critical Infrastructure: organisational or national assets (Physical and 
virtual) that are fundamental to its operations. 
Cyberattack: An offensive act against computer systems, networks, or 
infrastructure.  




    
Cyber Espionage: The practice and theft of confidential information 
from an individual or organisation.  
Cybersecurity: The discipline and practice of preventing and 
mitigating attacks on computer systems and networks.  
Cyberthreat: A potential threat targeting computer systems and 
technology, typically from the internet.  
Cyberwarfare:  Attack on computer systems, usually internet-based 
and perpetrated by the terrorist or political groups, or nation states to 
disrupt or destroy.  
Exposure: Vulnerability without risk mitigating control. 
Impact: The magnitude of harm that can occur as a consequence of 
unauthorised disclosure, modification, destruction of information or 
information system, and loss of availability. 
Information Security Policy: Aggregate of direction, practices, rules 
and regulations that describe how an organisation distributes, protects 
and manages information. 
Integrity: Ensuring systems remain operable throughout organisation 
life cycle by guarding against improper destruction and modification of 
information, including authentication and non-repudiation. 
IoT: Internet of Things. Generic term for internet-connected devices 
like smartphones, lights, thermostats, and sensors. 
Method: Process by which a threat agent attempts to exploit a 
vulnerability to accomplish a target.  
Motivation: The Internal reason a threat agent needs to attack.  
Objective: What the threat agent hopes to accomplish by the attack.  
Risk Assessment: Part of risk management framework which 
identifies, prioritises and estimates risk as well as determines the 
impact of adverse circumstances on an enterprise. 
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Risk Mitigation: The evaluation, prioritisation and implementation of 
appropriate risk-reducing control based on the recommendation of risk 
assessment processes. 
Risk: Information system-related security risks are the risks that arise 
from the loss of integrity, confidentiality and availability of information 
systems. It is a measure of the degree to which Information System is 
threatened based on the function of 1) the adverse impact of an event 
occurring and 2) the likelihood of the occurrence. 
Threat Agent: Any person or entity who either with noxiousness or 
coincidentally starts attacks, to exploit vulnerabilities to create a loss.  
Threat: Potential circumstances or event of an adverse impact on 
organisation, assets, individuals and operations as a result of 
unauthorised disclosure, destruction, access and modification of 
information, and denial of service. 
Vulnerability: Part of information security infrastructure that could 








    
APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
Security compliance Interview 
 
[University of Bristol Research Student] 
 
These interview questions are to provide insight into the study of security 
compliance in banking organisations. Information collected is solely for this 
study and all data obtained will be entirely anonymised. Therefore, no 
individual respondent will be identified by this study. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
 
Standard and Compliance Statements 
1) Can you please tell me about your organisation security structure 
and procedure? 
 
2) Can you describe your organisation security policy and 
guidelines? 
 
3) What will you consider as the major contributing factor to your 
organisation’s adoption of the ISO/IEC 27001 Standardisation? 
 
4) What are the factors that can improve security compliance in your 
organisation? 
 
5) What are the barriers to technical and procedural risk 





    






    
APPENDIX IV: SURVEY MEASUREMENT MODEL - A 
 
Survey Measurement Model Part A 
 









Information Security interferes with job productivity 
Hue et al. 
(2012) 
You can share your password with other people if you 
trust them.  
It is safe to open an email attachment if it is not in the 
spam/junk box 
You can use personal digital devices and removable 
storage on your organisation computers. 
You sometimes take official work home so that you 
can meet deadlines. 
You can download/install software on your work 
computer within the corporate network. 
You always lock your computer screen each time you 
leave your workstation 
Your organisation has information security policy, and 
you know where to locate a copy. 
Knowledge and 
Awareness 
Your organisation has provided security awareness and 









You know how to identify and report suspicious/actual 
security breaches. 
Information is permanently lost when files on hard 














    











    











    
APPENDIX VII: SURVEY MEASUREMENT MODEL - B 








My internet access privileges are restricted by 
my organisation. 





Security violations are severely punished by my 
organisation. 
LRE1 
My organisation security policy is not stringent, 
I can get away with security violations. 
LRE2 
You can use personal digital devices and 
removable storage on your organisation 
computers. 
LTV1 
I intend to use organisation internet for non-
work-related purposes 
LTV2 
There is a low change of being caught if I use 




You sometimes take official work home so 
that you can meet deadlines. 
Hue et al. 
(2012) 
Siponen et al. 
(2014) 
DR2 
It is Ok to violate security protocol if you don’t 
understand it. 
DI1 
You can share your password with other 
people if you trust them. 
DI2 
Work stress is too high, and security 
interferes with job productivity. 
BV1 
You can download/install software on your 
work computer within the corporate 
network. 
BV2 
If managers are worried about security, they 




You always lock your computer screen each 
time you leave your workstation. 
Survey 
Measurement 
Model Part A 
(Chapter 4) 
SC2 
It is safe to open an email attachment if it is 
not in the spam/junk box. 
KA1 
Your organisation has provided security 
awareness and training to all employees. 
KA2 
You know how to identify and report 
suspicious/actual security breaches.  
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APPENDIX X: THESIS TEMPLATE 
 
Thesis Template is downloaded from: 
https://www.scribd.com/document/294324944/csd-thesis-template-9th-
draft-docx 
 
 
 
 
